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It is widely accepted within the field of labor economics that centralization of 
collective bargaining leads to lower wage dispersion. But is it possible to change the 
wage structure through changes in the collective bargaining agreement and 
decentralization of the bargaining process? A unique opportunity to explore this 
question presented itself when changes were made to collective bargaining contracts in 
the public sector in Iceland.  
In the first chapter I look at the Icelandic labor market. The Icelandic labor force is 
often described as being flexible. But is it really? Using definitions of labor-market 
flexibility, I explore whether the Icelandic labor market can be classified as such and 
find that on most measures of flexibility the Icelandic labor market can be described as 
flexible.  
In the second chapter I explore the effects of the changes in the bargaining structure 
and decentralization in the public sector in Iceland on the wage structure. Did wage 
dispersion increase with decentralization, as theory would predict? I find that wage 
levels rose significantly, and that the wage structure for total wages did not change but 
that the dispersion of daytime wages increased. 
 In the third and final chapter I develop a model of collective bargaining as a two-stage 
process in the manner of Manning (1987). The resulting two-equation nonlinear 
structural model is then applied to the central government in Iceland in order to 
determine whether the collective bargaining structure changed along with the changes 
in the collective bargaining agreements. 
The decentralization of bargaining and the change in the collective bargaining 
agreements has changed the bargaining structure in the public sector in Iceland. I find 
that the unions have a greater bargaining power over employment than over wages, 
whereas their bargaining power over wages currently seems to be much greater for 
daytime wages than for total wages. Based on the means of the estimates of the 
bargaining power of unions over wages and employment, respectively, I can reject the 
monopoly union and right-to-manage bargaining models. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE ICELANDIC LABOR MARKET—IS IT REALLY FLEXIBLE? 
Abstract 
The Icelandic labor force is often described as being flexible. But is it really? Several 
studies have discussed the flexibility of labor markets and macroeconomic 
performance, such as those by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD; 1997, 2004), Solow (1998), Flanagan (1999), and Nickell 
(2003). These papers look at, for example, the strictness of labor market institutions as 
well as unions and bargaining structures. Other factors they examine include the 
general state of the economy and how wages and unemployment respond to changes in 
the labor market.  
The Icelandic wage-bargaining system is classified as centralized and coordinated, 
whereas the legal framework related to the labor market does not imply strictness. The 
country’s labor force participation rate is high, yet variable, and migration plays an 
important part; immigration occurs in times of robust economic growth, and 
outmigration occurs in times of downturn. The tax wedge on labor is relatively low 
and thus should not affect the decision to work. Furthermore, the unemployment rate 
is lower than in most other countries, and there is constant flow in and out of 
unemployment. Thus, on the most common measures of flexibility, the Icelandic labor 
market falls within the “flexible” category.  
1. Introduction 
Iceland is a small country with a population of 315,000 people; thus its labor market is 
quite small, at around 180,000 people in 2007 (Statistics Iceland). The Icelandic labor 
2 
market differs from others in that it has the highest labor market participation rate and 
the highest level of union density among the member countries of the OECD.  
In addition, Iceland’s per capita income is quite high, or fifth among the 30 OECD 
countries in 2006, measured using GDP per capita based on purchasing power parities 
(OECD, 2007a). This high level of income is partly due to the high labor force 
participation rate and to long work hours: the labor force participation rate is over 85% 
(OECD, 2007b), while average work hours exceed 40 per week (Statistics Iceland). 
Participants in the Icelandic labor market also retire at a later date than those in most 
other OECD countries.  
Trade union density in 2000 was 84%, and wage bargaining is generally centralized 
(OECD, 2004). In most cases wage bargaining takes place between the Icelandic 
Federation of Labor (ASI) and the Confederation of Icelandic Employers (SA). 
Iceland’s high unionization rate and the dominant role of labor unions there reflect a 
tradition of treating organized labor as the social equal of employers and government, 
a tradition shared by the other Nordic countries. Other factors, however, are also 
involved. Many contracts specify that priority in hiring must go to union members. 
The first priority clause (Icel: forgangsrettur) was established between the union 
Dagsbrun and the company Landsverslun during World War I, and was intended to 
prevent “free riders” from underbidding in times of unemployment, as they did not 
pay union fees or have to endure strikes. Iceland’s unions are mostly organized around 
sectors or skills, either for the whole country or through localized unions, as opposed 
to being organized by industry. This is similar to the systems found in the United 
Kingdom and Denmark. Also, many pension funds are organized around labor unions 
3 
(Snaevarr, 1993), and Icelandic law gives collective bargaining the legal status of law 
(Act No. 55/1980).  
The Icelandic labor force is often described as being flexible and is perceived to be 
much more flexible than the labor markets of the European Union (EU) member 
countries. For instance, the agenda for the Confederation of Icelandic Employers (SA) 
states: “SA stresses the maintenance of flexibility and agility in the Icelandic labor 
market” (SA, 2006). This flexibility is perhaps derived from the fact that the economy 
has historically been subject to large external shocks, mainly as a result of its dependence 
on the fishing industry. Although economists have not agreed on a simple definition of 
labor market flexibility, most indicators in Iceland point to flexibility.  
The question remains as to how flexible the Icelandic labor market is in terms of labor, 
on the one hand, and wages, on the other. The aim of the analysis in this chapter is to 
seek answers to these questions in order to throw light on the Icelandic labor market’s 
main characteristics.  
1.1. A flexible labor market 
In a perfectly flexible labor market, market forces work to ensure that there is low 
unemployment at all times and that labor moves to where it is needed. Thus, wages 
constantly change to maintain full employment. Several studies have discussed the 
flexibility of labor markets and macroeconomic performance, such as those by the 
OECD (1997, 2004), Solow (1998), Flanagan (1999), and Nickell (2003). 
Several indicators fall under the heading of flexibility. One is the strictness of a 
country’s labor market institutions, specifically, the system of laws that regulate the 
4 
labor market and the ease of hiring and firing; as well as taxes on labor, social 
security, and unemployment insurance; the system of education and training; and 
barriers to mobility. Unions and bargaining structures also fall under this heading. 
According to Nickell and Layard (1999), labor market institutions appear to have a 
strong relationship with unemployment. Any institution that reduces exogenous job 
separations, increases search effectiveness, reduces the level of benefits, or lowers the 
strength of workers is expected to lead to lower equilibrium unemployment. Labor 
market institutions that could be expected to increase growth rates are those that 
increase savings or human capital. 
One reason given for labor market regulation is to correct market failures, such as 
those related to job security, wage-setting, and job search. Increased job security could 
make workers more willing to participate in firm-specific training, thus enhancing 
productivity.  
Another item that influences flexibility is the general state of the economy, and with 
its low unemployment rate, the Icelandic economy has generally been robust. But 
labor market flexibility also refers to how wages and unemployment respond to 
changes in the labor market. Unions and bargaining structures play a large role in this 
respect. These items will be discussed in turn in this chapter.  
1.2. Sectors 
Looking at the evolution of the workforce share in different sectors of the economy, 
we see a development similar to that in most other industrialized countries, in which 
labor is moving away from the primary sector and into the service sector. 
5 
The main trend in Iceland has been away from fisheries and agriculture and into the 
service sector, as seen in Figure 1.1. In 1970 roughly 12% of the nation’s workforce 
worked in agriculture, and a similar portion, or 14%, was involved in the fisheries 
sector, fishing, and fish processing. Around 27% of the workforce worked in 
industries other than fish processing, and the remainder, or nearly half of the 
workforce, was employed in the service sector. Since then the share of the workforce 
involved in the primary sector, agriculture, fishing, and fish processing, has declined 
steadily, as has the share working in industry. Thus, the share of the workforce 
employed in the service sector has risen steadily. In 2005 the share of the workforce 
working in agriculture had declined to 2.4%, while 6.6% of the workforce worked in 
the fisheries sector. The decline is not as great in industry; still, its share of the 
workforce was 19.3% in 2005, down from 27% in 1970. However, the share of the 
workforce in the service sector had risen to 71.7% in 2005, up from 50% in 1970.  
The share of each sector in terms of manpower is similar in the other Nordic countries, 
as shown in Table 1.1. However, in Iceland a higher share of the population works in 
agriculture and fishing. On the other hand, a smaller share is employed in 
manufacturing in Iceland than in the other countries. 
1.3. Recent developments 
One of the main objectives of economic policy in Iceland after World War II and up to 
1990 was to ensure peace in the labor market as well as ample employment. Collective 
agreements with high wage increases were made, and shortly after, the government 
stepped in and devalued the national currency, the krona, in order to adjust real wages. 
This often led to high inflation rates, and as a result real wages have historically 
fluctuated widely. Furthermore, wage drift was the norm because of a chronic lack of 
6 
manpower. The last devaluation of the krona took place in 1993, and since 2001 the 
exchange rate has floated freely and, thus, the earlier norm has been abandoned.  
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 1.1. Division of labor force by industry. 
Man-years, percent of total. 
In 1990 the labor market partners entered into the National Pact Agreement (Icel: 
thjodarsattarsamningur), a unique contract intended to lower the inflation rate 
permanently. The partners agreed on low wage increases provided the economic 
environment remained favorable. The agreement stipulated certain trigger clauses: if 
items such as inflation and terms of trade exceeded a certain limit, the termination of 
the collective agreements was at risk, while the government agreed to do its share to 
ensure that the agreements would hold. Inflation declined rapidly, and the agreements 
were extended several times with either low, nominal wage increases or no increase. 
As can be seen in Figure 1.2, the agreements were signed during a period of stagnation 
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in the Icelandic economy, while inflation decreased significantly, as shown in Figure 
1.3. 
Table 1.1. Employment by industry, 2002. 
Percent of total. 
 
Source: Wolfl (2005) and Statistics Iceland 
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 1.2. Economic growth. 
Real annual changes in GDP, in percentages. 
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Agriculture and fishing 3.0   5.1   7.1   3.8   2.1   
Manufacturing 16.9   20.8   15.0   14.8   17.6   
Construction 6.3   6.2   7.9   6.9   5.5   
Trade 17.6   15.4   17.4   17.5   14.8   
Transport and communication 6.5   7.1   6.2   7.0   6.7   
Business services 13.4   13.0   12.7   11.9   15.4   
Other services 35.7   32.1   33.6   38.0   37.7   
Other 0.6   0.3   0.1   0.1   0.2   
Total 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
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Among other achievements of this contract was that it changed the attitude of the 
unions from demanding ever-larger nominal wage increases to focusing on real wage 
increases. Furthermore, the length of the contracts has increased substantially, from 1 
year or less to around 3 years. 
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 1.3. Inflation rate. 
Annual percentage changes in the consumer price index. 
Tripartite agreements, in which the government steps in to facilitate the signing of new 
agreements between labor unions and employers, have been the norm in recent years. 
As economic growth picked up in the second half of the 1990s, the negotiations again 
became more fragmented, although they were never very decentralized.  
2. The wage determination system 
Compared with other countries, the strictness of Iceland’s employment protection is 
very low. This section describes the legal framework in the Icelandic labor market and 
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the bargaining structure. It also discusses the main union and employer federations and 
shows the contents of the collective agreement that has the largest coverage. 
2.1. Laws and regulations regarding the labor market 
Laws and regulations that add directly to labor costs, such as mandatory sick pay, have 
little effect on unemployment, as wages appear to adjust to compensate. Furthermore, 
they do not seem to have any effect on productivity (Nickell and Layard, 1999). Rules 
and regulations aimed at employment protection, such as severance pay, tend to affect 
hiring and firing decisions. These tend to reduce short-term unemployment and 
lengthen long-term unemployment, by reducing the flow in and out of unemployment, 
as well as by affecting labor force participation rates, especially for women (Lazear, 
1990). 
Regulating minimum wages affects the labor market in two different ways. Minimum 
wages increase overall productivity, first, by eliminating low-paying and low-
productivity jobs, thereby increasing the probability of higher unemployment rates; 
and second, by reducing skill differentials, thereby reducing the incentive to invest in 
human capital. Empirically, the minimum wages in most countries seem to be set at 
such low levels that the effects are generally minimal (Nickell and Layard, 1999).  
Similar to those of the other Nordic countries and unlike those of many European 
countries and the United States, Icelandic law stipulates few rights concerning the 
labor market. Instead, the protection of employees in the labor market is stipulated 
through labor contracts. Thus, there are no laws on minimum wages, but because each 
contract stipulates the minimum wages under that contract, it is the equivalent of 
having minimum wages.  
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Iceland is not a member of the EU. It is, however, a member of the European 
Economic Area (EEA), which extends the four freedoms of the EU to Iceland, 
Norway, and Lichtenstein. Since the EEA was formed in 1994, Icelandic labor 
legislation and collective agreements have been altered in accordance with EU 
regulations and directives. The most notable changes relate to the protection of 
children and adolescents in employment and restrictions on maximum working hours 
(on average, 48 hours per week). Thus, the number of rules governing the Icelandic 
labor market has increased in recent years, either through legislation or through 
collective agreements. 
Rules for hiring and firing are much less restrictive in Iceland than in most other 
European countries. Most collective bargaining contracts stipulate 1–6 months’ notice, 
depending on tenure, and usually 3 months. Firing is generally done without awarding 
severance pay. To dismiss an employee, one must present him or her with a written 
notice before the end of the month prior to the notice taking effect (Juliusdottir, 1993). 
Shop stewards, pregnant women, and employees on parental leave enjoy greater 
protection from dismissal. Employers in the private labor market do not need to 
demonstrate reason for dismissal; however, the rules for dismissal in the public sector 
are more stringent. Severance-pay agreements are rare, except for high-ranking 
personnel, in both the private and the public sector and are bound in individual 
contracts. There are also no restrictions on part-time work. 
Iceland’s current system of parental leave took effect in 2003. In the event of the birth 
of a child the mother receives 3 months’ leave; the father receives another 3 months’ 
leave, and an additional 3 months can be used by either parent (Act No. 95/2000). 
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During the parental-leave period, the parent receives 80% of his or her former wages, 
up to a certain limit.  
Active labor market policies have been used in many countries to facilitate the move 
from unemployment to employment. With the historically low unemployment rate in 
Iceland, there is little demand for active labor market policies. However, public 
employment agencies, which list local jobs as well as those in other EEA countries, 
operate in each part of the country. They also offer assistance to job-seekers in the 
form of various kinds of instruction, such as computer courses, self-enhancement 
courses, and courses in operating heavy machinery, to name a few. 
The OECD estimated the strictness of employment protection for regular employment 
in its member countries as well as in a number of nonmember countries in 2008 
(Venn, 2009). The study looks at 21 items and gives each country a score depending 
on the strictness of its employment protection; higher values represent stricter 
regulations. The scores for each of the 21 items are combined into a single score on 
which countries can be ranked by strictness of employment protection. The total score 
is made up of three sub-indicators: protection of permanent workers against individual 
dismissal, regulation on temporary forms of employment, and specific requirements 
for collective dismissal. 
On overall strictness of employment protection for regular employment, the United 
States ranks number one with the least strictness, followed closely by Canada and the 
United Kingdom (see Table 1.2). On the other end of the scale are Portugal, 
Luxembourg, and Turkey. On this scale, Iceland ranks 11th with a score of 2.11, on a 
par with Hungary and below the OECD average of 2.23. Iceland ranks close to the 
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OECD average on protection of permanent workers against dismissal. It ranks below 
the OECD average for regulations on temporary work and above the OECD average 
when it comes to specific requirements for collective dismissal.  
Table 1.2. Employment protection indicator. 
Scored on a scale from 0 for least strict to 6 for most strict. Rank is from lowest to 
highest value. 
 
Source: Venn (2009) 
2.2. The bargaining system 
In the literature on the macroeconomic effects of collective bargaining structures, a 
distinction is usually made between centralization of bargaining, on the one hand, and 
coordination of bargaining, on the other (Aidt and Tzannakos, 2002). Whereas 
centralization describes the locus of the formal structure of bargaining, that is, in terms 
Score Rank Score Rank
Australia 1.38   5     Korea 2.13   13-14
Austria 2.41   18-19 Luxembourg 3.39   29     
Belgium 2.61   21     Mexico 3.23   28     
Canada 1.02   2     Netherlands 2.23   15     
Czech Republic 2.32   17     New Zealand 1.16   4     
Denmark 1.91   9     Norway 2.65   23     
Finland 2.29   16     Poland 2.41   18-19
France 2.90   25     Portugal 2.84   24     
Germany 2.63   22     Slovak Republic 2.13   13-14
Greece 2.97   26     Spain 3.11   27     
Hungary 2.11   11-12 Sweden 2.06   10     
Iceland 2.11   11-12 Switzerland 1.77   8     
Ireland 1.39   6     Turkey 3.46   30     
Italy 2.58   20     United Kingdom 1.09   3     
Japan 1.73   7     United States 0.85   1     
OECD average 2.23   -
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of bargaining at the national, industry or firm levels, coordination of bargaining 
focuses on the degree of consensus between the collective bargaining partners.  
As discussed in textbook economics, unions increase wage pressure and therefore 
increase unemployment. However, a centralized union will internalize the negative 
externalities of the wage-bargaining process, as wages are lifted above the competitive 
level, taking into consideration the welfare of all of its members in the economy. This 
relates to Calmfors and Driffill’s (1988) idea of the hump-shaped relationship between 
centralization of bargaining and macroeconomic outcome. 
There does not appear to be a strong link between economic performance and 
collective bargaining. The OECD (1997) found no significant relationship between 
most measures of economic performance and collective bargaining. Several studies 
done in the United States and the United Kingdom have found negative effects of 
unions on productivity and productivity growth. Cross-country growth regressions, on 
the other hand, reveal no evidence of union effects.  
The OECD (2004) defines centralization of bargaining on a scale from 1 to 5 as 
follows: 
1. Company- and plant-level predominant. 
2. Combination of industry- and company-/plant-level, with an important share of 
employees covered by company bargains. 
3. Industry-level predominant. 
4. Predominantly industrial bargaining, but also recurrent central-level 
agreements. 
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5. Central-level agreements of overriding importance. 
During a period in which the Icelandic economy is experiencing a downturn, central-
level agreements are the norm. However, during an upswing period it is more common 
to see a more fragmented bargaining environment, one closer to that of industrial 
bargaining. Thus, on this scale, Iceland would rate somewhere between 4 and 5. 
The OECD (2004) defines coordination on a scale from 1 to 5 as follows: 
1. Fragmented company/plant bargaining, little or no coordination by upper-level 
associations. 
2. Fragmented industry- and company-level bargaining, with little or no pattern-
setting. 
3. Industry-level bargaining with irregular pattern-setting and moderate 
coordination among major bargaining actors. 
4. a) Informal coordination of industry- and firm-level bargaining by (multiple) 
peak associations. 
4. b) Coordinated bargaining by peak confederations, including government-
sponsored negotiations (tripartite agreements, social pacts), or government 
imposition of wage schedules. 
4. c) Regular pattern-setting coupled with high union concentration and/or 
bargaining coordination by large firms. 
4. d) Government wage arbitration. 
5. a) Informal coordination of industry-level bargaining by an encompassing union 
confederation. 
5. b) Coordinated bargaining by peak confederations or government imposition of a 
wage schedule/freeze, with a peace obligation. 
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Here, again, Iceland rates somewhere between 4 and 5; 4b) and 4c) are most common, 
but 5 also takes place.  
Table 1.3. Trade union density, 2000. 
Percentage of the workforce who belong to a union. Rank is from highest to lowest 
value. 
 
Source: OECD, 2004 
The structure of the Icelandic collective bargaining system thus ranks high in terms of 
both centralization and coordination, more so during recessions than in boom periods. 
Bargaining occurs most often at the national or sometimes at the industry level, and 
there is generally a large degree of coordination among the collective bargaining 
partners. Although bargaining power is formally in the hands of individual unions, 
member unions generally give bargaining power either to the Icelandic Federation of 
Labor (ASI), to individual associations within ASI, or to a few large unions that join 
together and bargain with the Confederation of Icelandic Employers (SA) to make a 
% Rank % Rank
Australia 25    18    Korea 11    29    
Austria 37    8    Luxembourg  34    11    
Belgium  56    5    Mexico 18    24    
Canada 28    14    Netherlands  23    20    
Czech Republic 27    15    New Zealand 23    21    
Denmark  74    4    Norway  54    6    
Finland  76    3    Poland  15    27    
France  10    30    Portugal  24    19    
Germany  25    17    Slovak Republic 36    9    
Greece  27    16    Spain  15    26    
Hungary 20    23    Sweden  79    2    
Iceland  84    1    Switzerland 18    25    
Ireland  38    7    Turkey 33    12    
Italy  35    10    United Kingdom 31    13    
Japan 22    22    United States 13    28    
OECD OECD
    Unweighted average 34        Weighted average 21    
16 
general wage agreement, and the other unions follow suit, usually making a similar 
agreement.  
Trade union density in 2000 was 84% (Table 1.3), the highest among the OECD 
countries, followed by Sweden with 79% (OECD, 2004). Furthermore, the union 
density for women is higher than that for men in Iceland. Official figures on 
bargaining coverage do not exist, but have been estimated to be 95%, or almost 
complete coverage (Zoega and Herbertsson, 2005). 
2.2.1. Union federations 
The union movement is dominated by a few labor federations. The Icelandic 
Federation of Labor (ASI) was founded in 1916 and is by far the largest, with 94,000 
active members in 2004, while the estimated total number of active union members 
was 147,000 (Table 1.4). Private-sector employers are also represented by a bargaining 
organization, the Confederation of Icelandic Employers (SA), which represents about 
2,000 firms. SA was founded in 1999 with the merger of two confederations, the older 
of which dates from 1934. 
Employees in the public sector are represented by public-sector unions organized into 
three main federations, BSRB, KI, and BHM. The public sector is represented by the 
central government, which is by far the largest single employer in the country, and by 
the municipal governments. About 24% of employees in Iceland work in the public 
sector (Mosesdottir et al, 2006). 
The existence of large umbrella organizations for both workers and employers in the 
general labor market has made nationwide labor bargains possible, typically with the 
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active participation of the central government. Underlying this centralization of wage 
agreements, however, is a fragmented system of labor unions, as individual unions 
have the right to negotiate independently of the federations. The federation officially 
acts only on behalf of the unions, whereas agreements must be voted on within each 
union. Although the labor federations are large, individual labor unions are quite 
small, as their membership is often determined by both type of work and geographical 
location. As a result, there are over 200 separate unions operating in Iceland.  
Table 1.4. Active members of labor federations, 2004. 
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
When it comes to bargaining, ASI, individual associations, or some member unions of 
ASI bargain with SA and usually lead the negotiations and set the stage on which 
other agreements are based. In times of slow economic growth and increased 
unemployment, when expectations for higher purchasing power through wage 
negotiations are low, unions generally delegate the negotiation to the federation to 
which they belong, to ensure that of the possible wage increases, every member gets 
the same increase. On the other hand, when economic growth is on the rise and 
Estimate Number Percentage
Icelandic Federation of Labor (ASI) 93,562      63.5%
Federation of State and Municipal Employees (BSRB) 18,589      12.6%
Teachers’ Association of Iceland (KI) 8,623      5.9%
Association of Academics (BHM) 8,141      5.5%
Union of Icelandic Bank Employees (SIB) 3,850      2.6%
Icelandic Union of Foremen and Supervisors (VSSI) 2,317      1.6%
Apprentices’ Association of Iceland (INSI) 2,419      1.6%
Merchant Navy and Fishing Vessel Officers’ Guild (FFSI) 1,809      1.2%
Masons’ Association of Iceland 343      0.2%
Independent unions 7,587      5.2%
Total active members of labor unions 147,240      100.0%
18 
expectations are running high, unions may decide to negotiate on their own behalf, 
without the cooperation of other unions. Even though such negotiations sometimes 
become more fragmented, they remain synchronized, that is, the wage agreements in 
Iceland all cover the same period and all expire on approximately the same date. 
Negotiated wages and wage increases are always considered to be minimums. There is 
no upper limit to the wage or wage increase that union members can receive. Thus, 
actual wage increases can easily deviate from the negotiated minimum. The extension 
of contracts, however, is generally not practiced in Iceland. 
The Icelandic Federation of Labor (ASI) is divided into 5 countrywide associations and 
7 unions that have direct membership. In total 64 unions are members of ASI. The 5 
associations are (ASI, 2007) the following: 
• The Commercial Federation of Iceland (Landssamband islenskra 
verslunarmanna), with 32,000 members in 10 unions. 
• The Union of Icelandic Electrical Workers (Rafidnadarsamband Islands), with 
5,300 members in 10 unions. 
• The Federation of Skilled Construction Workers and Industrial Workers 
(Samidn), with 6,100 members in 9 unions. 
• The Icelandic Seamen’s Federation (Sjomannasamband Islands), with 3,000 
members in 5 unions. 
• The Federation of General and Special Workers (Starfsgreinasamband Islands), 
with 53,000 members in 24 unions.  
The Confederation of Icelandic Employers is divided into 8 associations (SA, 2008): 
• The Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners, (LIU).  
• Samorka—Icelandic Energy and Utilities. 
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• The Icelandic Travel Industry Association (SAF).  
• The Federation of Icelandic Electrical and Computer Employers (SART).  
• The Federation of Icelandic Fish-Processing Plants (SF). 
• The Association of Financial Institutions in Iceland (SFF).  
• The Federation of Icelandic Industries (SI). 
• The Federation of Trade and Services (SVTH).  
SA and its member associations include about 2,000 businesses. The organization 
employs about 50% of all salaried employees in the Icelandic labor market. 
2.2.2. Structure of collective bargaining contracts 
The structure of labor contracts varies according to union and employer, but certain 
items are common to most of them. They stipulate wages and wage increases during 
the term of the contract. The wages are generally considered minimum wages, 
allowing for wage drift and for wages paid in the private sector to be generally higher 
than the wages stipulated in the wage contract. The contracts also discuss working 
hours and breaks during working hours. The contracts define what constitutes 
overtime and payments for overtime, as well as holidays and paid vacation. Many 
contracts have priority clauses, as discussed earlier, while some stipulate when an 
employer is allowed to deviate from the contract. The contracts also discuss workplace 
conditions and insurance, such as accident insurance and sickness insurance; some 
even include life insurance. Some contracts discuss the tools needed for the job at 
hand, protective clothing, and so forth. Also, some specify the termination of work, 
conditions for termination, and advance notice. Increasingly, contracts discuss 
continuing education and financing of advanced degrees. Most contracts also discuss 
the general goal of the contract as viewed by the contracting parties. Trigger clauses 
for the contract are often included; for instance, if inflation exceeds a certain limit, the 
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contract might be terminated or parts of the contract might be eligible for review, 
especially the chapter on wages and wage increases. 
2.2.3. Individual chapters of a general contract 
The main contract made in 2004, the one on which most other agreements in the 
private market are based, is used here as an example of a collective agreement 
(Collective Bargaining Agreement between SA and Efling, Hlif and VSFK, 2004). 
The agreement was in effect from March 1, 2004, to December 31, 2007; is 150 pages 
long; and is divided into 26 chapters with appendices.  
When a new collective bargaining agreement is signed, the new contract stipulates 
only the changes from the old, underlying contract; thus, it is only a few pages in 
length. A new contract was signed on February 17, 2008, and is valid through 
November 30, 2010 (Collective Bargaining Agreement between Efling, Hlif, VSFK 
and Bodinn and SA, 2008). It stipulates changes from the previous contract and totals 
almost 40 pages.  
The chapters of the original contract will be discussed in turn. The first fourteen 
chapters of this, the most common collective bargaining agreement in the private 
sector in Iceland, are general in nature. 
Chapter 1. On wages. The first chapter stipulates the wage schedule of monthly wages 
for daytime work. It specifies the wage for each wage category and increases due to 
seniority. This is followed by a definition of jobs that fall into each wage category. 
The chapter also shows the agreed-upon wage increases during the life of the contract, 
as well as other agreed-upon changes during the contract term. Wage increases usually 
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take place at the signing of a new contract and at the beginning of each calendar year 
until the contract expires. This chapter contains a section on minimum wages during 
the contract term. It also stipulates when an employer should sign an individual hiring 
contract with an employee and specifies the items to be included in such a contract.  
Chapter 2. On work hours. The chapter on work hours discusses what constitutes 
daytime work and overtime work and defines special holidays. Daytime hours are 37 
hours and 5 minutes per week, excluding breaks, to be worked between 8 a.m. and 5 
p.m. or 7:30 a.m. and 5:35 p.m. It also contains a section on the minimum rest period 
between work, based on the EU directive on work hours, and a section on part-time 
work. Minimum rest is 11 consecutive hours out of every 24, and employee should 
receive at least 1 day off every 7 days.  
Chapter 3. On breaks for lunch, dinner, and coffee, payments for food and 
transportation. This chapter discusses the right to breaks for lunch and coffee during 
daytime hours and overtime hours. In general, an employee has a right to a 1-hour 
break for lunch between 11:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m., unless there is a cafeteria located 
on the premises, in which case the lunch break is half an hour. Coffee breaks are 20 
minutes each, and there is one before lunch and one after. Furthermore, if an employee 
is working away from the workplace, the employer should pay for any expenses 
incurred, that is, travel, food, and accommodation.  
Chapter 4. On vacation. This chapter defines the right to paid vacation days, which 
number 24 to 28 days a year depending on seniority.  
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Chapter 5. Firm-level agreements. This chapter is relatively new and aims at 
decentralizing the contract. Under certain circumstances, individual firms can make a 
special agreement with each union that applies to each workplace, thereby deviating 
from this collective bargaining agreement. The chapter stipulates which items can be 
agreed upon in such a contract and emphasizes that employees should receive a share 
of the additional revenue or profits.  
Chapter 6. The priority clause. This is a small but very effective chapter. It plainly 
states that employers will give members of the union in question priority for all work. 
If an employer wants to hire someone from outside the union, the individual in 
question is free to join the union.  
Chapter 7. On a healthy work environment. Employees should be given an adequate 
work environment, and safety rules should be followed. 
Chapter 8. On payment of wages in case of illness or accident and sickness insurance. 
This chapter discusses employees’ rights to wages in case of illness. The right depends 
on seniority, starting with 2 sickdays per month up to a maximum of 4 months’ wages 
after 5 years of work. If an employee is injured on the job, he has, in addition to the 
rights above, the right to keep his wages for an additional 3-month period. The 
employer also pays any direct costs that are due to the accident. An individual also has 
a right to take days off due to the illness of his/her children, from 7 to 10 days during a 
12-month period for children under 13 years of age.  
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Employees are also insured for sickness under the contract. Thus, an employer takes 
out a collective insurance policy for his employees under the contract, the terms of 
which are defined in the contract.  
Chapter 9. On tools and work clothes. Employees should be supplied with tools with 
which to work and given work clothes suitable for their job.  
Chapter 10. On payments to funds for sickness, vacation, education, and pension. As 
part of the contract the employer pays a certain amount into various funds. For 
example, he pays 1% of all wages into a sickness fund run by the union. He also pays 
0.25% into a vacation fund, often used to finance the purchase of small vacation 
homes around the country that union members can rent by the week or weekend 
through the union. The employer also pays 0.15% into an education fund used to 
finance continuing education for employees. Finally, there is a compulsory pension 
fund payment of 8% for employers, while employees contribute 4% to the pension 
fund.  
Chapter 11. On union dues. The employer collects union dues on behalf of the union. 
Chapter 12. On resignation and rehiring. The advance notice in case of resignation is 
1 month after 3 months on the job, and up to 6 months after 10 years on the job and if 
the employee is over 63 years old. Resignation should be done in writing and takes 
effect the first day of the month following the resignation.  
Chapter 13. On shop stewards. Employees can elect one shop steward in a workplace 
with 5 to 50 employees and two if there are more than 50 employees. The shop 
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steward is allowed access to certain confidential information in case of disagreements 
with the firm, is allowed to call workplace meetings, and is allowed to attend 
workshops during work hours that are offered by the union and designed for shop 
stewards.  
Chapter 14. On productivity-enhancing payments. If an agreement can be made, 
different types of productivity-enhancing payments are allowed under this contract.  
Chapters 15 through 23. The next nine chapters cover special provisions for specific 
groups of employees. In a big union there are different types of employees, not all of 
whom fall into the same category; thus individual chapters are included in the contract 
to address the specific needs of each group. These groups typically work outside 
daytime hours or work under specific conditions or in remote locations. The chapters 
are as follows: 
• Chapter 15. On construction workers. 
• Chapter 16. On operators of heavy machinery and large trucks. 
• Chapter 17. On bus drivers. 
• Chapter 18. On employees in fish processing. 
• Chapter 19. On employees in fish farming. 
• Chapter 20. On employees in manufacturing. 
• Chapter 21. On employees in workplace cafeterias. 
• Chapter 22. On cleaning staff. 
• Chapter 23. On security guards. 
Finally, there are three chapters on the agreement itself: 
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Chapter 24. On how to resolve disagreements. Before resorting to using the court 
system, the union and employer should try to solve disagreements between 
themselves. If this is not possible within a certain time frame, a committee including a 
third party is formed. The committee should then try to reach an agreement within a 
certain time frame.  
Chapter 25. The premise of the agreement. This chapter contains the negotiating 
parties’ criteria for the agreement to hold, which usually depend on the economic 
situation at the time of signing the agreement and the length of the contract period. 
The contract usually tries to at least uphold the purchasing power of wages throughout 
the contract period. The current contract stipulates conditions for the development of 
the CPI as well as the development of the purchasing power of wages. The criteria are 
examined at predetermined dates during the contract period, in February of 2009. If 
the criteria of the contract do not hold, the contracting parties can make amendments 
to the contract. If an agreement to amend the contract is not reached, either party can 
terminate the contract. 
Chapter 26. On dates of validity of the agreement; how to terminate the agreement. 
The current agreement is valid from February 1, 2008, until November 30, 2010.  
The agreement also includes appendices containing various agreements between the 
contracting parties on various issues. These include an agreement on education, an 
agreement on foreign citizens in the Icelandic labor market, and an agreement on 
working hours in line with the EU directives, to name a few. 
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2.2.4. Strikes 
Strike activity in Iceland has often been very high, and Iceland is still close to the top 
of the list, having the highest strike rate among the OECD countries. This is the case 
even though strikes are illegal while a contract is valid.  
Table 1.5. Strikes in Iceland, 1990–2006. 
Number of strikes and lockouts and number of working days lost. 
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
The average number of working days lost to strikes and lockouts per year from 1990 
to 2006 was 48,000 days. Half of those days, or 25,000 per year, are due to strikes 
among fishermen and other seamen. Furthermore, teachers in Iceland have gone on 
few, but long, strikes throughout the years. For instance, elementary teachers all over 
the country were on strike for over a month in 2004. Excluding these two groups, 
Strikes and 
lockouts
Working 
days lost
1990 1    231    
1991 7    3,413    
1992 4    385    
1993 2    90    
1994 11    97,343    
1995 16    217,186    
1996 -     -     
1997 16    34,093    
1998 3    67,640    
1999 -     -     
2000 7    47,093    
2001 14    207,663    
2002 -     -     
2003 -     -     
2004 1    140,448    
2005 -     -     
2006 -     -     
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fishermen and teachers, the average number of working days lost to strikes falls from 
48,000 days per year to 5,200 a year, thus significantly lowering the average. There 
were, however, no strikes in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2005, or 2006, as general 
agreements were in effect (Table 1.5). 
Although in some years no strike activity has occurred, Iceland still holds the record 
when one compares average strike incidence over the 10-year period from 1994 to 
2004, as shown in Table 1.6. Iceland has by far the highest number of days lost to 
strikes, or 581 per 1,000 employees. Spain ranks second, with 200 days lost to strikes. 
If we exclude seamen and teachers, however, Iceland’s number falls to 35 days, which 
renders the country’s rank ninth instead of first.  
Table 1.6. Labor disputes, 1995–2004. 
Working days not worked per 1,000 employees, average per year. Rank is from 
highest to lowest value. 
 
Source: Beardsmore, 2006 
Days Rank Days Rank
Australia 68    8    Netherlands 18    16    
Austria 41    10    New Zealand 21    14    
Canada 193    3    Norway 83    7    
Denmark 172    4    Portugal 19    15    
Finland 85    6    Spain 200    2    
Germany 3    19    Sweden 39    12    
Iceland 581    1    Switzerland 4    18    
Ireland 68    9    United Kingdom 25    13    
Italy 100    5    United States 40    11    
Luxembourg 6    17    
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2.3. Outcome and patterns 
Having described the wage determination system, we now examine the wage outcome 
in terms of average income, income distribution, wage growth, and flexibility as well 
as the gender gap in wages. 
2.3.1. Income and income distribution 
The average income of individuals in a country is one indicator of that country’s 
overall welfare. National income per capita in Iceland is among the highest in the 
world. It ranked fifth among the OECD countries in 2006, having a gross domestic 
product per capita of 39,600 USD using current purchasing power parities (OECD, 
2007a). Only Luxembourg, Norway, the United States, and Ireland ranked higher than 
Iceland, as seen in Table 1.7. 
Although GDP per capita is relatively high in Iceland, this is due more to long work 
hours than to high productivity. Indeed, looking at GDP per hour worked, Iceland 
ranks much lower, as seen in Table 1.8. 
Average income, however, does not convey any information about the distribution of 
income or wages. Many studies have shown higher rates of unionization to be related 
to less wage inequality (Aidt and Tzannakos, 2002, OECD, 1997 and 2004, Blau and 
Kahn, 1999). In countries with centralized wage bargaining, wage contracts are often 
made across industries. Thus we would expect interindustry differences in wages to be 
smaller in countries with centralized bargaining (Blau and Kahn, 1999). Sweden and 
New Zealand both experienced increased wage dispersion when their collective 
bargaining systems were decentralized in the 1980s (Sweden) and 1990s (New 
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Zealand), while the wage dispersion narrowed in Norway after the collective 
bargaining system became more centralized in the 1980s (Flanagan, 1999). 
Table 1.7. Gross domestic product per capita, 2006. 
USD using current purchasing power parities. Rank is from highest to lowest value. 
 
Source: OECD, 2007a 
Minimum wages in contracts, if binding, will tend to raise the wage floor and thus 
reduce the distribution of wages by cutting off the lower end of the distribution. 
Unemployment insurance can have a similar effect, by setting a wage floor. Given the 
high rate of union membership in Iceland, the existence of minimum wages in each 
contract, and a narrow difference between unemployment insurance and minimum 
wages, we would a priori expect wage inequality to be low in Iceland.  
USD Rank USD Rank
Australia 34,700 12    Korea 23,400 23    
Austria 36,200 8    Luxembourg 77,800 1    
Belgium 34,800 11    Mexico 11,600 29    
Canada 35,900 10    Netherlands 37,300 7    
Czech Republic 22,100 24    New Zealand 26,300 22    
Denmark 36,000 9    Norway 53,100 2    
Finland 33,300 15    Poland 15,000 28    
France 31,700 18    Portugal 21,000 25    
Germany 32,000 16    Slovak Republic 17,600 27    
Greece 31,600 19    Spain 28,800 21    
Hungary 18,300 26    Sweden 34,100 14    
Iceland 39,600 5    Switzerland 37,500 6    
Ireland 41,300 4    Turkey 8,700 30    
Italy 29,300 20    United Kingdom 34,400 13    
Japan 31,900 17    United States 44,000 3    
Euro area 31,300
G7 37,100 OECD Total 30,900
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Table 1.8. Output and productivity, 1995–2003. 
GDP figures are index, with Iceland = 100. Productivity growth in percentages. 
 
Source: OECD, 2005a 
The most common measure of income distribution is the gini coefficient, whose values 
range from 0 to 1; numbers close to 0 represent a narrow distribution of income, and 
values close to 1 represent a wide distribution of income. Table 1.9 shows that the gini 
coefficient for Iceland is 0.26, which is the fifth-lowest value among the European 
countries. Only Sweden, Denmark, the Czech Republic, and Austria have lower gini 
coefficients. The average for the EU countries is 0.30 for 2006, close to the average 
value of 0.31 for the OECD countries in 2000. The gini coefficient for the United 
States is larger, at 0.36, close to the value for the United Kingdom of 0.32, indicating a 
greater wage distribution than in the Nordic countries (OECD Data Base). 
Another measure of income distribution looks at deciles, that is, dividing the sample 
into 10 equal-sized groups and looking at the average for each group. Thus, comparing 
the income of the 20% of people who have the highest income and the 20% of people 
who have the lowest income gives us a measure of wage dispersion. The higher the 
ratio, the wider the wage distribution. This ratio (S20/S80) gives a value of 3.7 for 
Iceland, which is the seventh-lowest ratio. Thus, the 20% of the population with the 
Productivity 
growth
GDP per 
capita
GDP per 
hour
Denmark 1.4       104    134    
Finland 2.6       94    117    
Iceland 2.5       100    100    
Norway 2.4       126    179    
Sweden 2.3       96    123    
EU 1.5       91    131    
USA 2.2       128    143    
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highest income have on average 3.7 times the income of the 20% with the lowest 
income. 
Table 1.9. The gini coefficient and S20/S80 in 2006. 
Eurostat Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Rank is from lowest to 
highest value. 
 
Source: Eurostat 
A similar measure of income distribution compares the 90th centile with the 10th 
centile. Looking at the 90/10 centile differential for disposable income of married 
couples in Iceland over the period 1993–2005, as shown in Figure 1.4, we see that the 
ratio rose over the period from 2.8 to 3.4. The data are from tax returns without 
correcting for part-time jobs. The path is relatively stable over the period except for a 
 Gini coefficient   S20/S80  
Value Rank Value Rank
Austria 0.25    3     3.4    1     
Belgium  0.28    10     4.2    10     
Czech Republic 0.25    3     3.5    3     
Denmark  0.24    1     3.4    1     
Finland  0.26    5     3.6    5     
France  0.27    8     3.6    5     
Germany  0.27    8     4.1    9     
Greece  0.34    18     6.1    18     
Iceland  0.26    5     3.7    7     
Ireland  0.32    14     4.9    13     
Italy  0.32    14     5.5    15     
Luxembourg  0.28    10     4.2    10     
Netherlands  0.26    5     3.8    8     
Norway  0.30    11     4.6    12     
Poland  0.33    17     5.6    16     
Portugal  0.38    19     6.8    19     
Spain  0.31    13     5.3    14     
Sweden  0.24    1     3.5    3     
United Kingdom 0.32    14     5.6    16     
EU (25) 0.30    - 4.8    -
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jump in the ratio from 1996 to 1998, which coincides with a strong upswing in the 
economy accompanied by a generous increase in real wages after a long period of 
stagnation. Furthermore, the income tax was cut in 1998, and a tax on interest income 
was introduced with a rate lower than the income tax rate. Revenue, which was 
formerly taxed as income tax, is now taxed as interest income at the lower rate.  
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 1.4. The ratio of the 90th to the 10th centile in income distribution. 
Data for disposable income of married couples from tax returns. 
One of the objectives of collective bargaining agreements in recent years has been to 
increase the wages of those at the bottom end of the wage distribution relative to other 
wages. Looking at the distribution of wages from 2002 to 2007, that is, wages of those 
at the top of the bottom quarter of the wage distribution as a percentage of median 
wages, it can be seen that the distribution is relatively stable over time (Table 1.10). 
Thus, special arrangements to give a larger wage increase to those at the bottom of the 
wage distribution do not appear to have changed the wage distribution; rather, wage 
2.6
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3.2
3.4
3.6
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increases appear to have crept up the wage scale. The exception seems to be among 
clerks, where the ratio has climbed from 80% in 2004 to 86% in 2007. 
Table 1.10. Distribution of wages. 
Ratio of wages in the bottom quarter to median wages. 
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
A study by Johannesson (2001) supports this, as it shows that the ratio of minimum 
wages to average wages is relatively constant over time, or around 55 to 60%. The 
study shows that 80% of a specific increase in the minimum wages shows up as a 
general increase in wages over 4 years.  
2.3.2. Real wage growth 
If a centralized collective bargaining arrangement internalizes the externalities of 
wage bargaining, then a moderate wage demand should be pursued (Flanagan, 1999). 
However, collective bargaining coverage exhibits a positive relationship with real 
earnings growth, according to the OECD (1997, 2004).  
Real earnings growth in Iceland has been very high in recent years, as shown in Figure 
1.5. From 1995 to 2007, the growth in real wages as measured by the official wage 
index was 45.3%, or 3.2% per year on average. Although the last decade has shown 
significant growth, this has not always been the case. Real wage growth from 1990 to 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Managers 84    83    82    82    76    75    
Professionals 75    78    79    81    78    79    
Technicians 78    82    82    81    84    82    
Clerks 81    81    80    82    86    86    
Service workers and sales people 80    80    80    78    80    79    
Craft workers 80    82    83    78    82    82    
General and machine workers 81    79    79    79    79    80    
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1995 measured 0.6% in total. Thus, real wage growth varies with the economic cycle. 
The simple correlation coefficient between real wage growth and growth in GDP from 
1990 to 2007 is 0.44. 
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 1.5. Changes in real wage growth. 
Changes in the wage index deflated by changes in the CPI. 
2.3.3. Wage flexibility 
One measure of a flexible labor market has to be the flexibility of wages, or how 
easily wages respond to changes in labor market conditions. In countries where wage 
determination is coordinated, average wages are more responsive to the state of the 
labor market (Layard et al, 1991). 
In 1991, the OECD measured wage flexibility in its member countries and found 
wages to be more flexible in Iceland than in the other OECD countries, except 
Portugal (OECD, 1991). This was measured by the standard deviation of changes in 
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real wages from 1970 to 1987 divided by economic growth, and smoothed using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. The value for Iceland was 2.14 compared with the average of 
19 other OECD countries of 1.10. With the lowering of the inflation rate in the early 
1990s, the flexibility of real wages has fallen, and from 1990 to 2004 measured 1.13.  
Wage flexibility can also be measured in terms of employee compensation as a share 
of gross factor income. If the labor market is perfectly flexible, the wage share should 
be constant over time. In Iceland, the wage share has historically fluctuated between 
60% and 70% of gross factor income, reaching a low of 58% in 1984 and a high of 
70% in 2007 (Figure 1.6). Thus, the wage share fluctuates significantly, with larger 
fluctuations seen only in Ireland, Mexico, and Turkey when comparing the OECD 
countries (OECD Data Base). The wage share was 58% in the EU-15 and 61% in the 
United States in 2005 (OECD, 2007b). 
2.3.4. The gender wage gap 
Blau and Kahn (1996) find that centralized wage-setting lowers the gender pay gap, 
and the OECD (2004) found a significant positive relationship between collective 
bargaining coverage and the relative earnings of women. Based on these findings, we 
would expect the gender wage gap in Iceland to be relatively small. 
The Act on Equal Status and Equal Rights of Men and Women has been in effect since 
1975, Iceland being the first Nordic country to institute such law. Also, union density 
for women in Iceland is greater than that for men. Still, there is a significant difference 
in the wages men and women receive, as Table 1.11 reveals.  
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Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 1.6. Wages as a share of gross factor income. 
 
A survey comparing the Nordic countries with their European counterparts found the 
gender pay gap, in terms of women’s average gross hourly earnings as a percentage of 
men’s average gross hourly earnings, to range from 6% in Italy to 30% in Iceland in 
2001. The figure for Iceland is for the private sector only. The other Nordic countries 
showed a significantly smaller gender wage gap than Iceland, ranging from 14% in 
Norway to 18% in Sweden (Mosesdottir et al, 2006).  
Surprisingly, while the gender wage gap is quite large in Iceland, it is significantly 
smaller in Italy. The explanation for this difference lies in the labor force participation 
rate for women in these two countries. In Italy, where the labor force participation rate 
for women is low, child care is mostly the responsibility of the family or is in the 
hands of women outside the formal economy. The opportunity cost of women entering 
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the labor force is thus relatively high. On the other hand, unskilled women in Iceland 
are in the labor force, working at low-paying jobs in the care sector, because 
subsidized daycare for children is widely available.  
Table 1.11. The gender wage gap, 2001. 
Difference between men’s and women’s average gross hourly earnings as a percentage 
of men’s average earnings. Rank is from lowest to highest value. 
 
Source: European Commission (2005), Mosesdottir et al (2006) 
The figures above show unadjusted differences in male and female wages. Recent 
studies show that the unexplained gender wage differential in Iceland has been 
measured to lie between 7% and 18% when controlling for the most common factors, 
such as work hours, occupation, age, experience, education, and so forth (Mosesdottir 
et al, 2006). 
A recent survey (Capacent Research, 2006) found that of people working full-time, 
women receive on average 68% of the total earnings of men in Iceland. The largest 
Difference Rank Difference Rank
Austria 20      19   Latvia 16      11   
Belgium 12      5   Lithuania 16      12   
Cyprus 26      26   Luxembourg 16      10   
Czech Republic 20      20   Malta 9      2   
Denmark 15      9   Netherlands 19      18   
Estonia 24      25   Norway 14      8   
Finland 17      13   Poland 12      6   
France 14      7   Portugal 10      3   
Germany 21      22   Slovak Republic 23      24   
Greece 18      16   Slovenia 11      4   
Hungary 20      21   Spain 17      15   
Iceland 30      27   Sweden 18      17   
Ireland 17      14   United Kingdom 21      23   
Italy 6      1   
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difference is among unskilled workers, where women’s wages amount to 55 to 60% of 
men’s wages. Female managers, however, receive 92% of male manager’s wages, as 
seen in Table 1.12. The reverse pattern emerges in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, 
where the largest gender pay gap can be found among managers and professionals 
(Mosesdottir et al, 2006). 
Table 1.12. Male-female wage differential, 2006. 
Female total earnings as a share of male total earnings for full-time work. 
 
Source: Capacent Research, 2006 
3. The labor force 
3.1. Labor force participation 
Labor force participation in Iceland is high for both genders. Furthermore, Icelanders 
work relatively long hours and retire late in life. In this section, we look at these in 
turn as well as the elasticity of labor and factors that affect the decision to work. 
3.1.1. Participation rate 
The high labor force participation rate in Iceland has contributed significantly to the 
country’s high per capita GDP. The labor force participation rate in Iceland was 88.0% 
in 2006 among people aged 15 to 64, the highest rate among the OECD countries 
Share
Managers 92   
Professionals 73   
Technicians 83   
Clerks 67   
Service workers and sales people 55   
General and machine workers 60   
Total 68   
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(OECD, 2007b). Ranking second is Switzerland, with a labor force participation rate 
of 81.2%, followed by Sweden and Denmark, both with labor force participation rates 
above 80%. The labor force participation rate in the United States was 75.5%, and for 
the European Union (EU-15) was 71.7%. The average labor force participation rate in 
the OECD countries was 70.5% in 2006, as Table 1.13 shows. 
The labor force participation rate for men in Iceland was 91.4% in 2006. Again, this is 
the highest rate among the OECD countries, followed closely by that of Switzerland, 
with a labor force participation rate for men of 87.8%. The 2006 labor force 
participation rate for men was 81.9% in the United States and 79.3% in the European 
Union (EU-15), while the average labor force participation rate for men in the OECD 
countries measured 80.4%.  
When it comes to the labor force participation rate for women, Iceland still leads with 
84.2%, the only country with a labor force participation rate for women of over 80%. 
Sweden is second in line with 77.7%. The labor force participation rate for women in 
the United States is 69.3%, a little higher than in the European Union (EU-15), where 
the female labor force participation rate is 64.2%. The average labor force 
participation rate for women in the OECD countries is 60.8%. The lowest female labor 
force participation rate in the OECD is 26.7% in Turkey.  
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Table 1.13. Labor force participation rates, 2006. 
People aged 15–64. Rank is from highest to lowest value. 
 
Source: OECD, 2007b 
Total Men Women
% Rank % Rank % Rank
Australia 75.9   9     82.9   8     69.0   12     
Austria 73.7   15     80.4   17     67.0   15     
Belgium 65.9   25     72.7   28     58.9   22     
Canada 77.9   7     82.2   11     73.5   6     
Czech Republic 70.3   19     78.2   20     62.3   17     
Denmark 80.1   4     83.4   6     76.7   3     
Finland 74.7   13     76.2   23     73.2   7     
France 69.1   20     74.2   27     63.9   16     
Germany 75.0   12     81.4   14     68.5   13     
Greece 67.0   22     79.1   19     55.0   26     
Hungary 62.0   29     68.7   30     55.5   25     
Iceland 88.0   1     91.4   1     84.2   1     
Ireland 71.3   18     81.0   16     61.3   18     
Italy 62.7   28     74.6   26     50.8   28     
Japan 73.1   16     84.8   4     61.3   19     
Korea 66.2   24     77.7   21     54.8   27     
Luxembourg 66.6   23     76.0   24     57.0   23     
Mexico 63.0   27     84.2   5     44.5   29     
Netherlands 75.7   10     81.9   12     69.4   10     
New Zealand 78.1   6     85.1   3     71.4   8     
Norway 78.2   5     81.4   15     74.8   4     
Poland 63.4   26     70.1   29     56.8   24     
Portugal 73.9   14     79.5   18     68.4   14     
Slovak Republic 68.5   21     76.3   22     60.9   21     
Spain 71.9   17     82.5   10     61.1   20     
Sweden 80.2   3     82.6   9     77.7   2     
Switzerland 81.2   2     87.8   2     74.7   5     
Turkey 51.1   30     75.5   25     26.7   30     
United Kingdom 76.7   8     83.2   7     70.3   9     
United States 75.5   11     81.9   13     69.3   11     
EU-15 71.7   79.3   64.2   
OECD Total 70.5   80.4   60.8   
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In a flexible labor market, the labor force participation rate fluctuates to accommodate 
the state of the economy at each point in time. From 1991 to 2007, the participation 
rate for people aged 16 to 74 was, on average, 82.6% in Iceland, with a standard 
deviation of 1.0%. There is a large variation in participation rates between age groups. 
The participation rate for people aged 25 to 54 is relatively stable, averaging 91.2%, 
with a standard deviation of 1.1%. The labor force participation rate for young people 
aged 16 to 24 varies significantly, however, averaging 76.3%, with a standard 
deviation of 3.4%. The labor force participation rate for older people (aged 55–74) is 
64.6%, on average, with a standard deviation of 1.4% (Statistics Iceland). 
Not only do more people of working age participate in the labor market in Iceland than 
in other countries, they also work longer, as the retirement age there is higher. 
Looking at persons aged 55 to 64 years old, on average 53% are active in the labor 
market in the OECD countries, while in Iceland, 85% in that age group are in the labor 
market, the highest percentage among the OECD countries (OECD, 2008). 
Furthermore, the labor force participation rate for people aged 65 to 74 is 37% 
(Statistics Iceland). Half of all men in that age group participate in the labor market, 
while one in four women aged 65 to 74 does so. According to the OECD, the effective 
retirement age of men in Iceland is nearly 70 years, third-highest after Mexico and 
Japan. The retirement age of women is slightly lower, or 66 years of age, fourth in line 
among the OECD countries after Mexico, Korea, and Japan (OECD, 2003).  
3.1.2. Working hours 
In a flexible labor market, working hours should fluctuate according to the economic 
cycle. The average work week in Iceland is 42 hours. Men work on average 47 hours 
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per week, while it is more common for women to work part-time; thus, their average 
working hours were 36 hours per week in 2007. The standard deviation in working 
hours using annual figures from 1991 to 2007 is 0.7 hours. The standard deviation for 
women’s working hours is 0.8, while the comparable number for men is 1.4. Working 
hours deviate the most among young men (aged 16–24), with a standard deviation of 
2.5 hours (Statistics Iceland).  
The average weekly working hours among 25 of the European Union member 
countries (EU-25) is 36.6 hours per week, ranging from 34.4 hours in Denmark to 41.2 
hours in Latvia (European Commission, 2006). 
Although the weekly working hours in Iceland seem to be many, the annual hours 
worked are 1,794, which ranks tenth among the OECD countries (Table 1.14). The 
dichotomy between the long work week and few hours worked per year can be 
explained by the many public holidays in Iceland and long vacation time, which 
generally ranges from 24 to 30 days per year. A total of 16 days are defined in 
collective agreements as public holidays. Two of these always fall on a Sunday, 7 are 
always on weekdays, and the remaining 7 can fall either on a weekday or a weekend, 
with 2 days being half-days. Thus, on average, people in the Icelandic labor market get 
11 working days off per year, excluding vacation time. 
The longest work year was in Korea and Greece in 2006, both with over 2,000 hours 
worked, followed by countries of the former eastern bloc, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland. The average annual working hours in the United States were 
1,804 in 2006, a little higher than in Iceland. The fewest annual working hours are to 
be found in Norway (1,407 hours) and the Netherlands (1,391 hours). 
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Table 1.14. Average annual hours worked, 2006. 
Per person in employment. Rank is from highest to lowest value. 
 
Source: OECD, 2007b 
A recent study has shown that most women working part-time in Iceland do so of their 
own volition, not because they are unable to get a full-time job (Gudmundsdottir, 
2002). In 2002, 20% of the people in the labor force in Iceland worked part-time. 
While 10% of men work part-time, 31% of women do. Part-time work is most 
common among young people between 16 and 24 years of age (OECD, 2005b). On 
average, part-time employment accounts for 15% of total employment in the OECD 
countries. The share is 13% in the United States and 16% in the European Union (EU-
15). The highest incidence of part-time work can be found in Holland (34%), Australia 
(28%), Japan and Switzerland (25%), and in the United Kingdom (23%). In all the 
OECD countries, women’s share in part-time employment is over half and, on 
average, is 72%. 
Hours Rank Hours Rank
Australia 1714   17    Korea 2305   1    
Austria 1655   21    Luxembourg 1604   23    
Belgium 1571   26    Mexico 1883   7    
Canada 1738   16    Netherlands 1391   30    
Czech Republic 1997   3    New Zealand 1787   11    
Denmark 1577   25    Norway 1407   29    
Finland 1691   18    Poland 1985   5    
France 1564   27    Portugal 1758   14    
Germany 1436   28    Slovak Republic 1749   15    
Greece 2031   2    Spain 1764   13    
Hungary 1989   4    Sweden 1583   24    
Iceland 1794   10    Switzerland 1659   20    
Ireland 1640   22    Turkey 1918   6    
Italy 1800   9    United Kingdom 1669   19    
Japan 1784   12    United States 1804   8    
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3.1.3. Migration 
One measure of flexibility in the labor market is labor force mobility. If the labor force 
is flexible, it will move with the employment opportunities. Nickell and Layard (1999) 
found that in the United States, the percentage of the population that moved from one 
region to another per year from 1980 to 1987 was 2.9%. Regional mobility was also 
high in Sweden (3.7%) and Norway (2.5%). The comparable number for Iceland for a 
more recent period, 1990–2007, is 3.2% and was relatively stable throughout the 
period (Statistics Iceland). It should be mentioned that the size of the regions in these 
countries varies significantly. 
There has been significant internal migration in Iceland in recent years. A study by 
Zoega and Skuladottir (2002) shows that internal migration has mainly been from the 
rural areas to the cities. A study from 1997 (Gudmundsson and Zoega) found 
significant flexibility in internal migration such that if unemployment in a certain part 
of the country is 1% above the national average, the migration from that area increases 
by 0.3%. From 2000 to 2006, during each year over 3% of the population of the 
Reykjavik area moved out of the city at the same time that 4% of the population 
moved into the Reykjavik area, leaving a net increase in the population of the 
Reykjavik area of close to 1% (Statistics Iceland).  
It has been suggested that owner-occupied housing can act as a significant barrier to 
mobility, as it is much easier to move if one rents than if one owns (Nickell and 
Layard, 1999). The share of owner-occupied housing in Iceland is very high, or 81% 
in the years 2002–2004; thus it has the potential to hamper both internal mobility and 
mobility across borders. This, however, is not reflected in the Icelandic migration 
figures. 
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The Icelandic labor market has been open to citizens of the other Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) since 1954. A further opening of the 
Icelandic labor market took place when Iceland became a member of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) in 1994 and joined the common market of the European Union. 
With the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, some limitations were put on 
the flow of people from the 10 new entrant countries, as they had to apply for work 
permits. These limitations have now been lifted in Iceland, although employers are 
still obliged to report the number of workers from these countries to the authorities. 
People from countries outside the EEA must apply for residency and for a work permit 
in order to be able to live and work in Iceland. 
Net immigration from abroad has been on the rise, especially in the last few years, as 
seen in Figure 1.7. The development reflects a large increase in the demand for labor 
coupled with a large growth in GDP. With the increased immigration, the share of 
people of foreign origin in the Icelandic labor market has risen considerably in recent 
years, from around 2.3% in 1998, to 4.4% in 2004, and up to 5.5% in 2005. From 
1998 to 2003, the share of immigrant women in the labor force was higher than that of 
immigrant men. However, the shares were equal in 2004, and in 2005 the share of men 
exceeded that of women by 1.5 percentage points (Statistics Iceland). 
The share of people of foreign origin in the population has also risen, from 1.6% 
through 1987, to 3.5% in 2004, and up to 6.0% in 2007. The comparable numbers for 
the other Nordic countries are 4.9% in Denmark, 2% in Finland, 4.3% in Norway, and 
5.3% in Sweden. The immigrants come from all over the world; however, the largest 
group of immigrants comes from Poland, as one in five foreign nationals is from there 
(Statistics Iceland). 
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Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 1.7. Net immigration. 
Percentage of population. 
3.1.4. Elasticity of labor supply 
When Iceland changed its personal income-tax system from paying back taxes to a 
pay-as-you-earn system in 1988, there was one year in which income bore no income 
tax: in 1987 taxes were paid on income accrued in 1986, and in 1988 taxes were paid 
on income earned that same year. Thus, no income tax was paid on income earned in 
1987. Therefore, a unique opportunity rose to measure labor supply elasticity. In their 
study, Bianchi et al (2001) found a large variation in the labor supply response in 
1987, where some workers decided to work less while others chose to work more. On 
average, the elasticity of weeks worked to the rise in after-tax wages was 0.42 for all 
workers, 0.58 for men, and 0.06 for women. The elasticity of earnings was 0.80 for 
men and 0.40 for women, yielding an average of 0.67. Looking only at workers 
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employed in 1986, there was a larger response from men than women as they 
increased their labor supply by 14.3%. 
3.1.5. Taxes on labor 
Taxes on labor form a wedge between the real cost of a worker for an employer and 
the real consumption wage of the worker. According to Nickell and Layard (1999), the 
major impact of labor taxes on unemployment is through the total tax wedge, while the 
mix of individual taxes does not seem to influence unemployment. There is some 
evidence that personal income taxes adversely affect productivity growth (Nickell and 
Layard, 1999). 
Authorities in Iceland levy an income tax that is a state and a municipal tax combined, 
using the same tax base. There is a flat single tax rate of 36.72% (2007) and a basic 
personal tax credit and tax relief for compulsory pension fund payments. There is also 
an interest payment relief for interest paid on owner-occupied housing as well as 
transfers for dependent children. A social security tax is levied on employers with 
wages as the tax base with a rate of 5.79%. 
The tax wedge measures the difference between the total cost to the employer and the 
corresponding net take-home pay for the worker, taking into account income taxes, the 
employee’s social security contributions, and the employer’s social security 
contributions. In comparison with the other OECD countries, the measured tax wedge 
in Iceland is small, as Table 1.15 shows; thus we would expect the tax wedge to affect 
unemployment only minimally. This expectation is supported by Iceland’s low 
unemployment rate. 
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Table 1.15. Total tax wedge, 2007. 
Percentage of labor costs for a single person without children at the income level of 
the average worker. Rank is from lowest to highest value. 
 
Source: OECD, 2007c 
3.1.6. Pension funds 
Mandatory pension funds can be expected to increase overall savings, as they are 
unlikely to completely crowd out other types of saving. Thus, the existence of pension 
funds can be considered to enhance economic growth. 
Iceland has a three-tiered pension fund system. First, the social security system 
secures a minimum pension for everyone. Second, every wage earner is obliged to 
contribute to a pension fund. The pension fund system is characterized by the 
operation of occupational pension funds. These funds became general in 1969 and 
% Rank % Rank
Australia 27.7    5     Korea 19.6    2     
Austria 48.5    26     Luxembourg 37.5    13     
Belgium 55.5    30     Mexico 15.3    1     
Canada 31.3    10     Netherlands 44.0    23     
Czech Republic 42.9    21     New Zealand 21.5    3     
Denmark 41.3    17     Norway 37.5    14     
Finland 43.7    22     Poland 42.8    20     
France 49.2    27     Portugal 37.4    12     
Germany 52.2    28     Slovak Republic 38.5    15     
Greece 42.3    18     Spain 38.9    16     
Hungary 54.4    29     Sweden 45.4    24     
Iceland 28.3    6     Switzerland 29.6    8     
Ireland 22.3    4     Turkey 42.7    19     
Italy 45.9    25     United Kingdom 34.1    11     
Japan 29.3    7     United States 30.0    9     
EU-15 42.5    OECD Total 37.7    
EU-19 43.0    
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mandatory in 1974. Every wage earner is obliged to contribute 4% of his or her total 
earnings to an occupational pension fund, in most cases one predetermined by his or 
her trade union. This payment is tax-exempt. The payment burden is shared by the 
employer, who in most cases pays 8% of wages into the pension fund, while the 
central government pays 11.5%. The third tier of the pension system consists of an 
optional payment to a pension fund or to an individual retirement account, of up to 4% 
of wages, which is tax-exempt, with the employer matching that contribution with up 
to 2% of wages.  
3.1.7. Education 
The more educated the labor force, the larger the choice set of employment for each 
individual, and the easier it is to move between jobs. Thus a more educated labor force 
is a sign of a flexible labor force. Illiteracy is not found in Iceland. However, the 
average number of years of formal education for those aged 25 to 64 is below the 
OECD average of 11.9 years, or only 10.5 years. The OECD average does not show a 
difference in educational attainment between males and females, while in Iceland, the 
average number of years in formal education is higher for females than for males, or 
11.4 years for women compared with 9.7 for men (OECD, 2006a).  
The share of the population that has attained at least an upper secondary education is 
relatively low, or 63% of people aged 25 to 64, compared with an OECD or European 
average of 68% (Table 1.16). This puts Iceland in 22nd place compared with the other 
OECD countries (OECD, 2007d). The main reason for the low percentage is not low 
participation rates in secondary schooling; it is due instead to high dropout rates. In 
2003, the dropout rate from upper secondary schools in Iceland was just under 20% 
(OECD, 2005a).  
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Although a relatively low percentage of the population finishes upper secondary 
education, the share of the population that has attained tertiary education is close to the 
average of the OECD countries, as shown in Table 1.17. Thus, a high proportion of 
those who finish secondary education continue on to receive tertiary education. 
Furthermore, tertiary education has increased dramatically in recent years; thus, this 
share is expected to rise in the coming years. 
Table 1.16. Share of population with secondary education, 2005. 
Percentage of people aged 25–64. Rank is from highest to lowest value. 
 
Source: OECD, 2007d 
3.2. Unemployment 
More highly coordinated bargaining systems tend to yield lower unemployment and 
higher employment rates compared with other, less coordinated systems (OECD, 
% Rank % Rank
Australia 65 20     Luxembourg 66 19     
Austria 81 9     Mexico 21 29     
Belgium 66 17     Netherlands 72 15     
Canada 85 4     New Zealand 79 11     
Czech Republic 90 1     Norway 77 12     
Denmark 81 8     Poland 51 24     
Finland 79 10     Portugal 26 28     
France 66 18     Slovak Republic 86 3     
Germany 83 6     Spain 49 26     
Greece 57 23     Sweden 84 5     
Hungary 76 13     Switzerland 83 7     
Iceland 63 22     Turkey 27 27     
Ireland 65 21     United Kingdom 67 16     
Italy 50 25     United States 88 2     
Korea 76 14     
EU19  average 68 OECD average 68
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1997). Thus we would a priori expect unemployment in Iceland to be lower than in the 
other European countries.  
Table 1.17. Share of population with tertiary education, 2005. 
Percentage of people aged 25–64. Rank is from highest to lowest value. 
  
Source: OECD, 2007d 
The existence of minimum wages does not seem to greatly increase unemployment. 
Abowd et al (1999) found that increases in the French minimum wage significantly 
lowered the employment rate of workers at the minimum wage level relative to those a 
little further up the wage scale. However, as the affected group is relatively small, the 
overall effects on employment are small. 
Unemployment in Iceland has historically been low, fluctuating between 0 and 1% 
until 1990. In the early 1990s it started to rise and reached a high of 5% in 1995, as 
% Rank % Rank
Australia 32 8     Korea 32 9     
Austria 32 10     Luxembourg 27 19     
Belgium 31 11     Mexico 15 25     
Canada 46 1     Netherlands 30 13     
Czech Republic 13 27     New Zealand 27 20     
Denmark 34 6     Norway 33 7     
Finland 35 5     Poland 17 24     
France 25 21     Portugal 13 28     
Germany 25 22     Slovak Republic 14 26     
Greece 21 23     Spain 28 18     
Hungary 39 3     Sweden 30 14     
Iceland 31 12     Switzerland 29 17     
Ireland 29 16     Turkey 10 30     
Italy 12 29     United Kingdom 30 15     
Japan 40 2     United States 39 4     
EU-19 average 24 OECD average 26
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Figure 1.8 shows, indicating a change in the pattern from real wage flexibility to 
employment volatility, as inflation fell dramatically during this time. The 
unemployment rate fell to 1.3 to 1.4% in 2000 and in 2001 rose again, but in 2007 it 
measured 1.0% again. 
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 1.8. Unemployment rate. 
Percentage of labor force. 
3.2.1. Unemployment benefits 
Unemployment benefits affect the labor market through replacement rates, on the one 
hand, and duration of benefits, on the other. High replacement rates have been shown 
to lengthen unemployment duration (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2006), and long-term 
benefit duration has been shown to generate long-term unemployment (Nickell and 
Layard, 1999).  
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Thus, Iceland’s low unemployment rate might indicate a low replacement ratio. 
Indeed, unemployment benefits in Iceland are not generous. In 2004 the benefit 
replacement ratio equaled 35% of the wage of the average employee. The amount was 
fixed and not related to past wages. In 2006 changes were made that increased the 
replacement ratio temporarily and shortened the duration of benefits. For the first 3 
months of unemployment, the replacement ratio is 70% of former wages, with a 
ceiling. After 3 months the unemployment benefit is a fixed amount, similar to the 
amount before the changes. The maximum duration of unemployment benefits has 
been shortened from 5 to 3 years (Act No. 54/2006). Given the benefit’s low rate and 
limited duration, it is not a viable alternative to employment. 
Before the recent changes, Iceland had one of the lowest replacement rates and one of 
the longest duration periods among the OECD countries, as seen in Table 1.18. Since 
the changes were made, the initial replacement ratio has risen considerably, while the 
duration of benefits has shortened. 
Although unemployment compensation has until recently been low compared with 
average wages, it is generous compared with the minimum wage as negotiated in the 
general wage agreements. In 1991, unemployment compensation was almost equal to 
the negotiated minimum wage. Since that time, minimum wages have risen faster than 
unemployment compensation, and in 2004 unemployment compensation equaled 85% 
of the minimum wage.  
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Table 1.18. Unemployment insurance, 2004. 
Initial net replacement rates as percentage of work earnings and unemployment 
insurance benefit duration in months. 
 
Source: OECD (2006b), except author’s calculations for Iceland 
Initial Unemployment
net insurance 
replacement benefit
rates duration
Australia 45         0         
Austria 63         9         
Belgium 61         No limit
Canada 63         9         
Czech Republic 56         5         
Denmark 70         48         
Finland 70         23         
France 75         23         
Germany 69         12         
Greece 55         12         
Hungary 49         9         
Iceland 35         60         
Iceland (2006) 70         36         
Ireland 49         15         
Italy 54         6         
Japan 62         8         
Korea 47         7         
Netherlands 74         24         
New Zealand 56         0         
Norway 68         36         
Poland 59         12         
Portugal 83         24         
Slovak Republic 56         8         
Spain 67         21         
Sweden 75         28         
Switzerland 77         24         
United Kingdom 54         6         
United States 54         6         
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Table 1.19. Long-term unemployment, 2006. 
Percentage of total unemployment out of work for 12 months or more. Rank is from 
lowest to highest value. 
 
Source: OECD, 2007b 
3.2.2. Long-term unemployment 
The unemployment rate might be low, but what are the flows in and out of 
unemployment? In a flexible labor market, labor moves quickly in and out of 
unemployment, thus showing a low rate of long-term unemployment.  
Long-term unemployment, measured by the percentage of those unemployed who 
have been out of work for 12 months or longer, is 7.3% in Iceland, as seen in Table 
1.19. This is quite favorable compared with the European average of 44%. New 
Zealand, Canada, and the United States all have long-term unemployment rates similar 
% Rank % Rank
Australia 17.8    9     Korea 1.1    1     
Austria 27.3    14     Luxembourg 26.4    13     
Belgium 55.6    27     Mexico 2.5    2     
Canada 8.7    5     Netherlands 45.2    21     
Czech Republic 55.2    26     New Zealand 7.1    3     
Denmark 20.4    10     Norway 14.1    7     
Finland 24.8    12     Poland 50.4    23     
France 44.0    20     Portugal 51.8    24     
Germany 57.2    29     Slovak Republic 73.1    30     
Greece 55.6    28     Spain 29.5    15     
Hungary 46.1    22     Sweden 14.2    8     
Iceland 7.3    4     Switzerland 39.1    19     
Ireland 34.3    17     Turkey 35.8    18     
Italy 52.9    25     United Kingdom 22.1    11     
Japan 33.0    16     United States 10.0    6     
EU-15 44.2    OECD Europe 44.5    
EU-19 45.9    OECD Total 32.2    
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to Iceland’s. Other countries, except Korea and Mexico, have far higher rates. The 
highest rate of long-term unemployment is in the Slovak Republic, where over 70% of 
those unemployed have been out of work for over a year. 
3.2.3. Unemployment by education level 
Blau and Kahn (1999) found that in countries with compressed wage structures, such 
as Austria and Norway, low-skilled workers have a lower employment rate than those 
with middle levels of skill compared with countries having a wider wage structure. 
This evidence is consistent with the adverse employment effects of compressed wage 
structures. Similarly, we would expect that in Iceland unemployment was more highly 
concentrated among less-skilled workers.  
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 1.9. Unemployment rate by education level. 
Percentages. 
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This is evidenced by the fact that in 2005 about 60% of those unemployed had only an 
elementary school education or a lower secondary education. Only 10% of those 
unemployed had a tertiary education (Statistics Iceland).  
Looking at the unemployment rate by education level from 1991 to 2005 in Figure 1.9, 
the highest unemployment rate is consistently found among those with only an 
elementary education, while the lowest unemployment rate is among those with a 
tertiary education. The same pattern has been observed in many other countries, where 
persons with lower educational attainment experience higher unemployment rates 
(Nickell and Layard, 1999). 
3.2.4. Structural unemployment 
The non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) for Iceland was 
estimated in 1997 to have risen from around 1% during the period 1970–1988 to over 
4% in 1996 (Gudmundsson and Zoega, 1997). The OECD estimated Iceland’s NAIRU 
to be 3.2% in 2005 (OECD, 2005a). These estimates of the NAIRU seem to track the 
actual unemployment rate to a remarkable extent, while indicating a structural change 
in the relationship between inflation and unemployment around 1990. Zoega (2002) 
links the changes in the NAIRU to structural changes in the economy following 
liberalization of the economy in the 1990s, especially in the financial markets. 
3.2.5. The Beveridge curve 
The Beveridge curve shows the relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
vacancy rate. The relationship is negative, as the vacancy rate falls when 
unemployment grows and vice versa. The further the curve is from the origin, the 
greater the labor market rigidities (Solow, 1998). 
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Source: Central Bank of Iceland 
Figure 1.10. The Beveridge curve, 1999–2007. 
Percentage of labor force. 
The Beveridge curve in Iceland seems to be stable from 1999 up to the last quarter of 
2002, when it appears to shift to the right, where a new relationship seems to form 
(Figure 1.10). The shift might suggest greater rigidities in the Icelandic labor market, 
or an increased mismatch between patterns of unemployment and available vacancies. 
From the end of 2005 and throughout 2006, the relationship seems to have returned to 
its previous level, closer to the origin. This shift has administrative roots, as earlier, 
employers needed to advertise available jobs locally, and only when they were not 
able to fill the vacancies by those means could they apply for work permits for 
workers from outside the EEA. An agreement was made in the fall of 2005 to lift this 
restriction, thus reducing the number of advertised jobs. 
3.2.6. Unemployment and growth 
In the manner of Okun (1962), Hall et al (1998) estimated the relationship between 
unemployment and growth in Iceland from 1980 to 1996. They found a significant 
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negative relationship between migration and growth, in which a 1% increase in net 
outmigration leads to a 0.067% decrease in GDP. They also found a significant 
relationship between labor force participation rates and growth, in which a 1% 
increase in the labor force participation rate can be expected to increase GDP by 
0.23%. On the other hand, they found the relationship between unemployment and 
growth to be insignificant, with an estimated coefficient of -0.078, meaning that a 1% 
increase in unemployment can be expected to decrease GDP by 0.078%. 
4. Conclusion 
The Icelandic wage bargaining system is classified as centralized and coordinated, yet 
there is significant flexibility in the centralization that depends largely on the 
economic situation and union expectations. The legal framework does not imply 
strictness, and many rules regarding the labor market are only stated in collective 
bargaining agreements. The agreements have the status of law, and strikes are not 
allowed while a contract is valid.  
In countries with highly centralized bargaining, the wage distribution is generally 
narrow, as is the case in Iceland. There is still some flexibility in real wages, although 
the flexibility has declined significantly with the fall in inflation. The gender wage gap 
is higher than in the other Nordic countries and higher than would be expected in light 
of the degree of centralization.  
The labor force participation rate is high, with both men and women actively 
participating in the labor market. Furthermore, average weekly working hours exceed 
40 hours per week. Migration has been an integral part of the Icelandic labor market in 
recent years, characterized by immigration in times of robust economic growth and 
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outmigration in times of downturn. The tax wedge on labor is relatively low and thus 
should not significantly affect the decision to work, whereas pension fund 
contributions are mandatory. 
The unemployment rate is lower than in most other countries, and there is constant 
flow in and out of unemployment, as long-term unemployment is low. This is aided by 
the unemployment benefits, which are not generous and are of limited duration.  
Thus, of the measures discussed above under the heading of flexibility, the Icelandic 
labor market, with its centralized bargaining structure, falls in the category of being 
flexible.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
DECENTRALIZATION OF BARGAINING 
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN ICELAND: 
DID IT CHANGE THE WAGE STRUCTURE? 
Abstract 
It is widely accepted within the field of labor economics that union membership has a 
positive effect on wages and that centralization of collective bargaining leads to lower 
wage dispersion. The question remains whether it is possible to change the wage 
structure through changes in the collective bargaining agreement and decentralization 
of the bargaining process. 
A unique opportunity to explore this question presented itself when changes were 
made to collective bargaining contracts in the public sector in Iceland as the 
bargaining process was decentralized. In this chapter I explore the effects of 
decentralization on wage structure in order to examine whether wage dispersion 
increased with decentralization, as theory would predict, and whether decentralization 
affected wages equally or differently depending on gender and union federation. I 
examine wage level and wage structure in the 4 years leading up to the changes, 1994 
through 1997, and compare them with those during a 4-year period after the change in 
the collective bargaining agreement, 2001 through 2004. I find that the wage structure 
for total earnings did not change between the two periods but that the dispersion of 
base wages increased. 
1. Objective of research 
It is widely accepted within the field of labor economics that union membership has a 
positive effect on wages and that centralization of collective bargaining leads to 
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narrower wage dispersion. The question remains whether it is possible to change the 
wage structure by changing the wage schedule in the collective bargaining agreement 
and decentralizing the bargaining process. Little or no research exists on whether 
contract type has any bearing on union members’ wages or on wage structure. 
Collective bargaining contracts between Iceland’s public-sector unions and its central 
government underwent significant changes in 1997, providing a unique opportunity to 
study whether the structure of labor contracts and bargaining process decentralization 
influences wages or wage dispersion. 
There is evidence that earnings dispersion decreases with higher union membership 
and more coordinated collective bargaining (Blau and Kahn, 1999; and OECD, 1997 
and 2004). Thus, with decentralization one should expect greater wage dispersion. It is 
also possible that decentralized public-sector wage determination brings the public-
sector wage structure closer to that of the private sector (Holmlund and Ohlsson, 
1992). The objective of this study is to find out what happens when a rigid wage 
structure is replaced with a much more flexible one and a centralized bargaining 
structure is replaced with a more decentralized one. 
Several questions arise as to what determines the changes in the wage structure when 
the wage determination process is changed. What determines the result? Do the wages 
of those unions that are closely linked to the general labor market increase more on 
average than those of other unions? What happens to labor turnover? Does it matter 
whether the union has the right to strike? Is there a difference between smaller unions 
and larger unions? Does workplace size matter? Or is it possible that wage formation 
has no bearing on wage distribution? 
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2. The structure of the public sector 
2.1. The development in the public sector in other countries 
Public-sector pay systems in the OECD countries came under pressure in the early 
1980s. Tightness in the labor market resulted in problems recruiting and retaining 
staff. This created incentives to improve managerial efficiency and to provide better 
services, while using wages as a managerial tool to improve the efficiency of public-
sector workers. Macroeconomic considerations created pressures to improve wage 
flexibility in both the public and private sectors at the same time that pressures grew to 
curb public expenditures and government deficits (Maguire, 1993). 
In response to this, wage determination in the central government administrations of 
many countries, which historically had been centralized, has in recent years become 
increasingly decentralized (Rexed et al, 2007). The important motivation behind 
decentralization is the need for more differentiated pay-setting as the workforce has 
become increasingly heterogeneous. A more decentralized system can better meet the 
changing needs of the labor market in terms of addressing specific situations in each 
institute, using the specific skills and encouraging the performance of each employee, 
and meeting the competition for skills in the labor market. 
The possible advantages of decentralization can be significant, while the actual 
outcome will depend on how the managers of the decentralized system who assume 
responsibility for the new pay arrangements make use of the opportunities (Rexed et 
al, 2007). There are also costs to consider: the transaction costs of a decentralized pay-
setting system increase as single-pay bargaining is replaced with multiple, separate 
negotiations. 
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The current Icelandic system in many ways resembles those in Denmark and Finland. 
Each of these countries has a two-level collective bargaining system, in which some 
conditions are regulated by central collective agreements and others by local 
agreements (Rexed et al, 2007). In Denmark the central collective agreements stipulate 
general pay increases for government employees, while individual departments or 
institutes can add pay increases as long as they fit within their respective budgets. In 
Finland, the central agreement covers general wage increases, while state civil 
servants can negotiate separate collective agreements. These agency-specific 
agreements are drawn up according to general principles contained in the central 
agreement. 
Elliot and Bender (1997) examined public-sector reforms in the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, and Australia. These reforms were in the direction of decentralization of pay 
bargaining and the individualization of pay. Prior to the reforms all three countries had 
highly centralized and coordinated arrangements for determining the pay of central 
government employees. The countries chose to delegate responsibility for pay to either 
existing or newly formed agencies, and all three have introduced controls on the 
running costs of these agencies. 
The reforms in these three countries were, according to Elliot and Bender (1997), 
motivated by the search for increased flexibility and efficiency and by the desire to 
contain the public-sector pay bill. To achieve these goals, the performance of public-
sector workers could be enhanced by linking their pay to their performance. In these 
respects the public sector was following the lead of the private sector, as in all three 
countries, the private sector adopted a more decentralized approach to wage 
bargaining during the 1980s and 1990s. 
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The decentralization of pay bargaining, or the delegation of responsibility for pay, 
might be expected to affect both the pay dispersion between occupations within a 
single agency or department and the pay dispersion within the central government 
sector as a whole. This is mainly because the delegation of decisions over pay will 
result in many more separate bargaining units than before, and management in each of 
these may seek to reflect the specific circumstances and needs of their organization in 
awarding pay settlements. 
Decentralization is frequently accompanied by the introduction of new pay and 
grading structures. In Australia and in several agencies in the UK, broader pay bands 
have replaced incremental pay scales. In the new pay bands, wage growth is generally 
tied to individual performance, whereas on the old scales, wage growth was related to 
seniority. For this reason and the fact the pay bands are broader than the pay scales, 
this change is likely to increase pay dispersion.  
In the UK earnings dispersion has generally increased in both the public and private 
sectors since 1985, accompanied by a widening of pay differences at both the top and 
the bottom of the earnings hierarchy. In both sectors earnings in the bottom decile 
have fallen relative to those at the median, while those in the top decile have increased 
relative to the median. 
In Sweden the evidence concerning the impact of the reforms on the dispersion of 
public-sector earnings is mixed. There is some suggestion that earnings among the 
most highly paid occupations became more widely dispersed over the period. In 
Australia since 1990 there has been a modest increase in the earnings dispersion in the 
public sector. 
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Falch and Strom (2006) investigate the effects of moving a centralized pay system to a 
system with more local pay discretion, a change that took place in the local public 
sector in Norway in 1990. After 1990 central contracts stipulated a wage frame for 
each occupation and granted local governments considerable freedom to place 
individual employees within each frame. There is some evidence that wage differences 
increased somewhat as the wage setting became decentralized and that local wages 
have become more responsive to local budgets. The authors also suggest that because 
the changes in the wage distribution are small, the established pay equality norms 
across government workplaces continue to play a significant role in the determination 
of wages even after decentralization. 
Public-sector unions are better able to influence employer behavior through the 
political process than are private-sector unions (Freeman, 1986). On the other hand, 
public-sector strikes may be less effective than their private-sector counterparts: in the 
former, services are interrupted but governments continue to receive tax revenues, 
whereas in the latter, production seizes and, thus, income is lost. 
2.2. The public sector in Iceland 
Iceland’s public sector has two levels, the central government and local governments. 
In many ways Iceland resembles its Nordic neighbors in terms of social services, 
although its public sector is relatively smaller. General government outlays in Iceland 
amounted to 43% of GDP in 2005, as shown in Figure 2.1. Sweden, Denmark, and 
Finland had general government outlays above the Icelandic level. The United 
Kingdom’s and Norway’s general government outlays were similar to Iceland’s 
spending as a share of GDP, while the United States had a lower level of spending, or 
37% of GDP. 
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Source: OECD, 2006 
Figure 2.1. General government outlays, 2005. 
Percentage of GDP. 
The main reason Iceland’s general government outlays are lower than those of the 
other Nordic countries is its lower expenditure for social services. The central 
government is responsible for the police; the court system; foreign affairs; health 
services, which are largely financed through taxes; and the education system, except 
for elementary schools, which are the responsibility of local governments. In addition 
to elementary schools, local governments are responsible for preschools, local 
planning, local infrastructure, and certain types of welfare services, although the 
central government provides most of the latter (Central Bank, 2006). Defense 
spending is limited, as Iceland has no armed services. 
2.3. Changes in the public sector in the 1990s 
The central government’s policy in the early 1990s aimed to increase efficiency in the 
public sector. This included the contracting out of services and privatization, which 
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increased competition in the provision of both outputs and inputs. The government’s 
human resource policy aimed to reduce the difference between the private and public 
sectors, enhancing a free flow between the two. 
This policy is reflected in a brochure published by the Ministry of Finance (1993), 
which states: 
The current situation in the policy on human resources and wage policy is to a 
large extent characterized by centralization. Decisions are in some cases made 
by individuals lacking knowledge of the needs and the situation of individual 
institutes and government entities. . .  Collective bargaining agreements 
provide only limited room to reward good employees and compete for 
labor. . .  The possibilities for rewarding employees who show initiative and 
talent need to be increased. . .  The flexibility of collective bargaining 
agreements needs to be increased such that individual institutes and their 
employees can organize their work as they see fit. (page 11; translated from 
Icelandic by author) 
In light of this policy, the government agreed to significant changes in the public-
sector collective bargaining contracts during the negotiating round that began in 1997. 
The pay schedule was previously quite rigid and included large automatic wage 
increases tied to seniority. During the negotiations a new pay schedule was 
implemented for a large number of unions. The new schedule was much more open 
and provided much greater flexibility in wage determination while significantly 
reducing automatic wage increases. Furthermore, the negotiations were made more 
decentralized, because a part of the negotiating process was moved from the central 
government to individual institutes. 
In addition, significant changes were made to the Pension Fund for State Employees. 
The system that was in effect prior to 1997 (now called Division B) is based in part on 
funding from accumulated contributions and in part from supplemental contributions 
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from public sources. Fund members’ rights under this system are based on various 
factors that relate to their working life, such as number of years employed and the base 
wage. This system was closed to new members starting in 1997. Employees in the 
system prior to 1997 were given the choice to either stay in the old system or move to 
the new one. The new system (Division A) is fully funded, with benefit rights based 
on contributions made, which are a set percentage of total earnings in which the 
employer and employee both pay their share. 
2.4. The public-sector bargaining system 
Most of those employed by the central government in Iceland belong to one of 
approximately 100 unions that bargain with the Ministry of Finance. Most of the 
unions are public-sector unions and belong to one of three federations. Public-sector 
employees have separate organizations from those in the private sector; the largest of 
these is the Federation of State and Municipal Employees (BSRB), established in 
1942. In 2004 BSRB had 28 unions and 18,000 members. University graduates 
working for the public sector belong to a separate federation of unions, the 
Association of Academics (BHM), formed in 1958. In 2004 there were 25 member-
unions in BHM, consisting of 8,000 employees with an academic degree of 3 years or 
more. Furthermore, teachers and school administrators at the preschool, primary 
school, and secondary school levels are members of the Icelandic Teachers’ Union 
(KI), whose members numbered over 8,000 in 6 unions in 2004. A few public-sector 
unions operate outside these three federations. These include the Icelandic Air Traffic 
Controllers’ Association, the Icelandic Medical Association, and the Society of Chartered 
Engineers. In addition, a small group of public-sector workers belong to unions that are a 
part of the Icelandic Federation of Labor (ASI). The group consists mainly of employees 
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doing blue-collar work, such as maintenance and custodial work, but also includes the 
Union of Icelandic Electrical Workers. 
All central government contracts are negotiated between each union and the State 
Negotiation Committee (SNR) on behalf of the Minister of Finance. High-level central 
government employees do not belong to unions, as their wages are determined by the 
State Salaries Commission (Icel: Kjararad). 
2.5. The legal environment 
In addition to being covered by general labor-market legislation, public-sector 
employees in Iceland are subject to the Government Employees Act and the Act on 
Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements. 
The current Government Employees Act dates from 1996 (Act no. 70/1996), while the 
former version dates from 1954 (Act no. 38/1954). Both acts are discussed here, as the 
research period dates from 1994, when the earlier act was valid. In the earlier act the 
general specifications for working for the central government included the following: 
1. Having reached the age of 21. 
2. Having attained majority. 
3. Being of sound mind and body. 
4. Having Icelandic citizenship. 
5. Having attained general education as well as the required education for the job 
in question. 
6. Being in charge of one’s own finances where a financial responsibility is 
required. 
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The current act specifies the same general requirements, except the age requirement is 
now 18, and the citizenship requirement has been extended to the citizens of member 
countries of the European Economic Area (EEA), which are the European Union (EU) 
member countries, plus Norway and Lichtenstein. 
Unlike the earlier act, the current act distinguishes between those employees who are 
hired indefinitely for a specific job and those who hold posts for 5 years at a time. In 
general, high-level public-sector employees hold posts for a limited time, while lower-
level public-sector employees are hired indefinitely. 
Central government employees who hold posts for a term of 5 years at a time are the 
following: 
1. The Head of Staff of the Althing (the parliament), the State Auditor General, 
and the Ombudsman of the Althing. 
2. The Secretary to the President, Permanent Secretaries of ministries, directors in 
ministerial offices, ambassadors and counselors in the Foreign Service. 
3. Justices of the Supreme Court, Secretary to the Supreme Court, and regional 
court judges. 
4. The Bishop of Iceland, ordainment bishops, provosts, and ministers of the 
church. 
5. The Director of Public Prosecutions, the Deputy Director of Public 
Prosecutions, and other prosecutors. 
6. The Solicitor General, the State Mediator, and the Ombudsman for Children. 
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7. District magistrates, the State Police Chief and the Deputy State Police Chief, 
the Reykjavík Police Chief and the Reykjavík Deputy Police Chief, the Head 
of the State Police Academy, and police officers. 
8. The State Director of Customs, the Reykjavík Director of Customs, and 
customs officers. 
9. The State Director of Prisons, prison directors, and prison wardens. 
10. The Director of Internal Revenue, the Director of Tax Investigations, full-time 
members of the Appellate Tax Committee, and heads of tax offices. 
11. District physicians and district nurses. 
12. The State Veterinarian, district veterinarians, and the veterinarian for fish 
diseases. 
13. The Consumer Spokesman and the head of the Consumer Agency. 
14. Heads of state agencies and state enterprises not listed above. 
Six months before the end of his or her 5-year term, the person holding a post will be 
notified about whether the post will be advertised as vacant. If it is not advertised, his 
or her term of appointment is automatically extended by 5 years. 
All available jobs and posts are to be advertised. Under the earlier act, all jobs had to 
be advertised in the Legal Gazette (Icel: Logbirtingarblad), while the names of 
applicants were to be provided to other applicants and to the public-sector unions on 
request. Under the current act, all available posts should be advertised in the Legal 
Gazette, and the names of applicants are to be provided to the general public. Also, all 
jobs are to be advertised, and the requirements for advertising jobs are set by a specific 
set of rules published by the Minister of Finance. The deadline for applications was 
specified as 4 weeks under the earlier act, but is 2 weeks under the current act. 
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If a government employee does not fulfill his or her duties as required, he or she can 
be dismissed temporarily provided he or she is given a warning and a chance to 
improve. This rule was made more stringent in the current act, which stipulates that a 
written complaint be made. An employee can also ask for an explanation upon being 
removed from a job or post temporarily. Thus, the rules for firing central government 
employees are much stricter than those for the general labor market, where an 
employee can be dismissed without reason or prior warning. If a government 
employee has been dismissed temporarily his case is investigated and/or left to the 
courts to decide. The current act goes further than the older one, in that it specifies a 
committee to investigate the affair. 
As for leaving a government job, the advance notice of resignation is at least 3 
months, on both sides. If many employees wish to leave at the same time, the 
government can extend the notice period to 6 months. A government employee should 
retire no later than the age of 70. According to the former act, if an employee’s 
position is eliminated, he or she is paid wages for 6 or 12 months, depending on 
seniority. If the employee accepts another job during this period, he or she receives the 
difference of the wages, provided the wages in the new job are lower than in the 
earlier job. In the current act, this stipulation applies only to those holding posts, not to 
employees. 
In the earlier act, the number of holidays per year is specified as 21 to 27, depending 
on seniority, while the new one only refers to the State Salaries Commission or public-
sector wage contracts. 
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The Act on Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements (Act no. 94/1986) covers 
all public-sector employees. It stipulates the conditions a union must fulfill in order to 
negotiate on behalf of employees and states that the Ministry of Finance negotiates on 
behalf of the central government. The act defines the general contents of a collective 
bargaining agreement, including wages, both the base wage and overtime payments, 
working hours, and vacation, among other topics. The act also stipulates under which 
conditions a union is allowed to strike and discusses which government employees are 
not allowed to strike. 
Other items discussed in the Act on Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements 
include when and how to refer cases to a labor court in case of a disagreement 
between the parties to the collective bargaining agreement. Also discussed are the 
rights and responsibilities of shop stewards. 
2.6. Conflicts and strikes in the public sector 
Most central government employees have the right to strike. Only a handful of unions 
and employees of a few institutes do not have this right. Government employees who 
are not allowed to strike are the following (parentheses refer to the label used to 
identify the unions and institutes in the data set used in this research):1 
1. The heads of various government institutes that hold posts for a term of 5 years 
(not in the data set). 
2. Employees of the Althing (Union 5195). 
                                                 
1 According to the Government Employees Act No. 70/1996 and the previous Act No. 38/1954 and Act 
No. 94/1986 on Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements. The unions in the data set are listed in 
Appendix 2.B, and institutions are listed in Appendix 2.C. 
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3. Employees of the ministries (Union 5303 and Union 5196). 
4. Employees of the National Audit Office (Union 5536). 
5. Employees of the Ombudsman of the Althing (Union 5194). 
6. Police officers (Union 5405). 
7. Customs officers (Union 5627). 
8. Employees of the Office of the President of Iceland (Institute 00-101). 
9. Employees of the court system including the Supreme Court (Institutes 06-201, 
06-210, 06-211, 06-212, 06-213, 06-214, 06-215, 06-216, 06-217, 06-218). 
10. Employees of the State Prosecutor (Institute 06-301). 
11. Employees of the State Solicitor General (Institute 09-105). 
12. Employees of the State Arbitrator (Institute 07-302). 
13. Employees of the Ombudsman for Children (Institute 01-241). 
14. Prison guards (Union 5573 in Institutes 06-501, 06-512, 06-513, 06-590). 
During negotiations, if either party is unsatisfied with the progress being made, that 
party can send the negotiation to arbitration. At that point the State Arbitrator takes 
over and leads the negotiation process until an agreement is reached. 
While a contract is valid a peace obligation is in effect; thus, a strike cannot be called. 
A strike can be called only if the following requirements have been fulfilled: 
1. No contract is valid, that is, the previous contract has expired. 
2. The conflict has been called into arbitration and attempts have been made to 
solve the conflict with the aid of the State Arbitrator. 
3. A secret ballot has been cast among union members in which at least 50% of 
active union members take part and the majority votes for a strike. 
4. A strike has been announced at least 15 days in advance. 
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The number of conflicts in the public sector during the period 1994–2004 is shown in 
Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Conflicts in the public sector, 1994–2004. 
Number of conflicts. 
 
Source: The State Arbitrators’ Office 
During the period 1994–1996, many contracts were short-term contracts valid for a 
year or less, and each year a few contracts entered arbitration. In 1994 two unions 
entered arbitration, biomedical scientists and practical nurses. Both unions called 
strikes, which lasted for 45 and 50 days, respectively. The following year, seven 
unions entered arbitration, two of which called a strike. Both unions were teachers in 
secondary schools, and both unions ended up striking for 41 days. Nine unions went 
into arbitration in 1996, but no strikes were called. 
All contracts were up for renegotiation in 1997; thus, it is not surprising that 46 unions 
entered arbitration that year, especially as the employer (the central government) was 
offering a significant change to the contracts. Two unions called a strike, but both 
Arbitration Called a strike Went on strike Went on a long strike
1994 2 2 2 2
1995 7 2 2 2
1996 9 0 0 0
1997 46 2 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0
2000 2 1 1 1
2001 16 9 5 0
2002 1 0 0 0
2003 1 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0
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strikes were averted. There were no strikes in 1998 and 1999 in the public sector, as 
contracts were in force for all public-sector unions. 
In 2000 as the contracts made in 1997 expired, two unions entered arbitration, air 
traffic controllers and secondary school teachers. The teachers went on strike, which 
lasted for 61 days and ended in early 2001. 
Contracts from the negotiating round that started in 2000 were still being negotiated in 
early 2001, and 16 unions entered arbitration. Of the 16, 9 unions called a strike and 5 
eventually went on strike. These were air traffic controllers, registered nurses, 
practical nurses, and social educators, as well as teachers, who had begun their strike 
in 2000. There were no strikes in the public sector in 2002, 2003, and 2004, as 
contracts were in force for most public-sector unions. Only 2 unions entered 
arbitration, hospital doctors and pharmacists. 
2.7. The earlier agreements 
During the previous decades, public-sector wage contracts in Iceland were very rigid. 
All job titles were defined in the contracts and were limited to a narrow range of pay 
levels. Unlike private-sector contracts, which stipulate only the minimum wage, 
public-sector contracts stipulate the base wage for all employees. The base wage was 
presented in a single wage table. A sample of such a table from the secondary school 
teachers’ collective bargaining agreement can be seen in Table 2.2. 
These earlier agreements held that all related communication was to take place 
between the Ministry of Finance, on the one hand, and individual unions, on the other. 
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Any decision regarding placing an individual within the wage table was made by the 
parties to the agreement, and little or no flexibility existed within each institute. 
Table 2.2. Wage schedule from contracts prior to 1997. 
Employees move down the wage schedule with promotion, while a horizontal move is 
due to seniority and/or age. A limited vertical move is also possible in some contracts 
due to seniority and/or age. In this contract most individuals start in the third column 
and in line marked 142. 
 
Source: Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Association of 
Teachers in Upper Secondary Schools (1995) 
The contract spelled out the range in which an individual with certain types of 
responsibilities could be placed, usually within two or three lines of the contract. This 
determined vertical placement within the wage table. Horizontal placement was 
determined by the person’s age or seniority. In some cases a vertical move was also 
possible due to age or seniority. Thus one could attain a significant wage gain simply 
by growing older. 
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During negotiations the government tried to limit the increase in the base wage. This 
pushed the wage pressures into other wages, overtime, and other payments, thus 
causing “wage drift.” This also encouraged job title “inflation.” Other measures to 
increase pay were also used; the most common was to pay “unworked” overtime, a 
tactic in which an agreement was made to pay an employee for a certain number of 
overtime hours each month without the work actually being done. Thus, by the middle 
of the 1990s, the base wage accounted for only about 60% of total earnings. 
The contract period was often less than a year, and during the period 1994–1997 the 
general contracts were in place during these periods: 
1. May 1993 to December 1994. This contract held no general wage increases but 
made specific allowances for the lowest-paid employees. 
2. Spring 1995 to December 1996. The contracts had either an increase of 2,700 
kronur or a 3% increase. The wages increased first at the signing of the 
contract and again in January 1996. 
2.8. The new collective agreements 
In the negotiating round that took place in 1997, significant changes were made to the 
wage structure in the contract. 
The agreements made with the new wage structure state the following as the objective 
of both negotiating parties: 
The negotiating parties agree on a new wage system. The objective of the 
change is the following: 
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To increase the flexibility of the wage system and reduce centralization 
in wage determination and introduce a more efficient wage system that takes 
into account the needs and responsibilities of the institutes and their 
employees. 
To give an individual institute the responsibility of executing the 
collective agreement such that it can, given its type of operation, organization, 
or other characteristics, make an agreement with the union, which then 
becomes part of the collective agreement, on what should be the underlying 
factors for evaluating the jobs at the institute. 
To increase the share of the base wage. This is done by reducing the 
number of seniority steps in the agreement and thereby reducing the weight of 
automatic wage increases. At the same time the possibility is created to change 
the composition of total earnings to reduce the share of overtime payments and 
increase the base wage without reducing the total amount actually worked or 
reducing productivity. (Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Minister 
of Finance and the Union of Natural Scientists, 1997; translated from Icelandic 
by author) 
The changes resulted in decentralization of the wage negotiation process, as the 
negotiations were split in two. First, there is a central contract between the union and 
the Ministry of Finance. This defines the base wage in kronur and general wage 
increases during the term of the contract, usually a general increase once a year during 
a 3-year contract. In each contract, three to four wage ranges, or so-called frames, are 
defined in the central agreement and include a broad job definition for each wage 
range, with the ranges usually overlapping. With the overlapping frames, an able 
specialist can be placed next to an average middle manager. The broad idea is that 
general staff are in the lowest frame, Frame A, middle managers are in Frame B, and 
higher-level officials are in the highest frame, Frame C. The range from the lowest 
wage in Frame A to the highest wage in Frame C is in most cases much wider than the 
range from the lowest to the highest wage in the earlier contracts. An example of a 
wage schedule according to the new wage agreements can be seen in Table 2.3. 
According to the new wage schedule, individuals move to the right as they age. Note 
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that seniority is not a factor for lateral movement in the table, unlike in the previous 
contract. 
In the second stage of negotiation, the members of a specific union in each workplace 
negotiate with the head of each institute on how the contract will be applied to that 
particular workplace, based on the broad definition given in the central agreement. 
Thus, an additional agreement, the institutional agreement (Icel: stofnanasamningur), 
is made within each institute with each union operating in that institute. This 
institutional agreement is considered part of the collective bargaining agreement. 
Secondary negotiations can involve the restructuring of wages, that is, a new 
classification of jobs specific to the workplace involved. Most importantly, these 
negotiations can include moving “extra” wages into the base wage, thus increasing the 
share of the base wage in total earnings. Thus, the outcome of wage negotiations 
depends on both steps of the negotiating process. 
As a result of these negotiations, the range of wages from lowest to highest was 
broadened significantly from the previous contract. At the same time, automatic 
age/seniority payment increases were minimized. Instead, the head of each institute 
has been granted much more responsibility and power in the human resources policy 
of his/her institute, that is, the power to grant individual pay increases based on merit, 
education, and so forth, where rules guiding these decisions are made in the 
institutional agreement. 
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Table 2.3. Wage schedule from a post-1997 contract. 
The wage schedule consists of three frames, A, B, and C. Each individual moves right 
in the table according to age, whereas a move down the table is discretionary. A move 
between frames usually constitutes a promotion. The figures show the monthly base 
wage for a full-time job. 
Age <25 yrs 25 yrs 27 yrs 30 yrs 35 yrs 40 yrs 
Category Step 1 Step 1 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 
A01 103.111 106.228 109.438 111.080 112.746 114.437 
A02 106.228 109.438 112.746 114.437 116.154 117.896 
A03 109.438 112.746 116.154 117.896 119.664 121.459 
A04 112.746 116.154 119.664 121.459 123.281 125.130 
A05 116.154 119.664 123.281 125.130 127.007 128.912 
A06 119.664 123.281 127.007 128.912 130.846 132.809 
A07 123.281 127.007 130.846 132.809 134.801 136.823 
A08 127.007 130.846 134.801 136.823 138.875 140.958 
A09 130.846 134.801 138.875 140.958 143.072 145.218 
A10 134.801 138.875 143.072 145.218 147.396 149.607 
A11 138.875 143.072 147.396 149.607 151.851 154.129 
A12 143.072 147.396 151.851 154.129 156.441 158.788 
A13 147.396 151.851 156.441 158.788 161.170 163.588 
A14 151.851 156.441 161.170 163.588 166.042 168.533 
A15 156.441 161.170 166.042 168.533 171.061 173.627 
A16 161.170 166.042 171.061 173.627 176.231 178.874 
Age <30 yrs 30 yrs 35 yrs 40 yrs 45 yrs  
Category Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5  
B01 132.809 134.801 136.823 138.875 140.958  
B02 136.823 138.875 140.958 143.072 145.218  
B03 140.958 143.072 145.218 147.396 149.607  
B04 145.218 147.396 149.607 151.851 154.129  
B05 149.607 151.851 154.129 156.441 158.788  
B06 154.129 156.441 158.788 161.170 163.588  
B07 158.788 161.170 163.588 166.042 168.533  
B08 163.588 166.042 168.533 171.061 173.627  
B09 168.533 171.061 173.627 176.231 178.874  
B10 173.627 176.231 178.874 181.557 184.280  
B11 178.874 181.557 184.280 187.044 189.850  
B12 184.280 187.044 189.850 192.698 195.588  
B13 189.850 192.698 195.588 198.522 201.500  
B14 195.588 198.522 201.500 204.523 207.591  
B15 201.500 204.523 207.591 210.705 213.866  
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
Age <30 yrs 30 yrs 35 yrs 40 yrs 45 yrs  
Category Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5  
B16 207.591 210.705 213.866 217.074 220.330  
B17 213.866 217.074 220.330 223.635 226.990  
B18 220.330 223.635 226.990 230.395 233.851  
Age <40 yrs 40 yrs 45 yrs    
Category Step 1 Step 2 Step 3    
C01 151.851 154.129 156.441    
C02 158.788 161.170 163.588    
C03 166.042 168.533 171.061    
C04 173.627 176.231 178.874    
C05 181.557 184.280 187.044    
C06 189.850 192.698 195.588    
C07 198.522 201.500 204.523    
C08 207.591 210.705 213.866    
C09 217.074 220.330 223.635    
C10 226.990 230.395 233.851    
C11 237.359 240.919 244.533    
C12 248.201 251.924 255.703    
C13 259.539 263.432 267.383    
C14 271.394 275.465 279.597    
C15 283.791 288.048 292.369    
C16 296.755 301.206 305.724    
Source: Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Union of Natural 
Scientists (1997) 
The first contract was signed in March 1997 with two independent unions bargaining 
together, the Union of Engineers and the Union of Technicians. The contracts took 
account of the fact that it would take time to implement the changes; thus, the changes 
to the wage table took effect in late 1997 and extended into early 1998. 
Participating in the first wave toward a new wage structure were member unions of the 
two public-sector federations, BSRB (Federation of State and Municipal Employees) 
and BHM (the Association of Academics), along with some of the independent 
unions. Most of the contracts were signed in the spring of 1997, as Table 2.4 shows. 
88 
Most of the remaining public-sector unions followed suit in the subsequent round of 
negotiations in 2001, including the third federation, KI. 
The contracts stipulated a 4.7% increase at the time of completion. The unions that 
agreed to the new wage system received an additional 1.5% increase. Most unions 
received this increase in the beginning of 1998 along with a 4% contractual increase, 
thus receiving a 5.56% increase in wages. The contracts called for a further increase of 
3.5% in January 1999 and an additional 3% in January 2000. Most contracts expired at 
the end of October 2000. 
Table 2.4. Number of unions signing contracts each month in 1997. 
 
 
The next round of negotiations resulted in general contracts being signed in the spring 
of 2001 for most unions. These contracts stipulated an initial general increase of 6.9% 
at signing and 3% at the beginning of each of the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, with the 
contracts expiring at the end of November 2004. 
New wage 
system Old system
March 2      0      
April 21      0      
May 18      2      
June 13      0      
July 0      2      
August 1      2      
September 0      1      
November 0      2      
December 0      1      
Total 55      10      
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2.9. Contracts in the public sector 
The structure of the various collective bargaining agreements with different unions in 
the public sector is similar. The first 12 chapters of the agreements include similar 
items, with slight variations depending on union type. When the wage structure 
changed, the general structure of the agreements did not, except for the first chapter on 
wages. This section discusses a few of the collective bargaining agreements in more 
detail. 
2.9.1. The Union of Natural Scientists (FIN) 
The Union of Natural Scientists (FIN) is a member union of the Association of 
Academics (BHM). In the last contract before the changes were made, effective from 
September 1995 to December 1996, the automatic wage increases due to age or 
seniority were 38% (Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Minister of 
Finance and the Union of Natural Scientists, 1995). In the contract signed in June 
1997 and valid until October 2000, the automatic wage increases were reduced to 11% 
(Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Union of 
Natural Scientists, 1997). The span of wages in the new agreement was 196% from the 
lowest wage to the highest wage, up from an effective span of 103% in the earlier 
agreement. The highest wage in the wage table in the new agreement was 74% higher 
than the highest wage in the earlier agreement. 
The contract contains the following chapters: 
Introduction, validity period. 
1. Wages. 
2. Working hours. 
3. Lunch and coffee breaks, cafeterias. 
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4. Vacation time and payments while on vacation. 
5. Travel and lodging while working, moving. 
6. Working conditions and safety issues. 
7. Insurance. 
8. Tools and protective clothing. 
9. Rules for replacing a superior. 
10. Continuing education. 
11. Standing committee of collective bargaining parties. 
12. The wage receipt and union dues. 
13. Validity of agreement. 
The annex to the contract includes various additions to the agreement, including an 
agreement on working hours in accordance with EU directives. Other examples 
include an agreement on payments for employees doing marine field research. 
2.9.2. The Union of University Teachers (FH) 
The Union of University Teachers also belongs to the Association of Academics 
(BHM). The automatic wage increases in the last contract before 1997, effective from 
August 1995 to December 1996, were at least 26.5% (Collective Bargaining 
Agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Union of University Teachers, 
1995). In the later contract, which was valid from May 1997 to October 2000, the 
automatic wage increases were 11% (Collective Bargaining Agreement between the 
Minister of Finance and the Union of University Teachers, 1997). The effective span 
from the lowest to the highest wage in the earlier contract was 109%, whereas it was 
205% in the later contract. The highest wage in the wage table in the new contract was 
85% higher than the highest wage in the older contract. 
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The contract contains the following chapters: 
Introduction, validity period. 
1. Wages. 
2. Working hours. 
3. Lunch and coffee breaks, cafeterias. 
4. Vacation time and payments while on vacation. 
5. Travel and lodging while working, moving. 
6. Working conditions and safety issues. 
7. Insurance. 
8. Tools and protective clothing. 
9. Rules for replacing a superior. 
10. Education. 
11. Standing committee of collective bargaining parties and institutional 
agreements. 
12. Union members’ rights in case of illness or accidents. 
13. Parental leave. 
14. Family and support fund. 
15. Additional payments to pension funds. 
16. The wage receipt and union dues. 
17. Premise of the agreement and validity period. 
The annex to the contract includes an agreement on how to move from the old wage 
system to the new wage system. Also included is an agreement on working hours in 
accordance with the EU directive. 
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2.9.3. SFR–Union of Public Servants 
SFR is a member union of the Federation of State and Municipal Employees (BSRB). 
It is the largest of the public-sector unions and is represented in the sample by over 
4,000 individuals. Although a single union with a single contract, SFR consists of 
three separate groups: unskilled employees in the health sector, technical staff, and 
clerical staff. Thus, in the data set the union is treated as three separate unions.   
In the agreement that was valid from April 1995 to December 1996, the minimum 
automatic wage increase was 24% but could go up to 29% (Collective Bargaining 
Agreement between the Minister of Finance and SFR–Union of Public Servants, 1995) 
In the contract that was valid from April 1997 to October 2000, these automatic wage 
increases were reduced to 11% (Collective Bargaining Agreement between the 
Minister of Finance and SFR–Union of Public Servants, 1997). The span from the 
lowest to the highest wage in both contracts was similar, or 170%. The highest wage 
in the wage table in the new contract was 40% higher than the highest wage in the 
older contract. 
The contract contains the following chapters: 
Introduction, validity period. 
1. Wages. 
2. Working hours. 
3. Lunch and coffee breaks, cafeterias. 
4. Vacation time and payments while on vacation. 
5. Travel and lodging while working. 
6. Working conditions and safety issues. 
7. Insurance. 
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8. Tools and protective clothing. 
9. Rules for replacing a superior. 
10. Continuing education. 
11. Standing committee of collective bargaining parties. 
12. The wage receipt and union dues. 
13. The role of the union. 
14. The premise of the agreement. 
The annex includes an agreement on working hours in accordance with EU directives. 
Because it is such a large union, SFR encompasses a wide variety of employees. 
Therefore, the annex also includes various agreements for different groups, such as 
ballet dancers, theater staff other than actors and actresses, prison guards, and people 
engaged in field marine research, among others. 
2.9.4. The Policemen’s Union 
The Policemen’s Union also belongs to the Federation of State and Municipal 
Employees (BSRB). This union did not change its contract in the same way as most 
other unions in this period. In the contract that was valid from October 1995 to 
December 1996, the wage increase in the wage table due to seniority or age was at 
least 33% (Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Minister of Finance and the 
Policemen’s Union, 1995). The total span of the wage table, that is, the span from the 
lowest wage to the highest wage, was 140%. 
In the agreement that was valid from August 1997 to October 2000, automatic 
increases were reduced to 28% maximum (Collective Bargaining Agreement between 
the Minister of Finance and the Policemen’s Union, 1997). The span from the lowest 
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to the highest wage in the wage table was 130%. The highest wage in the new wage 
table was 20% higher than the highest wage in the old wage table. 
In the policemen’s contract there is no provision regarding general wage increases, 
which are an important factor in the other contracts. This does not mean there are no 
general wage increases during the term of the contract. To compensate for the fact that 
policemen do not have the right to strike, the contract includes a specific clause that 
ensures that they receive an increase in the base wage equal to the average increase in 
the base wage obtained by other central government workers. Every May and 
November policemen’s base wages are adjusted according to this measure. This rule 
also applies to the Icelandic Customs Officers’ Union. 
The contract contains the following chapters: 
Introduction, validity period. 
1. Wages. 
2. Working hours. 
3. Lunch and coffee breaks, cafeterias. 
4. Vacation time and payments while on vacation. 
5. Travel and lodging while working. 
6. Working conditions and safety issues. 
7. Insurance. 
8. Tools and protective clothing. 
9. Rules for replacing a superior. 
10. Continuing education. 
11. Standing committee of collective bargaining parties. 
12. The wage receipt and union dues. 
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13. Telephone costs. 
14. Validity of the agreement and resignation clause. 
The annex includes the agreement on working hours in accordance with EU directives, 
an agreement on how the biannual increase in the base wage should be measured, and 
an agreement regarding weapons used by policemen, among other topics. 
2.9.5. The Association of Teachers in Upper Secondary Schools (KI) 
Secondary school teachers used to belong to two separate unions, one that operated 
within the Association of Academics (BHM) and another that operated outside the 
main federations as KI. However, the two unions planned to merge and thus their 
contracts were identical during the period in question, although they operated within 
different federations. In the contract prior to 1997, the automatic wage increases 
amounted to 23%, while the span from the lowest to the highest effective wage in the 
wage table was 109% (Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Minister of 
Finance and the Association of Teachers in Upper Secondary Schools, 1995). 
The unions negotiated a common contract again in 1997 but did not enter the new 
wage system. The two unions merged in 2000, and the resulting union operates as a 
part of KI, the Teachers’ Union. In early 2001, following a long strike, the teachers 
signed a contract adopting the new wage system. The automatic increases in the new 
contract amount to 16% (Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Minister of 
Finance and the Association of Teachers in Upper Secondary Schools, 2001). 
The contract contains the following chapters: 
Introduction, validity period. 
1. Wages. 
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2. Working hours (unlike other contracts, the teachers’ contracts stipulate in 
detail how working hours are determined). 
3. Lunch and coffee breaks, cafeterias. 
4. Vacation time and payments while on vacation. 
5. Travel and lodging while working. 
6. Working conditions and safety issues. 
7. Insurance. 
8. Tools and protective clothing. 
9. Rules for replacing a superior. 
10. Continuing education. 
11. Standing committee of collective bargaining parties. 
12. Union members’ rights in case of illness or accidents. 
13. Parental leave. 
14. Family and support fund. 
15. Additional payments to pension funds. 
16. The wage receipt and union dues. 
17. Premise of the agreement and validity period. 
The annexes to the agreement include a more detailed discussion of items in the 
contract as well as various items that the parties to the agreement have agreed to 
discuss during the term of the contract. 
3. The economic situation 
Before analyzing the wage data in the sample, I will briefly discuss economic 
development in Iceland from 1994–2004. Table 2.5 shows the economic conditions in 
terms of economic growth, unemployment, and inflation. 
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Table 2.5. Economic conditions. 
Percentage change from previous year, except unemployment. 
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
Economic growth was on average quite similar during the periods 1994–1997 and 
2001–2004, the two periods used in this study. During the period 1994–1997, average 
growth was 3.3% per year, while during the period 2001–2004 it was 3.5% per year. 
Furthermore, the economic cycle in terms of growth is similar in the two periods. The 
output gap, however, is narrower in the second period than in the first. This is evident 
when one looks at the unemployment rate, which averaged 4.5% during the period 
1994–1997, compared with 2.6% during the period 2001–2004. As would be expected, 
inflationary pressures were more pronounced during the second period (4.2%) than 
during the first (1.8%). 
There is no significant change in the central government from 1994 to 2004. A 
coalition government of the same two parties was in power from 1995 to 2007. One of 
Economic 
growth
Unemployment 
rate Inflation rate
% % %
1994 3.6          4.8          1.5          
1995 0.1          5.0          1.7          
1996 4.8          4.4          2.3          
1997 4.9          3.9          1.8          
1998 6.3          2.8          1.7          
1999 4.1          1.9          3.4          
2000 4.3          1.3          5.0          
2001 3.9          1.4          6.7          
2002 0.1          2.5          4.8          
2003 2.4          3.4          2.1          
2004 7.7          3.1          3.2          
Average 1994-1997 3.3          4.5          1.8          
Average 2001-2004 3.5          2.6          4.2          
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the coalition parties was also in government from 1991 to 1995. Thus, fiscal policy did 
not change significantly during the period in question. However, monetary policy 
changed as the Central Bank adopted an inflation target in 2001, replacing a fixed 
exchange rate regime. 
3.1. Wage development in the public sector compared with the private sector 
From 1994 to 2004, real wages according to the official wage index rose by 37%, or 
by 3.2% per year on average. There is a significant difference between wage 
development in the private sector, on the one hand, and wage development in the 
public and financial sectors, on the other. Real wages rose by 27% in the private sector 
from 1994 to 2004, or by 2.4% per year on average, while wages in the public sector 
and financial sector rose by 53% in real terms, which averages 4.3% per year. This 
development can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
Looking at the two time periods that are the basis for this study, 1994–1997 and 2001–
2004, we find a significant difference in wage development between them. According 
to the official wage index, real wage increases were slightly greater in the public and 
financial sectors than in the private sector from 1994 to 1997, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
While real wages in general rose by 13% from the first quarter of 1994 to the fourth 
quarter of 1997, real wages in the public and financial sectors rose by 16% as wages in 
the private sector grew by 11%. 
The difference is much greater when looking at the period from 2001 to 2004, as 
shown in Figure 2.4. From the first quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2004, real 
wages in general rose by 6%. Real wages in the public and financial sectors increased 
by 11%, while real wages in the private sector grew by 2.5%. 
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Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 2.2. The wage index, 1994–2004. 
Quarterly figures adjusted for inflation, index 1994 = 100. 
 
Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 2.3. Wage development from 1994 to 1997. 
Quarterly figures adjusted for inflation. Index first quarter 1994 = 100. 
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Source: Statistics Iceland 
Figure 2.4. Wage development from 2001 to 2004. 
Quarterly figures adjusted for inflation. Index first quarter 2001 = 100. 
4. The data set 
The data were supplied by the Ministry of Finance in Iceland. The data set consists of 
information on all wages paid by the central government to members of the public-
sector unions. 
The data used in this study are wages paid in October of each of the years 1994 to 
1997 and again in October of 2001 to 2004 for the unions in the three public-sector 
federations and the public-sector unions outside the federations. The years 1994 
through 1997 are the 4 years leading up to the changes made to the collective 
bargaining agreements, and the period 2001–2004 represents a 4-year period after the 
changes were implemented for those unions that adopted the new scheme in the 
negotiating round of 1997–1998. The month of October is chosen because there are no 
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public holidays in Iceland in October and because it is not affected by summer 
holidays or by end-of-year or beginning-of-year events. 
Two groups of public-sector employees are excluded from the data set. A small 
number of central government employees belong to private-sector unions. Most of 
these employees are involved in maintenance and custodial work, and their contracts 
did not undergo any changes; therefore, they are not included in the data set. In 
addition, a small number of employees, largely those who hold posts with the central 
government, are outside the public-sector unions. Their wages are determined by the 
State Salaries Commission and therefore are not included in the data set. 
To ensure that the data set consists of individuals whose main source of employment 
is with the central government, only those with base wages are included. This excludes 
individuals working mainly in the private sector while serving on a government 
committee or giving occasional lectures at a state university. Furthermore, the data set 
was limited to those individuals whose share of base wages was between 0.2 and 1.2. 
The wage measures used are total earnings and the base wage. Total earnings are the 
sum of all payments to the individual for the month in question, the base wage, and all 
other types of wages, including overtime payments. The base wage is the wage paid 
for a normal working day, that is, wages paid for daytime work without any extra 
payments, presented as a share of full-time work. To reduce the effect of different 
working hours in comparing the base wage across individuals, the base wage for 
individuals working part-time is adjusted to reflect full-time work. On the other hand, 
there is no reliable measure of the amount of work behind total earnings. All wage 
102 
figures are presented using the 2004 price level; thus, any wage changes shown reflect 
real wage changes. 
4.1. Changes in the data during the period 
During the period of the study, several government entities were made into 
corporations owned by the government, while others were privatized. The post and 
telecommunications service was split into two corporations, and the 
telecommunications part was privatized. Thus, the Postmen’s Union and the 
Telecommunication Workers’ Union were dropped from the sample. Similarly, a few 
architects had previously worked for the government. Their services were outsourced 
during the research period; thus, their union is dropped from the sample. 
Two unions, the Firemen’s Union and the Association of Teachers in Primary and 
Lower Secondary Schools, were dropped from the sample because their services 
moved from the central to local governments during the period. The primary school 
system had previously fallen under the central government’s jurisdiction, but in 1996 
the responsibility moved to the local governments. 
Thus 5,500 individuals are dropped from the sample for each of the years 1994 and 
1995, as Table 2.6 shows. Two thousand individuals are dropped for 1996. 
During the period of study, some unions merged or moved between federations. One 
teachers’ union moved from BHM to KI. The two unions of employees working for 
state radio and TV, respectively, merged. The union of midwives and the union of 
social educators moved from BSRB to BHM. A few of the smaller unions in BSRB 
joined forces and made a joint contract and thus are taken as one union in this study. 
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When comparing federations in this chapter the figures are corrected for movements 
between federations to ensure their comparability. 
Table 2.6. Observations dropped from the data set. 
 
 
4.2. Description of the data set 
The number of individuals in the sample each year ranges from 11,100 to 14,300, as 
shown in Table 2.7. The age of individuals ranges from 16 to 74. Over 86% of all 
central government workers work in or close to the capital area. 
1994 1995 1996 1997
Due to privatization:
Postmen's union 829   825   822   0   
Telecommunication workers' union 984   994   1,000   0   
Architects' union 17   19   16   11   
Operation moved from central to local government:
Firemen's union 16   17   21   22   
Primary school teachers' unions 3,312   3,426   37   2   
Other employees due to primary school 311   292   112   6   
Total 5,469   5,573   2,008   41   
2001 2002 2003 2004
Due to privatization:
Postmen's union 0   0   0   0   
Telecommunication workers' union 0   0   0   0   
Architects' union 0   0   0   0   
Operation moved from central to local government:
Firemen's union 4   4   0   0   
Primary school teachers' unions 0   0   0   0   
Other employees due to primary school 0   0   0   0   
Total 4   4   0   0   
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Table 2.7. Description of the data set. 
Numbers. 
 
 
The number of public-sector unions in the data set is 64 at the beginning of the period, 
whereas because of mergers the number of unions in the sample decreased to 59 at the 
end of the period. Union size varies greatly: from almost 4,000 members in the largest 
unions being paid by the central government to 1 member in a single union. Of the 59 
unions in 2004, 7 had 10 or fewer members being paid by the central government. 
Over 70% of the employees, however, belonged to one of the 10 largest unions. 
Table 2.8 shows that from 1994 to 1997, the average age of employees in the sample 
is 44.0 years. The women are slightly younger than the men, having an average age of 
43.3 years compared with 44.8 years for men. Women make up over half of the 
sample, or 56.8%. 
  
1994 1995 1996 1997
Observations 11,239   11,372   11,506   11,405   
Individuals 11,125   11,229   11,351   11,220   
Men 4,965   5,004   4,986   4,730   
Women 6,274   6,368   6,520   6,675   
2001 2002 2003 2004
Observations 13,572   13,925   14,367   14,550   
Individuals 13,331   13,670   14,107   14,273   
Men 5,260   5,309   5,381   5,477   
Women 8,312   8,616   8,986   9,073   
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Table 2.8. Descriptive statistics by federation, 1994–1997. 
 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 Average
Total:
Observations 11,239   11,372   11,506   11,405   11,381   
Average age 43.7   44.0   44.2   44.0   44.0   
Avg. age women 42.9   43.4   43.5   43.5   43.3   
Avg. age men 44.7   44.9   45.0   44.7   44.8   
Women, % 55.8   56.0   56.7   58.5   56.8   
Men, % 44.2   44.0   43.3   41.5   43.2   
BHM (Association of Academics):
Individuals 3,270   3,341   3,469   3,553   3,408   
Average age 41.7   42.0   42.3   41.7   41.9   
Women, % 60.9   60.6   61.0   66.4   62.2   
Men, % 39.1   39.4   39.0   33.6   37.8   
BSRB (Federation of State and Municipal Employees):
Individuals 5,584   5,562   5,570   5,451   5,542   
Average age 45.0   45.2   45.2   45.1   45.1   
Women, % 61.9   62.6   62.9   62.4   62.4   
Men, % 38.1   37.4   37.1   37.6   37.6   
KI (Teachers' Association of Iceland):
Individuals 1,306   1,337   1,295   1,358   1,324   
Average age 44.5   44.8   45.2   45.8   45.1   
Women, % 44.5   45.7   47.2   47.0   46.1   
Men, % 55.5   54.3   52.8   53.0   53.9   
Unions outside federations:
Individuals 1,079   1,132   1,172   1,043   1,107   
Average age 42.7   43.5   43.4   43.7   43.3   
Women, % 22.6   22.1   24.7   26.7   24.0   
Men, % 77.4   77.9   75.3   73.3   76.0   
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Table 2.9. Descriptive statistics by federation, 2001–2004. 
 
 
The largest federation of unions is BSRB (Federation of State and Municipal 
Employees), representing 49% of all employees; BHM (the Association of 
Academics) is the second-largest federation of unions, representing 30% of the 
2001 2002 2003 2004 Average
Total:
Individuals 13,331   13,670   14,107   14,273   13,845   
Average age 44.4   44.6   44.8   45.0   44.7   
Avg. age women 43.8   44.0   44.2   44.6   44.2   
Avg. age men 45.4   45.6   45.6   45.6   45.6   
Women, % 62.4   63.0   63.7   63.6   63.2   
Men, % 37.6   37.0   36.3   36.4   36.8   
BHM (Association of Academics):
Individuals 4,669   4,802   5,058   5,143   4,918   
Average age 42.9   43.1   43.5   43.9   43.4   
Women, % 69.1   69.7   70.1   69.9   69.7   
Men, % 30.9   30.3   29.9   30.1   30.3   
BSRB (Federation of State and Municipal Employees):
Individuals 6,313   6,456   6,601   6,620   6,498   
Average age 44.9   45.1   45.1   45.2   45.1   
Women, % 64.7   65.7   66.4   65.5   65.6   
Men, % 35.3   34.3   33.6   34.5   34.4   
KI (Teachers' Association of Iceland):
Individuals 1,323   1,352   1,332   1,408   1,354   
Average age 47.1   47.3   47.5   47.5   47.4   
Women, % 48.7   48.4   49.8   52.0   49.7   
Men, % 51.3   51.6   50.2   48.0   50.3   
Unions outside federations:
Individuals 1,267   1,315   1,376   1,379   1,334   
Average age 45.0   45.1   45.0   45.3   45.1   
Women, % 27.9   26.8   28.9   29.9   28.4   
Men, % 72.1   71.6   71.1   70.1   71.2   
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employees in the sample. KI (the Icelandic Teachers’ Union) is the smallest 
federation, representing 12% of employees. The members of BSRB and KI are the 
oldest, at an average age of 45 years. The share of men and women in the two largest 
federations is similar: around 60% women and 40% men. The gender division is more 
even in KI, at 45% women and 55% men. 
In the second research period, 2001–2004, the average age is slightly higher than in 
the first period, or 44.7 years compared with 44.0 years in 1994–1997, as shown in 
Table 2.9. The share of women in the sample has risen from 56.8% to 63.2% in the 
second period. 
BSRB is still the largest federation, although its share has fallen slightly, from 49% to 
47%. BHM has gained share from 30% to 35%. KI’s share has fallen from 12% to 
10%. The share of women is growing in BHM and BSRB, as the share of women in 
BHM is up to 70% and 65% in BSRB. The gender division in KI is, on the other hand, 
equal. 
4.3. Data set for alternative workers 
The model used in chapter 3 requires information on the alternative wage or the 
outside wage, meaning the wage the public-sector employee would be likely to receive 
if he or she were working in the private sector. In order to estimate the alternative 
wage in the private sector from 1994 to 1997, I used data from Statistics Iceland. The 
data collection method in the two periods is not the same. The data for 1994–1997 are 
quarterly data based on those companies willing to submit data, whereas the data for 
2001–2004 are monthly data based on a survey of employers with 10 or more 
employees. 
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The data used for 2001–2004 are from October of each year. The data for 1994–1997 
are fourth-quarter data. Furthermore, the data collection according to this system was 
abandoned in the middle of 1997, and no data are available for the second half. Thus, 
the data for 1997 are second-quarter data calculated to fourth-quarter equivalents using 
the wage index (a 2.56% increase). The data for 1994–1997 accurately reflect the 
wages of a general office worker, but the data set contains only a handful of 
employees with a tertiary degree. Thus, a correction had to be made to the data for 
1994–1997 to account for this. 
A markup in wages due to university education was estimated for the period 2001–
2004. Information on university education is not included in the data set, but from job 
type it is possible to deduct which individuals have a university education and which 
do not. The estimates of approximately 0.398 log points for total earnings and 0.426 
log points for the base wage in the second period were used to reflect university-
educated employees in the first period. This method assumes that the markup 
remained constant between the two periods. To test this assumption, the university 
markup was estimated using wage surveys taken among engineers each year during 
both periods. This estimate yielded a similar markup in both periods, thus supporting 
the use of the method discussed above. 
5. Wage development in the public sector 
5.1. Contractual wage increases 
Table 2.10 shows the increase in contractual wages according to the public-sector 
wage agreements along with the increase in the CPI from October to October each 
year, giving the real wage change. The increase in contractual wages refers to the 
general wage increase in the collective bargaining agreement every employee receives. 
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During the period 1994–1997 the increase in contractual wages was 4.3% in real 
terms, or 1.4% per year on average, whereas during the period 2001–2004 the total 
increase was 0.2% in real terms. From 1997 to 2001, the increase amounted to 0.6% in 
real terms. 
Table 2.10. Contractual changes in base wages. 
 
5.2. Changes in total earnings 
The data set shows that the wage level in real terms rises far beyond the increase in 
contractual wages between the two periods. Total earnings increase by 41% from the 
average level in 1994–1997 to the average level in 2001–2004, adjusted for inflation, 
as Table 2.11 shows. In comparison, the real change in contractual wages during the 
same period is 3.6%. The earnings of teachers and those outside the federations have 
risen most, or by 50–52% in real terms. The earnings of the largest federations, BHM 
and BSRB, have risen less, or by 39% and 34%, respectively. 
Increase in 
contractual wages
CPI increase 
October-October
Real change in 
contractual wages
1994 No increase 1.7% -1.6%
1995 3% or 2,700 kr. 2.4% 0.6%
1996 3% or 2,700 kr. 2.1% 0.9%
1997 4.7% 1.9% 2.7%
1998 4% + 1.5% 0.9% 4.6%
1999 3.5% 5.3% -1.7%
2000 3% 4.2% -1.2%
2001 6.9% 8.0% -1.0%
2002 3% 2.9% 0.1%
2003 3% 2.2% 0.8%
2004 3% 3.7% -0.7%
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Table 2.11. Development of total earnings by federation. 
Total earnings per month in Icelandic kronur, fixed 2004 prices. 
  
 
Of the three federations, the average earnings in BHM and KI are similar in 1994 and 
higher than the average level in BSRB. The members of BHM and most members of 
KI have a tertiary education, while only a few of the members of BSRB have more 
than a secondary education. Thus, a difference in the average level of earnings 
between these federations is not surprising. By 2004 the average earnings in KI 
exceeded the average earnings in BHM. BSRB, on the other hand, lags further behind 
the other federations at the end of the period than in the beginning. These estimates of 
the average level of earnings do not take into account a possible change in the 
composition of each group, including changes in seniority. 
BHM BSRB KI Other Total
Earnings:
1994 194,079  146,741  193,292  275,751  178,309  
1995 202,681  155,142  216,911  294,758  190,268  
1996 206,364  160,770  224,511  300,060  195,749  
1997 210,403  170,935  247,366  335,784  207,407  
Average 203,567  158,324  220,754  300,859  192,995  
2001 275,146  205,531  325,883  421,994  261,419  
2002 282,106  212,370  329,271  465,898  271,710  
2003 288,009  216,548  336,741  469,063  277,034  
2004 288,301  216,110  329,452  466,484  276,325  
Average 283,592  212,722  330,328  456,443  271,781  
Change:
94-97 8.4   16.5   28.0   21.8   16.3   
01-04 4.8   5.1   1.1   10.5   5.7   
Average 39.3   34.4   49.6   51.7   40.8   
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Table 2.12. Development of total earnings by gender and by federation. 
Total earnings per month in Icelandic kronur, fixed 2004 prices. 
  
 
Looking at total earnings by gender we see that women’s total earnings have increased 
more than men’s, or by 49.3% in real terms, compared with men’s 39.7% increase, as 
seen in Table 2.12. Thus, women’s total earnings as a share of men’s earnings have 
increased. The ratio increased from 61.8% to 66% for the whole sample. The largest 
change is within BHM, where the share rose from 73.6% to 81.7%, or by 8.1 
percentage points. BHM also had the highest initial share. BSRB, however, had the 
lowest share initially, as women’s total earnings amounted to 57.4% of men’s total 
Earnings
1994-1997 2001-2004 Change
Men:
BHM 243,718   325,078   33.4      
BSRB 215,686   289,315   34.1      
KI 252,639   367,818   45.6      
Other 321,804   487,517   51.5      
Total 246,506   344,391   39.7      
Women:
BHM 179,261   265,559   48.1      
BSRB 123,831   172,528   39.3      
KI 183,462   292,461   59.4      
Other 234,431   379,545   61.9      
Total 152,225   227,312   49.3      
Women's earnings as percentage of men's:
BHM 73.6  81.7  8.1      
BSRB 57.4  59.6  2.2      
KI 72.6  79.5  6.9      
Other 72.8  77.9  5.0      
Total 61.8  66.0  4.3      
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earnings. BSRB also showed the least change, as the share went up by 2.2 percentage 
points to 59.6%. 
5.3. Changes in base wages 
The premise of the contracts was to increase the share of base wages of total earnings. 
When looking at base wages adjusted to reflect daytime wages for full-time work, we 
can see a greater increase in the wage level than when looking at the level of total 
earnings. As Table 2.13 shows, the base wage rose by 58.4% on average from 1994–
1997 to 2001–2004 in real terms, compared to 40.8% for total earnings. The base 
wages of employees outside the federations rose the most, or by 75.8%. The base 
wages of KI members rose by 66.5%, while the base wages of BHM members rose by 
60.1%, and the base wages of BSRB members rose by 45.6%. 
Looking only at base wages, we see that men’s wages have risen more than women’s 
wages, or by 63.3% compared with 57.0%, as seen in Table 2.14. Thus, women’s base 
wages as a share of men’s wages have fallen from 86.2% to 82.9%, or by 3.3 
percentage points. The share fell for BHM and BSRB, while it rose for KI and the 
unions outside the federations. The women’s share of base wages for members of KI 
amounts to 97.4%; thus the gender difference in base wages is barely noticeable. 
5.4. Base wages as a share of total earnings 
With base wages rising more than total earnings, it follows that base wages as a share 
of total earnings have risen. This is reflected in Table 2.15. The share rose from 61.8% 
to 68.9% between the two periods in question, an increase of 7 percentage points. 
BHM, which initially had the largest share, shows the largest increase, or 9.1 
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percentage points. BSRB and the unions outside the federations, however, show the 
smallest change, or 5.4 percentage points. 
Table 2.13. Development of base wages by federation. 
Wages for daytime work, full-time equivalent, per month in Icelandic kronur, fixed 
2004 prices. 
 
 
Table 2.16 shows the change in base wages as a share of total earnings by gender. 
Initially the share of base wages of total earnings is lower among men than among 
women, or 56.1% compared with 68.9% for men. This suggests that men receive more 
“extra” payments, that is, payments other than base wages, and/or work more 
overtime. Women’s share rose by 4.4 percentage points to 73.3% between the two 
periods, while men’s share rose by 7.9 percentage points, thus slightly reducing the 
gap between men and women. The largest change is among men in BHM, where base 
wages as a share of total earnings rose by 13.1%. 
BHM BSRB KI Other Total
Wages:
1994 141,950  104,560  129,309  168,506  124,454  
1995 146,185  111,120  138,344  174,734  130,955  
1996 150,384  113,901  143,339  181,532  135,249  
1997 153,797  119,821  154,035  209,460  142,677  
Average 148,221  112,306  141,361  183,579  133,372  
2001 226,797  155,348  231,085  295,809  200,423  
2002 235,213  163,856  234,085  321,137  210,135  
2003 241,799  167,131  238,356  335,017  216,101  
2004 244,409  167,367  237,694  336,421  217,427  
Average 237,313  163,516  235,341  322,652  211,199  
Change:
94-97 8.3   14.6   19.1   24.3   14.6   
01-04 7.8   7.7   2.9   13.7   8.5   
Average 60.1   45.6   66.5   75.8   58.4   
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Table 2.14. Development of base wages by gender and by federation. 
Wages for daytime work, full-time equivalent, per month in Icelandic kronur, fixed 
2004 prices. 
 
 
Base wages as a share of total earnings is similar between men and women in BHM, 
with the men’s share at 74.6% compared with 73% for women. In all other federations 
the share is higher for women than for men. For BSRB the men’s share is 59.5%, 
while the women’s share is 75.3%, suggesting a sizeable difference between the 
compositions of men’s and women’s wages. 
Wages
1994-1997 2001-2004 Change
Men:
BHM 155,151   257,061   65.7     
BSRB 120,388   179,438   49.1     
KI 143,629   238,456   66.0     
Other 189,787   335,669   76.9     
Total 144,701   236,238   63.3     
Women:
BHM 144,026   228,730   58.8     
BSRB 107,446   155,160   44.4     
KI 138,708   232,195   67.4     
Other 163,893   290,439   77.2     
Total 124,740   195,864   57.0     
Women's wages as percentage of men's:
BHM 92.8  89.0  -3.9     
BSRB 89.2  86.5  -2.8     
KI 96.6  97.4  0.8     
Other 86.4  86.5  0.2     
Total 86.2  82.9  -3.3     
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Table 2.15. Base wages as a share of total earnings by federation. 
Wages for daytime work as a share of total earnings. 
 
5.5. Wage dispersion 
Decentralization can be expected to bring about more wage flexibility in response to 
changing supply and demand and, thus, greater wage dispersion (Kahn, 1998). Hibbs 
and Locking (1996) found that with centralized agreements in Sweden, wage 
dispersion fell from 1970 into the 1980s. After 1982–1983, wage dispersion began to 
rise again as the centralized wage formation system started to break down. 
Figure 2.5 shows the variance of log(wages) for both base wages and total earnings. 
Consistent with the findings of Dominguez and Gutiérrez (2004) on wages in Spanish 
firms in industry and services, the variance of total earnings is greater than the 
variance of base wages. This holds for both periods. Figure 2.5 also shows the 
BHM BSRB KI Other Total
Share:
1994 65.1  63.1  62.3  56.4  62.7  
1995 64.1  63.0  60.0  54.8  61.7  
1996 64.8  62.3  59.7  56.0  61.8  
1997 63.9  61.6  58.2  57.7  61.3  
Average 64.5  62.5  59.9  56.4  61.8  
2001 72.5  67.1  66.9  62.7  68.4  
2002 73.4  68.2  66.8  60.2  68.6  
2003 73.8  68.0  66.9  61.7  68.9  
2004 74.2  68.3  66.9  62.8  69.4  
Average 73.5  67.9  66.9  61.8  68.9  
Change:
94-97 -1.3   -1.4   -4.1   1.3   -1.4   
01-04 1.7   1.2   0.0   0.1   1.1   
Average 9.1   5.4   7.0   5.4   7.0   
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development in the variance over the research period. The variance of total earnings 
remains unchanged from the period 1994–1997 to the period 2001–2004, while the 
variance of base wages increased from the first period to the second with the 
decentralization of the bargaining process and efforts to increase base wages as a share 
of total earnings. 
Table 2.16. Base wages as a share of total earnings by gender. 
Wages for daytime work as a share of total earnings. 
 
 
Looking at other measures of wage dispersion, we see the same pattern emerge. The 
wage dispersion of total earnings barely changes between the two periods. This holds 
for the gini coefficient, the 90/10 centile ratio, and the 90/50 and the 50/10 ratios, as 
shown in Table 2.17. However, the wage dispersion increases between the two periods 
when we look at base wages. The gini coefficient increased from 0.0133 to 0.0143, 
while the 90/10 centile ratio increased from 1.0435 on average in 1994–1997 to 
1.0572 on average in 2001–2004. Although both ratios rise, there is a larger increase 
Share
1994-1997 2001-2004 Change
Men:
BHM 61.5   74.6   13.1     
BSRB 53.9   59.5   5.6     
KI 54.9   62.2   7.3     
Other 54.5   60.4   5.9     
Total 56.1   64.0   7.9     
Women:
BHM 66.9   73.0   6.0     
BSRB 71.5   75.3   3.8     
KI 67.9   72.9   4.9     
Other 64.5   66.3   1.8     
Total 68.9   73.3   4.4     
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in the 50/10 ratio than in the 90/50 ratio, suggesting that some employees at the 
bottom of the distribution are lagging in terms of increases in base wages. 
 
Figure 2.5. Variance in base wages and total earnings. 
Variance in log(wages) each year, both periods. 
The fact that the dispersion of base wages is rising while the dispersion of total 
earnings remains the same is further supported by looking at wage density. The 
density of base wages is shown in Figure 2.6, while the density of total earnings can 
be seen in Figure 2.7. Each line shows the average density over each research period. 
The wage density of base wages shows a greater change than the density for total 
earnings. Interestingly, the crooked shape of the density of base wages does not 
change between the two periods. 
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Table 2.17. Wage dispersion. 
The gini coefficient, 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 centiles using log(wages). 
 
<
1994 1995 1996 1997 Average
Gini coefficient:
Total earnings 0.0252    0.0255    0.0256    0.0265    0.0257    
Base wages 0.0113    0.0108    0.0194    0.0116    0.0133    
90/10
Total earnings 1.1117    1.1134    1.1158    1.1168    1.1144    
Base wages 1.0448    1.0419    1.0427    1.0445    1.0435    
90/50
Total earnings 1.0414    1.0443    1.0448    1.0467    1.0443    
Base wages 1.0200    1.0192    1.0189    1.0196    1.0195    
50/10
Total earnings 1.0675    1.0662    1.0680    1.0670    1.0672    
Base wages 1.0243    1.0222    1.0233    1.0243    1.0236    
2001 2002 2003 2004 Average
Gini coefficient:
Total earnings 0.0258    0.0249    0.0247    0.0252    0.0251    
Base wages 0.0144    0.0141    0.0143    0.0145    0.0143    
90/10
Total earnings 1.1139    1.1068    1.1059    1.1088    1.1088    
Base wages 1.0590    1.0555    1.0568    1.0576    1.0572    
90/50
Total earnings 1.0414    1.0405    1.0397    1.0395    1.0403    
Base wages 1.0219    1.0228    1.0226    1.0226    1.0225    
50/10
Total earnings 1.0696    1.0637    1.0636    1.0667    1.0659    
Base wages 1.0362    1.0320    1.0334    1.0342    1.0340    
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Figure 2.6. Wage density, 1994–1997 and 2001–2004. 
Average base wages, full-time equivalent, log(wages), 2004 price level. 
 
Figure 2.7. Earnings density, 1994–1997 and 2001–2004. 
Average total earnings, log(earnings), 2004 price level. 
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5.5.1. Wage dispersion by gender 
Table 2.18 shows the wage dispersion by gender. The wage dispersion of total 
earnings is greater among women than among men. The reverse is true, however, for 
base wages, where the dispersion is greater among men. From the first period to the 
second, the wage dispersion of total earnings increases for men, while it stays 
relatively constant for women, thus reducing the gender gap in the dispersion of total 
earnings. 
Table 2.18. Wage dispersion by gender. 
The gini coefficient, 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 centiles using log(wages). 
 
 
As one would expect, the wage density by gender shows that women’s wages are 
generally lower than men’s wages. The difference in base wages in the two periods 
can be seen in Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9. 
Men Women
Average Average Average Average
1994-1997 2001-2004 1994-1997 2001-2004
Gini coefficient:
Total earnings 0.0212    0.0219    0.0237    0.0238    
Base wages 0.0119    0.0150    0.0097    0.0130    
90/10
Total earnings 1.0867    1.0891    1.1032    1.1034    
Base wages 1.0475    1.0628    1.0392    1.0520    
90/50
Total earnings 1.0307    1.0317    1.0390    1.0392    
Base wages 1.0184    1.0247    1.0202    1.0222    
50/10
Total earnings 1.0543    1.0556    1.0618    1.0618    
Base wages 1.0286    1.0371    1.0185    1.0292    
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Figure 2.8. Wage density by gender, base wages, 1994–1997. 
Average base wages, full-time equivalent, log(wages), 2004 price level. 
 
Figure 2.9. Wage density by gender, base wages, 2001–2004. 
Average base wages, full-time equivalent, log(wages), 2004 price level. 
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The gender difference is even greater when we look at total earnings in the two 
periods, as shown in Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11, although as shown in Table 2.18, the 
difference narrows slightly from the first period to the second. 
5.5.2. Wage dispersion by federation 
Table 2.19 shows the wage dispersion by federation, averaged over each of the two 
periods. On the whole, the dispersion of base wages increases between the two 
periods, while the dispersion of total earnings remains unchanged in most cases. Still, 
the wage dispersion of both base wages and total earnings for KI falls between the two 
periods, contrary to the general result. This effect can also be seen for total earnings 
within BHM, although there the change is smaller. The wage dispersion of total 
earnings in the second period is largest in BSRB, which also is the largest federation. 
The density of base wages by federation changes between the two periods, as Figure 
2.12 and Figure 2.13 show. In both cases, BSRB has the lowest base wages of the 
three federations. During the period 1994–1997 the wage density of BHM and KI is 
quite similar. In the second period the wages in KI are higher than in BHM, and the 
dispersion is smaller when we look at base wages. 
There is less difference between the densities in the two periods when we look at total 
earnings, as seen in Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.15. As shown in Table 2.11, BSRB has 
the lowest wage level, trailing BHM and KI. 
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Figure 2.10. Wage density by gender, total earnings, 1994–1997. 
Average total earnings, log(earnings), 2004 price level. 
 
Figure 2.11. Wage density by gender, total earnings, 2001–2004. 
Average total earnings, log(earnings), 2004 price level. 
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Table 2.19. Wage dispersion by federation. 
The gini coefficient, 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 centiles using log(wages). 
 
 
1994-1997 BHM BSRB KI Total
Gini coefficient
Total earnings 0.0214    0.0251    0.0237    0.0257    
Base wages 0.0105    0.0080    0.0060    0.0133    
90/10
Total earnings 1.0929    1.1130    1.1114    1.1144    
Base wages 1.0270    1.0311    1.0239    1.0435    
90/50
Total earnings 1.0339    1.0453    1.0298    1.0443    
Base wages 1.0120    1.0161    1.0091    1.0195    
50/10
Total earnings 1.0571    1.0648    1.0793    1.0672    
Base wages 1.0148    1.0148    1.0147    1.0236    
2001-2004 BHM BSRB KI Total
Gini coefficient
Total earnings 0.0199    0.0244    0.0204    0.0251    
Base wages 0.0083    0.0103    0.0057    0.0143    
90/10
Total earnings 1.0861    1.1085    1.0933    1.1088    
Base wages 1.0326    1.0416    1.0226    1.0572    
90/50
Total earnings 1.0293    1.0415    1.0275    1.0403    
Base wages 1.0176    1.0192    1.0075    1.0225    
50/10
Total earnings 1.0552    1.0643    1.0640    1.0659    
Base wages 1.0147    1.0219    1.0150    1.0340    
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Figure 2.12. Wage density by federation, base wages, 1994–1997. 
Average base wages, full-time equivalent, log(wages), 2004 price level. 
 
Figure 2.13. Wage density by federation, base wages, 2001–2004. 
Average base wages, full-time equivalent, log(wages), 2004 price level. 
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Figure 2.14. Wage density by federation, total earnings, 1994–1997. 
Average total earnings, log(earnings), 2004 price level. 
 
Figure 2.15. Wage density by federation, total earnings, 2001–2004. 
Average total earnings, log(earnings), 2004 price level. 
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5.6. Wage changes by percentiles 
As discussed above, the distribution of base wages has increased, while the 
distribution of total earnings is unchanged. Thus, there does not seem to be a 
redistribution of wages within the group. This is further supported by looking at wage 
changes by percentiles, as shown in Figure 2.16. 
 
Figure 2.16. Wage changes by percentiles, base wages, full-time equivalent. 
 
The top line in Figure 2.16 shows the real wage increase by percentile over the entire 
research period, that is, from 1994 to 2004. The lower three lines show the increase 
within each research period as well as the increase between the two periods. 
The lowest percentiles show the smallest increase in base wages, while the wage 
increases rise with higher wage levels, resulting in a greater distribution of base 
wages. This is also reflected in the increase in the 50/10 centile ratio. Excluding the 
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top and the bottom five percentiles, the wage increase rises by 0.37 percentage points 
for every percentile increase in the wage level. 
Total earnings show the same trend at the bottom and at the top, as shown in Figure 
2.17, as the lowest earnings levels rise the least and the highest earnings levels receive 
the greatest increase. Unlike in the case of base wages, most of the percentiles show 
the same increase in earnings. Excluding the top and bottom five percentiles, the 
earnings increases fall by 0.02 percentage points for each percentile in the earnings 
level. 
 
Figure 2.17. Earnings changes by percentiles, total earnings. 
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while during the period 2001–2004 the exit rate measured 14.3% on average. The 
turnover figures can be seen in Table 2.20. 
Table 2.20. Labor turnover. 
Exit rate, entry rate, and total change in employment. 
 
 
A third of those employed in 1994 had left by 1997, while a quarter of those employed 
in 2001 had left by 2004. The number of employees rose by 0.85% from 1994 to 1997, 
while the increase amounted to 7.07% from 2001 to 2004. 
5.8. Individual wage changes 
Each contract stipulates a general increase in base wages that is received by every 
employee. While this wage increase can vary between collective bargaining contracts 
1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1994/97
Total 11,125    11,229    11,351    11,125    
Exit 1,556    1,722    2,118    3,397    
Entry 1,660    1,844    1,987    3,492    
Exit rate 13.99    15.34    18.66    30.53    
Entry rate 14.92    16.42    17.51    31.39    
Change in employment 0.93    1.09    -1.15    0.85    
2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2001/04
Total 13,331    13,670    14,107    13,331    
Exit 1,971    1,847    2,046    3,403    
Entry 2,310    2,284    2,212    4,345    
Exit rate 14.79    13.51    14.50    25.53    
Entry rate 17.33    16.71    15.68    32.59    
Change in employment 2.54    3.20    1.18    7.07    
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in the same bargaining round, such variation is rare. In addition to the general wage 
increase, individuals can receive wage increases above the increase in contractual 
wages. For example, they can receive a wage increase because of longer working 
hours, either through a higher share of full-time work or a greater number of overtime 
hours. Some contracts stipulate wage increases on the basis of age, seniority, and 
promotion. Furthermore, wages can rise as a result of good job performance or 
increased responsibility on the job. 
This section looks at wage increases received by each individual between two 
consecutive years. To minimize the effect of a change in daytime working hours on 
wages, individuals who changed their share of daytime work by more than 20% in 
either direction between years are excluded. In general, we should not see a decrease 
in base wages between two periods, although this is possible where an individual 
temporarily takes on a supervisor’s job and then returns to his or her old job. A 
decrease in total earnings can easily take place, however, especially if an employee 
worked less overtime than in the previous year. 
5.8.1. Changes in wages from 1994 to 1997 
According to collective bargaining agreements, wages rose by at least 3% in nominal 
terms in the spring of 1995. With an inflation rate of 2.4%, the real wage change 
between October 1994 and October 1995 is at least 0.6%. The actual wage increase 
received by public-sector employees between 1994 and 1995 was far higher, as most 
employees received a wage increase of 4% in real terms when looking at base wages, 
with a mean increase of 6.3%, as seen in Figure 2.18. Furthermore, 59% of all 
employees received an increase in base wages of between 1% and 7% in real terms. 
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Figure 2.18. Changes in base wages, full-time equivalent, from 1994 to 1995. 
Number of individuals receiving real wage change in each category. 
The wage increases are significantly larger when we look at total earnings, as Figure 
2.19 reflects. As with base wages, the most common increase is 4% in real terms, with 
a mean increase of 9.9%. The wage increases are, thus, well in excess of the increase 
in contractual wages of 0.6%. Interestingly, the median increase of total earnings of 
6.1% is very close to the median increase in base wages of 5.9%. 
This pattern of wage changes, in which the changes in total earnings are greater than 
the changes in base wages, reflects the policy followed during this period of keeping 
increases in the base wage to a minimum. Instead, other wage payments increased. 
The same picture emerges when we look at changes in wages from 1995 to 1996, as 
shown in Figure 2.20 and Figure 2.21. 
Nominal wages according to the collective bargaining agreements rose by 3% in the 
beginning of 1996, leaving a real increase in contractual wages of 0.9% between 1995 
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and 1996. Most employees received a 1% increase in base wages in real terms, and 
64% of employees received an increase in base wages of between 1% and 4%. When 
looking at total earnings, we see that 19% of employees received an increase of 
between 1% and 4%. Again, the medians of base wage increases and total earnings 
increases are similar, although the means differ. 
 
Figure 2.19. Changes in total earnings from 1994 to 1995. 
Number of individuals receiving real earnings change in each category. 
In the spring and summer of 1997, most unions received an increase of 4.7% in the 
general wage level upon signing the new agreement. Thus, the real increase in 
contractual wages according to the contracts between 1996 and 1997 is 2.7%. Between 
1996 and 1997, 44% of employees received a 3% increase in base wages in real terms, 
in line with the contractual wage increase, as Figure 2.22 shows. While 3% is also the 
most common increase when it comes to total earnings, only 8% of employees fall into 
that category, as seen in Figure 2.23. 
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Figure 2.20. Changes in base wages, full-time equivalent, from 1995 to 1996. 
Number of individuals receiving real wage change in each category. 
 
Figure 2.21. Changes in total earnings from 1995 to 1996. 
Number of individuals receiving real earnings change in each category. 
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Figure 2.22. Changes in base wages, full-time equivalent, from 1996 to 1997. 
Number of individuals receiving wage change in each category. 
 
Figure 2.23. Changes in total earnings from 1996 to 1997. 
Number of individuals receiving earnings change in each category. 
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5.8.2. Changes in wages from 2001 to 2004 
Following the changes in the wage structure that took place from 1997 to 2001, we 
continue to find a difference between increases in base wages and total earnings, 
although the difference is smaller than before. The contractual increase in wages from 
2001 to 2002 is 3% in nominal terms, leaving a real change in base wages of 0.1% 
between October 2001 and October 2002. Over 55% of employees received an 
increase of between 1% and 4% in base wages between 2001 and 2002, while 22% 
received an increase of total earnings in that bracket. Thus, a majority of employees 
received an increase in wages in excess of the contractual increase, as seen in Figure 
2.24 and Figure 2.25. A pattern similar to that during the first period appears: the 
mean increase in total earnings is greater than the mean increase in base wages, while 
the median increase is similar between base wages and total earnings. 
 
Figure 2.24. Changes in base wages, full-time equivalent, from 2001 to 2002. 
Number of individuals receiving wage change in each category. 
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Figure 2.25. Changes in total earnings from 2001 to 2002. 
Number of individuals receiving earnings change in each category. 
The collective bargaining agreements called for a nominal increase in wages of 3% in 
the beginning of 2003, yielding a real increase in contractual wages of 0.8% between 
October 2002 and October 2003. Looking at individual wage increases, we see that 
53% of all employees received an increase of 1% for base wages in real terms, as seen 
in Figure 2.26, in line with the collective bargaining agreements. When looking at 
total earnings, we see that the most common increase was also 1%; 17% of employees 
received that increase, as shown in Figure 2.27. 
From 2003 to 2004 actual wage increases were also in line with contractual wage 
increases. According to the contracts, wages rose by 3% in nominal terms in the 
beginning of 2004. With the inflation rate in excess of 3%, this resulted in a real 
decrease in base wages of 0.7% between October 2003 and October 2004. A total of 
60% of employees received no real increase in their base wages, while 19% received 
no increase in their total earnings, as seen in Figure 2.28 and Figure 2.29. The median 
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wage change is also in line with the contractual wage increase for both base wages and 
total earnings. 
 
Figure 2.26. Changes in base wages, full-time equivalent, from 2002 to 2003. 
Number of individuals receiving wage change in each category. 
 
Figure 2.27. Changes in total earnings from 2002 to 2003. 
Number of individuals receiving earnings change in each category. 
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Figure 2.28. Changes in base wages, full-time equivalent, from 2003 to 2004. 
Number of individuals receiving wage change in each category. 
 
Figure 2.29. Changes in total earnings from 2003 to 2004. 
Number of individuals receiving earnings change in each category. 
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A marked difference can be found between the two periods, in which the actual 
increases in the second period are much more in line with the contractual increase in 
the base wages than experienced in the first period. 
6. Human capital equations 
To further explore the wage formation in the public sector in Iceland, I ran classic 
human capital regressions using random effects on the individual, as shown below. 
 ݈݊ ௜ܹ௧ ൌ ௜ܺ௧ߚ ൅ ߳௜௧ (1)
Where ௜ܹ௧ is wages, ௜ܺ௧is a vector of independent variables that explain wages, ߳௜௧ is 
an error term, i refers to the individual, and t stands for time. The regressions are run 
with both base wages and total earnings as the independent variable for both the 
period 1994–1997 as well as 2001–2004. 
6.1. Human capital regressions on the whole sample 
Three regressions were run using the available explanatory variables. The difference 
between regressions (1) and (2) is that in regression (1) union dummies are included 
and federation dummies are excluded. In regression (2), this is reversed: union 
dummies are excluded and federation dummies are included. Equations (1) and (2) are 
therefore classical human capital regressions. Regression (3) is identical to regression 
(2) with the addition of the alternative wage, which alters the interpretation somewhat 
compared with the classical human capital regressions as discussed below. Table 2.21 
shows the results for base wages for full-time work during the period 1994 to 1997. 
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The explanatory power of the three regressions is very similar. The results of the 
regressions show that women received 4 to 5% lower base wages than men. The wage-
age profile has the shape of an inverse parabola, where wages reach a peak at the age 
of 54.77. Those who did not have the right to strike received 7 to 8% higher wages 
than those who were allowed to strike. There was a significant increase in real wages 
in each of the years of the period in question, and there was also a significant 
difference in wages between federations. The alternative wage had a small (3%), 
although significant, effect on wages. By including the alternative wage in the human 
capital regression, the other explanatory variables can now be interpreted as the effect 
on public-sector wages given the comparable wage in the private sector. It is therefore 
surprising that although the alternative wage has a significant effect on public-sector 
wages, including this variable does not have much effect on the estimation of the 
coefficients of the other variables in equation (3), as can be seen by comparing 
equations (2) and (3). 
Table 2.22 shows the same results as Table 2.21, for the second period, 2001 to 2004. 
The explanatory power of regressions (2) and (3) is very similar, while regression (1) 
has a greater explanatory power, suggesting that including individual unions is an 
improvement on including federations.  
In other respects, the results are in many ways similar to the results from the first 
period, except the  alternative wage seems to have a greater impact on public-sector 
wages in the second period than in the first. This suggests that during this period base 
wages were more responsive to the development of base wages in the private sector. 
There was still a significant gender difference in wages, and the magnitude was 
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similar, 5 to 6%. The highest wage was reached at the age of 56.28. The effect on 
wages of not being allowed to strike was smaller than in the earlier period and even 
measures negative in regression (1). There was still a significant increase in real wages 
in each year; however, the increase was smaller than during the period 1994 to 1997. 
There is a significant difference in base wages between federations, and the difference 
has grown, as the wages of members of BSRB (the excluded federation variable) seem 
to lag behind the wages of members of the other federations. The wage level of KI 
members also caught up with the wage level of BHM members.  
The same set of regressions was also run for total earnings. Table 2.23 shows the 
human capital regressions for total earnings during the period 1994 to 1997.  
The picture changes somewhat when the dependent variable is total earnings, that is, 
base wages and all extra payments received by the individual during the month in 
question. Again, the explanatory power is similar between the three regressions. 
However, the gender difference is much greater when it comes to total earnings than 
the difference in base wages, or 12 to 14%. The highest total earnings were reached 
later in life than base wages, or at 50.72 years of age, which suggests that older 
workers received a greater share of their wages as extra payments than did their 
younger counterparts. The wage effect of not being allowed to strike is similar for total 
earnings as estimated for base wages. During the period 1994 to 1997 the real earnings 
increase in each year is similar to the increase for base wages. When comparing 
federations, we see that the difference between base wages and total earnings is 
similar, except for KI members, whose base wages are 14 to 15% higher than the 
wages received by BSRB members. When it comes to total earnings, KI members 
142 
received wages that are 2% higher than the BSRB wage level. Thus, BSRB members 
received more extra payments than did KI members. 
Table 2.21. Human capital regressions, base wages, 1994–1997. 
   
  Dependent variable:    
  Log(base wages) (1) (2) (3) 
     
   
  constant 10.72862 * 10.76166 * 10.48762 *
  alternative wage - - 0.02626 *
  gender -0.04497 * -0.04765 * -0.04184 *
  age 0.03430 * 0.03538 * 0.03368 *
  age squared -0.00031 * -0.00033 * -0.00031 *
  share of daytime work 0.04735 * 0.04675 * 0.04681 *
  share of women in union 0.00150 * 0.00049 * 0.00044 *
  part time share in union 0.00078 * -0.00012 -0.00007 
  size of union 0.00012 * -0.00002 * -0.00002 *
  no strike -0.01126 0.07090 * 0.07344 *
  working in country -0.00258 -0.00691 * -0.00124 
  working close to city -0.00862 -0.00876 -0.00860 
  year 1995 0.05298 * 0.05510 * 0.05241 *
  year 1996 0.08402 * 0.08918 * 0.08769 *
  year 1997 0.14220 * 0.15012 * 0.14373 *
  federation bhm - 0.22953 * 0.22034 *
  federation ki - 0.14467 * 0.13627 *
  outside federations - 0.43716 * 0.42869 *
  size of institute 0.00046 * 0.00013 * 0.00012 *
  budget for institute -0.00001 * -0.00013 * -0.00001 *
  choice -0.33733 * -0.04589 * -0.04351 *
  ministry dummies yes yes yes 
  union dummies yes no no 
   
  R-squared:  
  within 0.6604 0.6557 0.6553 
  between 0.7755 0.7231 0.7238 
  overall 0.7617 0.7046 0.7053 
  N 42,842 42,842 42,842 
   
  * significant at 5% level.  
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Table 2.22. Human capital regressions, base wages, 2001–2004. 
   
  Dependent variable:    
  Log(base wages) (1) (2) (3) 
     
   
  constant 14.88307 * 11.02892 * 10.34202 *
  alternative wage - - 0.09038 *
  gender -0.05246 * -0.06362 * -0.04907 *
  age 0.03338 * 0.03598 * 0.03129 *
  age squared -0.00031 * -0.00033 * -0.00028 *
  share of daytime work 0.12591 * 0.05883 * -0.26607 *
  share of women in union 0.00254 -0.00093 * -0.00092 *
  part time share in union -0.00970 * 0.00060 * 0.00059 *
  size of union -0.00267 * 0.00000 * 0.00000 
  no strike -0.03456 0.04333 * 0.04280 *
  working in country -0.03152 * -0.02252 * -0.01435 *
  working close to city -0.04240 * -0.02460 * -0.02408 *
  year 2002 dropped 0.04381 * 0.04463 *
  year 2003 dropped 0.06989 * 0.06678 *
  year 2004 dropped 0.07538 * 0.07157 *
  federation bhm - 0.30743 * 0.26425 *
  federation ki - 0.29914 * 0.25585 *
  outside federations - 0.59131 * 0.55269 *
  size of institute -0.00015 * -0.00014 * -0.00014 *
  budget for institute 0.00001 * 0.00000 * 0.00000 *
  choice 1.32170 * -0.04610 * -0.04663 *
  ministry dummies yes yes yes 
  union dummies yes no no 
   
  R-squared:  
  within 0.5806 0.4674 0.4675 
  between 0.7732 0.7164 0.7164 
  overall 0.7738 0.6942 0.6942 
  N 55,414 55,414 55,414 
   
  * significant at 5% level.  
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Table 2.23. Human capital regressions, total earnings, 1994–1997. 
   
  Dependent variable:    
  Log (total earnings) (1) (2) (3) 
     
   
  constant 9.37128 * 9.55412 * 8.77745 *
  alternative wage  - - 0.08181 *
  gender -0.15316 * -0.15407 * -0.13353 *
  age 0.04650 * 0.04645 * 0.04236 *
  age squared -0.00046 * -0.00046 * -0.00042 *
  share of daytime work 1.53156 * 1.52563 * 1.52440 *
  share of women in union 0.00131 * -0.00143 * -0.00150 *
  part time share in union -0.00029 0.00056 * 0.00063 *
  size of union 0.00020 * -0.00003 * -0.00003 *
  no strike 0.02641 0.07041 * 0.07483 *
  working in country 0.00793 0.00714 * 0.02163 *
  working close to city 0.03641 * 0.03671 * 0.03697 *
  year 1995 0.05390 * 0.05752 * 0.05559 *
  year 1996 0.08448 * 0.09204 * 0.08529 *
  year 1997 0.15016 * 0.15832 * 0.14758 *
  federation bhm - 0.23498 * 0.20829 *
  federation ki - 0.04657 0.02184 *
  outside federations - 0.42981 * 0.40489 *
  size of institute 0.00018 * 0.00014 * 0.00014 *
  budget for institute 0.00001 * 0.00001 * 0.00001 *
  choice -0.58216 * -0.11339 * -0.10981 *
  ministry dummies yes yes yes 
  union dummies yes no no 
   
  R-squared:  
  within 0.4035 0.3981 0.3979 
  between 0.7631 0.7432 0.7435 
  overall 0.7080 0.6865 0.6869 
  N 42,842 42,842 42,842 
   
  * significant at 5% level.  
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Table 2.24. Human capital regressions, total earnings, 2001–2004. 
   
 Dependent variable:    
 Log (total earnings) (1) (2) (3) 
    
  
 constant 13.41698 * 9.98614 * 10.18650 *
 alternative wage - - -0.02039 
 gender -0.16774 * -0.15679 * -0.16211 *
 age 0.03936 * 0.04119 * 0.04234 *
 age squared -0.00039 * -0.00040 * -0.00041 *
 share of daytime work 1.63604 * 1.50891 * 1.53885 *
 share of women in union -0.00032 -0.00278 * -0.00278 *
 part time share in union -0.00117 0.00230 * 0.00231 *
 size of union -0.00281 * 0.00000 0.00000 
 no strike 0.14526 * 0.12975 * 0.12993 *
 working in country -0.00065 0.00209 0.00072 
 working close to city 0.06726 * 0.04708 * 0.04693 *
 year 2002 dropped 0.04020 * 0.04036 *
 year 2003 dropped 0.06569 * 0.06671 *
 year 2004 dropped 0.05995 * 0.06150 *
 federation bhm - 0.30087 * 0.30898 *
 federation ki - 0.32977 * 0.33789 *
 outside federations - 0.56195 * 0.56934 *
 size of institute 0.00006 * 0.00004 * 0.00004 *
 budget for institute 0.00003 * 0.00001 * 0.00001 *
 choice 1.57593 * -0.12693 * -0.12674 *
 ministry dummies yes yes yes 
 union dummies yes no no 
  
 R-squared:  
 within 0.7763 0.4425 0.4425 
 between 0.7188 0.7501 0.7501 
 overall 0.7234 0.6945 0.6945 
 N 55,414 55,414 55,414 
  
 * significant at 5% level.  
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Table 2.25. Human capital regressions by gender—Base wages. 
     
  Dependent variable:      
  Log (base wages)      
  Period 1994-1997 2001-2004 1994-1997  2001-2004
  Gender women women men  men
        
     
  constant 9.51476 * 9.01346 * 12.70104 * 10.97936 *
  alternative wage 0.12797 * 0.27169 * -0.21057 * -0.02543 *
  age 0.02312 * 0.01864 * 0.05674 * 0.04663 *
  age squared -0.00021 * -0.00016  -0.00053 * -0.00042 *
  share of daytime work 0.04672 * -0.92113 * 0.04567 * 0.15413  
  share of women in union 0.00057 * -0.00045 * 0.00046 * -0.00110 *
  part time share in union -0.00011  0.00017 * -0.00020   0.00205 *
  size of union -0.00002 * 0.00000  -0.00001 * 0.00000 *
  no strike 0.05753 * 0.04267 * 0.07420 * 0.02291 *
  working in country 0.02665 * -0.01033 * -0.06067 * -0.00884 *
  working close to city -0.01321 * -0.04177 * -0.00797   -0.01033 *
  year 2 0.04317 * 0.05225  0.07462 * 0.03391 *
  year 3 0.08022 * 0.06873  0.10167 * 0.05730 *
  year 4 0.10737 * 0.07375  0.21327 * 0.06180 *
  federation bhm 0.17696 * 0.19972  0.34855 * 0.33002 *
  federation ki 0.11059 * 0.22646  0.26067 * 0.24191 *
  outside federations 0.40866 * 0.50441 * 0.53677 * 0.52140 *
  size of institute 0.00004 * -0.00013 * 0.00019 * -0.00015 *
  budget for institute -0.00001 * 0.00000 * -0.00001 * 0.00001 *
  choice -0.02505 * -0.00132 * -0.04818 * -0.12676 *
  ministry dummies yes yes yes  yes
     
  R-squared:   
  within 0.7055 0.4545 0.6359  0.5053
  between 0.7373 0.7305 0.7168  0.7104
  overall 0.7106 0.7010 0.6998  0.6929
  N 24,393 34,367 18,449  21,047
     
  * significant at 5% level.   
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Table 2.26. Human capital regressions by gender—Total earnings. 
       
  Dependent variable:       
  Log (total earnings)      
  Period 1994-1997 2001-2004 1994-1997  1994-1997
  Gender women women men  men
        
     
  constant 7.47221 * 6.82539 * 10.60926 * 13.08961  
  alternative wage 0.22415 * 0.33083 * -0.15186 * -0.36038 *
  age 0.02795 * 0.01946 * 0.06831 * 0.07412 *
  age squared -0.00029 * -0.00017  -0.00066 * -0.00074 *
  share of daytime work 1.48974 * 0.90305 * 1.62311 * 2.22061  
  share of women in union -0.00123 * -0.00235 * -0.00070   -0.00270 *
  part time share in union 0.00097  0.00172 * -0.00112 * 0.00425 *
  size of union -0.00003 * 0.00000  -0.00001 * 0.00000  
  no strike 0.05904 * 0.13297 * 0.05151 * 0.09109  
  working in country 0.01046 * -0.00644 * 0.00402   0.00106  
  working close to city 0.08812 * 0.04600 * -0.02502 * 0.03840  
  year 2 0.05604 * 0.04121  0.05954 * 0.03596  
  year 3 0.06760 * 0.05608  0.11244 * 0.07114  
  year 4 0.09924 * 0.04814  0.20459 * 0.07084 *
  federation bhm 0.19180 * 0.20732  0.26589 * 0.37786 *
  federation ki -0.03632 * 0.21858  0.14630 * 0.43902 *
  outside federations 0.38307 * 0.46950 * 0.47278 * 0.60247 *
  size of institute 0.00014 * 0.00006 * 0.00012 * 0.00002 *
  budget for institute 0.00001 * 0.00001 * 0.00001 * 0.00001 *
  choice -0.07209 * -0.10811 * -0.12166 * -0.13565 *
  ministry dummies yes yes yes  yes
     
  R-squared:   
  within 0.4427 0.4466 0.3397  0.4462
  between 0.7296 0.7387 0.6719  0.7009
  overall 0.6666 0.6776 0.5655  0.6264
  N 24,393 34,367 18,449  21,047
     
  * significant at 5% level.   
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In Table 2.24 we can see the human capital regressions for total earnings during the 
period 2001 to 2004.  
Here, the explanatory power of the first regression is greater than the explanatory 
power of regressions (2) and (3). This suggests that the development of wages 
between the first and the second period depends more on individual unions than on 
individual federations.  
In the first period, the gender difference in wages measured 12 to 14%, while in the 
second period the gender difference increased to 14 to 16%. The highest wage was 
reached at the age of 51.41. The effect of not being allowed to strike was low when it 
came to base wages during the period 2001 to 2004, but the effect on total earnings is 
estimated to be 14%. In accordance with the objectives of the collective agreements 
during this period, the annual increase in real wages for base wages is somewhat 
greater than the increase measured for total earnings.  
Comparing the regressions for total earnings for the period 1994–1997, on the one 
hand, and the period 2001–2004, on the other, we see that the regressions are in fact 
quite similar. The age effect is almost identical in the two periods in spite of the fact 
that automatic wage increases due to age and seniority were cut almost in half in the 
new collective bargaining agreements. The effect of not being allowed to strike 
increased from 8 to 14%. Comparing the two periods, there also seems to be some 
reordering of the federations, as the wages of KI members were much higher than 
those of BSRB members (the omitted federation) in the second period than in the first 
period. The difference lies in that the effect of the alternative wage is positive and 
significant in the first period, and negative and insignificant in the second period. The 
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alternative wage has a significant effect on total earnings in the first period, while 
adding the alternative wage variable does not have much effect on the other variables 
in the equation. In the second period, however, the alternative wage has a negative and 
insignificant effect on total earnings, suggesting that total earnings in the private sector 
are unrelated to total earnings in the public sector in the second period. 
6.2. Human capital regressions by gender 
In the previous section, the effects of each of the explanatory variables on base wages 
and total earnings are assumed to be the same for both genders, except for the effects 
of the variable gender. In this section, the data are divided by gender and the 
regressions are run separately on women and men, thus allowing for different effects 
of the individual explanatory variables. 
Table 2.25 shows regressions on base wages identical to regression (3) in the previous 
tables, except now with separate regressions for men and women. Interestingly, the 
sign of the alternative wage is different between the two genders. While the alternative 
wage had a positive effect on women’s wages, it had a negative effect on men’s 
wages.  
The share of daytime work had a similar effect on men and women in the first period, 
whereas in the second period it had larger effects and negative effects on women, 
while the effects on men’s wages are positive. The age effects were slightly larger for 
women than for men. The wage effects for those who were not allowed to strike were 
similar for women in the two periods, while for men the effects were greater than the 
effects for women in the first period and lower than the effects on women’s wages in 
the second period. Being a member of the union federation BHM had larger effects on 
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base wages for men than for women in both periods. In the first period the effect of 
being a member of KI was larger for men than for women. However, in the second 
period the effects were similar for men and women, thus reducing the wage 
differential in that federation. For those individuals who were members of unions 
where it is easy to move from the public sector to the private sector, the wage effect 
was negative. In the first period it was quite small, and larger for men than for women. 
In the second period, the wage differential had almost vanished for women, while the 
differential had grown for men.  
Table 2.26 shows a comparable regression to the one shown in Table 2.25, except that 
the dependent variable is total earnings instead of base wages. As for base wages, the 
alternative wage has a positive coefficient for women, and a negative coefficient for 
men. Furthermore, the absolute value of the coefficients grows with time.  
The age effects of total earnings were larger than for base wages. As for base wages, 
the age effects were larger for women than for men. The effect of not being allowed to 
strike was similar for both genders in the first period. In the second period the effects 
grew, and the increase was larger for women than for men. The earnings effect for 
members of the union federations BHM and KI grew from the first period to the 
second. However, the effect was larger for men than for women.  
7. Conclusion 
The real wage level in the public sector rose considerably during the period from 1994 
to 2004. The teachers’ federation (KI) received the highest increase of the three 
federations during this period, in both base wages and total earnings. Individual unions 
outside the federations also received large increases in real wages. Women’s wages 
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rose more than men’s wages, thus reducing the gender wage gap. The share of base 
wages in total earnings rose during the period in question, thus meeting that objective 
of the collective bargaining agreements. 
However, the dispersion of wages did not change much from 1994 to 2004. The 
dispersion of base wages increased somewhat, but the dispersion of total earnings was 
largely unchanged, regardless of the measurement used.  
Thus, there is no strong evidence for a structural change in wages between the two 
periods. Looking at wage increases by percentiles, we see that most employees 
received the same increase in real wages from 1994 to 2004, thus raising the real wage 
level without changing the structure. 
Simple human capital regressions show that even though there are some differences in 
the individual estimated coefficients between the two periods, both when looking at 
regressions using base wages as the dependent variable and when using total earnings 
as the dependent variable, the difference is quite small.  
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APPENDIX 2.A: GLOSSARY 
BHM: Association of Academics. 
BSRB: Federation of State and Municipal Employees. 
FIN: The Union of Natural Scientists. 
FH: The Union of University Teachers 
KI: Icelandic Teachers’ Union. 
Kjararad: State Salaries Commission. 
Logbirtingarblad: Legal Gazette. 
SFR: Union of Public Servants 
SNR: State Negotiation Committee. 
Stofnanasamningur: Institutional Agreement. 
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APPENDIX 2.B: UNIONS 
BHM Association of Academics  
u5129 Dýralæknafélag Íslands   Icelandic Veterinary Association 
u5171 Stéttarfélag bókasafns- og upplýsingafræðinga Union of Library and Information Scientists 
u5184 Félag fréttamanna    The Society of Broadcast Journalists 
u5192 Félag háskólakennara   The Union of University Teachers 
u5193 Félag háskólakennara á Akureyri  The Union of University Teachers in Akureyri 
u5196 Fél hásk.mennt starfsmanna stjórnarráðsins The Association of University Graduates  
        Ministry Employees 
u5225 Félag íslenskra fræða   The Society for Icelandic Studies 
u5232 Félag íslenskra hjúkrunarfræðinga  The Icelandic Nurses’ Association 
u5243 Félag íslenskra náttúrufræðinga  The Union of Natural Scientists 
u5252 Stéttarfélag sjúkraþjálfara   The Union of Physiotherapists 
u5307 Félag tækniháskólakennara   The Union of Engineering College Teachers 
u5313 Kjaradeild Félags ísl. félagsvísindamanna Icelandic Social Science Association 
u5366 Iðjuþjálfafélag Íslands   Icelandic Occupational Therapy Association 
u5397 Kennarafélag Kennaraháskóla Íslands  The Teachers’ Association of the Iceland  
        University of Education 
u5406 Kjarafélag viðskipta- og hagfræðinga  Union of Economists 
u5414 Ljósmæðrafélag Íslands   The Icelandic Midwives’ Association 
u5440 Stéttarfélag háskólamanna á matvæla- og næringarsviði Union of Nutrition Scientists 
u5445 Félag lífeindafræðinga   Biomedical Scientists’ Union 
u5469 Félag geislafræðinga   The Icelandic Society of Radiographers 
u5477 Sálfræðingafélag Íslands   Union of Psychologists in Iceland 
u5580 Félagsráðgjafafélag Íslands   The Icelandic Association of Social Workers 
u5582 Stéttarfélag lögfræðinga   The Lawyers Union 
u5641 Útgarður, félag háskólamanna  The Union of University Graduates 
u5740 Þroskaþjálfafélag Íslands   Association of Social Educators 
 
BSRB Federation of State and Municipal Employees  
u5177 Félag flugmálastarfsmanna ríkisins  Union of Public Employees in Aviation 
u5303 Félag starfsmanna stjórnarráðsins  The Union of Government Ministries’ employees 
u5405 Landssamband lögreglumanna  The Policemen’s Union 
u5479 Sjúkraliðafélag Íslands   The Icelandic Union of Practical Nurses 
u5535 Starfsmannafélag Reykjavíkur  Reykjavik Municipal Employees’ Association 
u5546 Starfsmannafélag Ríkisútvarpsins  State Radio and Television Employees’ 
        Association 
u5573 Starfsmannafélag ríkisstofnana T  Union of Public Servants, technicians 
u5574 Starfsmannafélag ríkisstofnana S  Union of Public Servants, office workers 
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u5575 Starfsmannafélag ríkisstofnana H  Union of Public Servants, health sector workers 
u5627 Tollvarðafélag Íslands   Icelandic Customs Officers Union 
u8001 Samflot BSRB-félaga 1994-1997  Various local unions with a common contract 
        1994-1997 
u8002 Samflot BSRB-félaga I 2001-2004  Various local unions with a common contract I 
        2001-2004 
u8001 Samflot BSRB-félaga II 2001-2004  Various local unions with a common contract II 
        2001-2004 
 
KI The Icelandic Teachers’ Union  
u5321 Félag ísl. leikskólakennara  The Association of Teachers in Preschools  
u5341 Hið íslenska kennarafélag  The Association of Teachers in Upper Secondary Schools 
u5343 Kennarasamband Íslands  The Association of Teachers in Upper Secondary Schools 
u5400 Kennarasamband Íslands  The Association of Teachers in Upper Secondary Schools 
 
UTAN Outside federations 
u5195 Félag starfsmanna Alþingis   Union of Employees of Althingi  
u5222 Félag íslenskra flugumferðarstjóra  Icelandic Air Traffic Controllers’ Association. 
u5404 Kjarafélag tæknifræðinga   The Icelandic Society of Engineers 
u5412 Leikarafélag Íslands   Icelandic Actors’ Association 
u5418 Læknafélag Íslands    The Icelandic Medical Association  
u5536 Starfsmannafélag Ríkisendurskoðunar Union of Employees of the National Audit Office 
u5576 Starfsm.fél Sinfóníuhljómsveitar Íslands Union of Members of the Symphonic Orchestra 
u5732 Stéttarfélag verkfræðinga   Society of Chartered Engineers  
u7581 Stéttarfélag íslenskra lyfjafræðinga  Pharmaceutical Society of Iceland 
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APPENDIX 2.C: LIST OF INSTITUTES 
ID Name of Institute 
00-101 Embætti forseta Íslands 
00-201 Alþingi 
00-610 Umboðsmaður Alþingis 
00-620 Ríkisendurskoðun 
01-101 Forsætisráðuneyti aðalskrifstofa 
01-231 Norræna ráðherranefndin 
01-241 Umboðsmaður barna 
01-251 Þjóðmenningarhúsið 
01-255 Minningarsafn Halldórs Laxness 
01-261 Óbyggðanefnd 
01-271 Ríkislögmaður 
01-901 Húsameistari ríkisins 
01-902 Þjóðgarðurinn á Þingvöllum 
02-101 Menntamálaráðuneyti aðalskrifstofa 
02-201 Háskóli Íslands 
02-202 Tilraunastöð háskólans að Keldum 
02-203 Raunvísindastofnun Háskólans 
02-204 Stofnun Sigurðar Nordals 
02-205 Stofnun Árna Magnússonar á Íslandi 
02-206 Orðabók Háskólans 
02-207 Íslensk málstöð 
02-208 Örnefnastofnun Íslands 
02-210 Háskólinn á Akureyri 
02-211 Tækniskóli Íslands 
02-215 Kennaraháskóli Íslands 
02-223 Rannsóknastofnun uppeldis- og 
menntamála 
02-231 Rannsóknarráð Íslands 
02-299 Háskóla- og rannsóknastarfsemi 
02-301 Menntaskólinn í Reykjavík 
02-302 Menntaskólinn á Akureyri 
02-303 Menntaskólinn á Laugarvatni 
02-304 Menntaskólinn við Hamrahlíð 
02-305 Menntaskólinn við Sund 
02-306 Framhaldsskóli Vestfjarða 
02-307 Menntaskólinn á Egilsstöðum 
02-308 Menntaskólinn í Kópavogi, fjölbraut 
02-309 Kvennaskólinn í Reykjavík 
02-319 Framhaldsskólar almennt 
02-350 Fjölbrautaskólinn í Breiðholti 
02-351 Fjölbrautaskólinn Ármúla 
02-352 Flensborgarskóli fjölbraut 
02-353 Fjölbrautaskóli Suðurnesja 
02-354 Fjölbrautaskóli Vesturlands Akranesi 
02-355 Framhaldsskólinn í Vestmannaeyjum 
02-356 Fjölbrautaskóli Norðurlands vestra 
02-357 Fjölbrautaskóli Suðurlands 
02-358 Verkmenntaskóli Austurlands 
02-359 Verkmenntaskólinn á Akureyri 
02-360 Fjölbrautaskólinn í Garðabæ 
02-361 Framhaldsskólinn í Austur-
Skaftafellssýslu 
02-362 Framhaldsskólinn á Húsavík 
02-363 Framhaldsskólinn á Laugum 
02-365 Borgarholtsskóli 
02-430 Samskiptastöð heyrnarlausra og 
heyrnarskertra 
02-441 Fullorðinsfræðsla fatlaðra 
02-506 Vélskóli Íslands 
02-507 Stýrimannaskólinn í Reykjavík 
02-514 Iðnskólinn í Reykjavík 
02-516 Iðnskólinn í Hafnarfirði 
02-523 Fósturskóli Íslands 
02-524 Þroskaþjálfaskóli Íslands 
02-531 Íþróttakennaraskóli Íslands 
02-541 Hússtjórnarskólinn í Reykjavík 
02-551 Hússtjórnarskólinn Hallormsstað 
02-561 Myndlista- og handíðaskóli Íslands 
02-562 Leiklistarskóli Íslands 
02-563 Tónlistarskólinn í Reykjavík 
02-564 Listdansskólinn 
02-571 Sjómannaskólahúsið 
02-720 Grunnskólar almennt 
02-725 Námsgagnastofnun 
02-804 Kvikmyndaskoðun 
02-902 Þjóðminjasafn Íslands 
02-903 Þjóðskjalasafn Íslands 
02-904 Safnahúsið við Hverfisgötu 
02-905 Landsbókasafn Íslands, 
Háskólabókasafn 
02-906 Listasafn Einars Jónssonar 
02-907 Listasafn Íslands 
02-908 Kvikmyndasafn Íslands 
02-909 Blindrabókasafn Íslands 
02-969 Ýmis stofnkostnaður og viðhald 
02-972 Íslenski dansflokkurinn 
02-979 Húsfriðunarsjóður 
02-981 Kvikmyndasjóður 
02-996 Íslenska upplýsingasamfélagið 
03-101 Utanríkisráðuneyti aðalskrifstofa 
03-201 Sýslumaðurinn á Keflavíkurflugvelli 
03-211 Flugmálastjórn Keflavíkurflugvelli 
03-300 Sendiráð Íslands og fastanefndir 
03-301 Sendiráð Íslands í Berlín 
03-302 Sendiráð Íslands í Kaupmannahöfn 
03-303 Sendiráð Íslands í London 
03-304 Sendiráð Íslands í Moskvu 
03-305 Sendiráð Íslands í Ósló 
03-306 Sendiráð Ísl.í París fastan OECD 
UNESCO FAO 
03-307 Sendiráð Íslands í Stokkhólmi 
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03-308 Sendiráð Íslands í Washington 
03-309 Fastanefnd Íslands hjá Sameinuðu 
þjóðunum 
03-310 Sendiráð Íslands í Brussel og hjá EB 
03-311 Fastanefnd Ísl hjá Norður-
Atlantshafsbandal 
03-312 Fastanefnd Ísl hjá alþjóðastofnunum 
og EFTA 
03-313 Fastanefnd Íslands hjá  ÖSE í Evrópu 
03-314 Sendiráð Íslands í Peking 
03-315 Sendiráð Íslands í Ottawa 
03-316 Sendiráð Íslands í Tókíó 
03-317 Sendiráð Íslands í Helsinki 
03-318 Fastanefnd Ísl hjá Evrópuráðinu 
03-390 Þróunarsamvinnustofnun Íslands 
03-401 Alþjóðastofnanir 
04-101 Landbúnaðarráðuneyti aðalskrifstofa 
04-211 Rannsóknastofnun landbúnaðarins 
04-221 Veiðimálastofnun 
04-233 Yfirdýralæknir 
04-236 Aðfangaeftirlit ríkisins 
04-261 Landbúnaðarháskólinn á Hvanneyri 
04-271 Bændaskólinn á Hólum 
04-283 Garðyrkjuskóli ríkisins 
04-311 Landgræðsla ríkisins 
04-321 Skógrækt ríkisins 
04-331 Héraðsskógar 
04-831 Jarðasjóður og Jarðeignir ríkisins 
05-101 Sjávarútvegsráðuneyti aðalskrifstofa 
05-202 Hafrannsóknastofnunin 
05-203 Rannsóknastofnun fiskiðnaðarins 
05-204 Fiskistofa 
05-213 Verðlagsstofa skiptaverðs 
05-272 Bygging rannsóknarstofnunar 
sjávarútvegsins 
06-101 Dóms- og kirkjumálaráðuneyti 
aðalskrifstofa 
06-102 Stjórnartíðindi 
06-105 Lögbirtingablað 
06-201 Hæstiréttur 
06-210 Héraðsdómstólar 
06-211 Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur 
06-212 Héraðsdómur Vesturlands 
06-213 Héraðsdómur Vestfjarða 
06-214 Héraðsdómur Norðurlands vestra 
06-215 Héraðsdómur Norðurlands eystra 
06-216 Héraðsdómur Austurlands 
06-217 Héraðsdómur Suðurlands 
06-218 Héraðsdómur Reykjaness 
06-251 Persónuvernd 
06-301 Ríkissaksóknari 
06-303 Ríkislögreglustjóri 
06-305 Lögregluskóli ríkisins 
06-311 Lögreglustjórinn í Reykjavík 
06-321 Almannavarnir ríkisins 
06-331 Umferðarráð 
06-395 Landhelgisgæsla Íslands 
06-398 Útlendingaeftirlitið 
06-411 Sýslumaðurinn í Reykjavík 
06-412 Sýslumaðurinn Akranesi 
06-413 Sýslumaðurinn Borgarnesi 
06-414 Sýslumaðurinn Stykkishólmi 
06-415 Sýslumaðurinn Búðardal 
06-416 Sýslumaðurinn Patreksfirði 
06-417 Sýslumaðurinn Bolungarvík 
06-418 Sýslumaðurinn Ísafirði 
06-419 Sýslumaðurinn Hólmavík 
06-420 Sýslumaðurinn Blönduósi 
06-421 Sýslumaðurinn Sauðárkróki 
06-422 Sýslumaðurinn Siglufirði 
06-423 Sýslumaðurinn Ólafsfirði 
06-424 Sýslumaðurinn Akureyri 
06-425 Sýslumaðurinn Húsavík 
06-426 Sýslumaðurinn Seyðisfirði 
06-427 Sýslumaðurinn Neskaupstað 
06-428 Sýslumaðurinn á Eskifirði 
06-429 Sýslumaðurinn Höfn í Hornafirði 
06-430 Sýslumaðurinn Vík í Mýrdal 
06-431 Sýslumaðurinn Hvolsvelli 
06-432 Sýslumaðurinn Vestmannaeyjum 
06-433 Sýslumaðurinn Selfossi 
06-434 Sýslumaðurinn Keflavík 
06-436 Sýslumaðurinn Hafnarfirði 
06-437 Sýslumaðurinn Kópavogi 
06-490 Ýmis rekstrarkostnaður 
sýslumannsembætta 
06-501 Fangelsismálastofnun ríkisins 
06-701 Þjóðkirkja Íslands 
07-101 Félagsmálaráðuneyti aðalskrifstofa 
07-302 Ríkissáttasemjari 
07-313 Jafnréttisstofa 
07-331 Vinnueftirlit ríkisins 
07-400 Barnaverndarstofa 
07-401 Barnaverndarráð Íslands 
07-402 Unglingaheimili ríkisins 
07-700 Málefni fatlaðra 
07-701 Málefni fatlaðra Rvík 
07-702 Málefni fatlaðra Reykjanesi 
07-703 Málefni fatlaðra Vesturlandi 
07-704 Málefni fatlaðra Vestfjörðum 
07-705 Málefni fatlaðra Norðurl vestra 
07-706 Málefni fatlaðra Norðurl eystra 
07-707 Málefni fatlaðra Austurlandi 
07-708 Málefni fatlaðra Suðurlandi 
07-710 Meðferðarheimili og sambýli 
einhverfra 
07-711 Styrktarfélag vangefinna 
07-720 Skálatúnsheimilið Mosfellsbæ 
07-750 Greiningar- og ráðgjafarstöð ríkisins 
07-795 Framkvæmdasjóður fatlaðra 
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07-801 Jöfnunarsjóður sveitarfélaga 
07-980 Vinnumálastofnun 
07-981 Félagsmálaráðuneyti vinnumál 
07-984 Atvinnuleysistryggingasjóður 
08-101 Heilbrigðis- og tryggingam.ráðuneyti 
aðalskr 
08-201 Tryggingastofnun ríkisins 
08-301 Landlæknir 
08-305 Lýðheilsustöð 
08-311 Héraðslæknir í Reykjavík 
08-315 Héraðslæknir á Norðurlandi eystra 
08-324 Heyrnar og talmeinastöð Íslands 
08-326 Sjónstöð Íslands 
08-327 Geislavarnir ríkisins 
08-330 Manneldisráð 
08-397 Lyfjastofnun 
08-399 Heilbrigðismál ýmis starfsemi 
08-402 Framkvæmdasjóður aldraðra 
08-500 Heilugæslustöðvar almennt 
08-505 Heilsugæsla í Reykjavík 
08-510 Heilsuverndarstöðin í Reykjavík 
08-522 Heilsugæslustöðin  Borgarnesi 
08-524 Heilsugæslustöð Ólafsvík 
08-525 Heilsugæslustöð Grundarfirði 
08-526 Heilsugæslustöð Búðardal 
08-552 Heilsugæslustöð Dalvík 
08-553 Heilsugæslustöðin Akureyri 
08-555 Heilsugæslustöð Kópaskeri 
08-556 Heilsugæslustöð Raufarhöfn 
08-557 Heilsugæslustöð Þórshöfn 
08-561 Heilsugæslustöð Vopnafirði 
08-565 Heilsugæslustöð Eskifirði 
08-566 Heilsugæslustöð Fáskrúðsfirði 
08-567 Heilsugæslustöð Djúpavogi 
08-568 Heilsugæslustöðin Höfn í Hornafirði 
08-571 Heilsugæslustöðin Kirkjubæjarklaustri 
08-572 Heilsugæslustöð Vík í Mýrdal 
08-574 Heilsugæsla Rangárþings 
08-575 Heilsugæslustöð Hellu 
08-576 Heilsugæslustöð Laugarási 
08-578 Heilsugæslustöð Hveragerði 
08-579 Heilsugæslustöð Þorlákshöfn 
08-582 Heilsugæslustöð Hafnarfirði 
08-583 Heilsugæslustöð Garðabæ 
08-584 Heilsugæslustöð Kópavogi 
08-585 Heilsugæslustöð Seltjarnarnesi 
08-586 Heilsugæslustöðin Mosfellsbæ 
08-621 Forvarnarsjóður 
08-996 Íslenska upplýsingasamfélagi 
09-101 Fjármálaráðuneyti aðalskrifstofa 
09-103 Ríkisbókhald 
09-201 Ríkisskattstjóri 
09-202 Skattstofan í Reykjavík 
09-203 Skattstofa Vesturlands Akranesi 
09-204 Skattstofa Vestfjarða Ísafirði 
09-205 Skattstofa Norðurlands vestra 
Siglufirði 
09-206 Skattstofa Norðurlands eystra 
Akureyri 
09-207 Skattstofa Austurlands Egilsstöðum 
09-208 Skattstofa Suðurlands Hellu 
09-209 Skattstofa Vestmannaeyja 
09-211 Skattstofa Reykjaness Hafnarfirði 
09-214 Yfirskattanefnd 
09-215 Skattrannsóknarstjóri ríkisins 
09-261 Ríkistollstjóri 
09-262 Tollstjórinn í Reykjavík 
09-402 Fasteignamat ríkisins 
09-901 Framkvæmdasýsla ríkisins 
09-905 Ríkiskaup 
09-980 Arnarhvoll 
09-984 Fasteignir ríkissjóðs 
10-101 Samgönguráðuneyti aðalskrifstofa 
10-211 Vegagerðin 
10-335 Siglingastofnun Íslands 
10-381 Rannsóknanefnd sjóslysa 
10-471 Flugmálastjórn 
10-481 Rannsóknanefnd flugslysa 
10-512 Póst- og fjarskiptastofnun 
10-651 Ferðamálaráð 
11-101 Iðnaðarráðuneyti aðalskrifstofa 
11-102 Einkaleyfastofan 
11-201 Iðntæknistofnun Íslands 
11-203 Rannsóknastofnun 
byggingariðnaðarins 
11-299 Iðja og iðnaður 
11-301 Orkustofnun 
12-101 Viðskiptaráðuneyti aðalskrifstofa 
12-302 Löggildingarstofa 
12-402 Fjármálaeftirlitið 
12-902 Samkeppnisstofnun 
13-101 Hagstofa Íslands 
14-101 Umhverfisráðuneyti aðalskrifstofa 
14-202 Náttúrurannsóknastöðin við Mývatn 
14-205 Náttúruvernd ríkisins 
14-210 Veiðistjóri 
14-211 Umhverfisstofnun 
14-221 Hollustuvernd ríkisins 
14-301 Skipulagsstofnun 
14-310 Landmælingar Íslands 
14-321 Brunamálastofnun ríkisins 
14-401 Náttúrufræðistofnun Íslands 
14-403 Náttúrustofur 
14-407 Stofnun Vilhjálms Stefánssonar 
14-410 Veðurstofa Íslands 
22-872 Lánasjóður íslenskra námsmanna 
22-970 Ríkisútvarp 
22-973 Þjóðleikhúsið 
22-974 Sinfóníuhljómsveit Íslands 
23-101 Fríhöfnin Keflavíkurflugvelli 
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29-101 Áfengis- og tóbaksverslun ríkisins 
29-932 Húseignin Borgartún 7 
29-934 Tollstöðvarhús 
31-301 Íslenskar orkurannsóknir 
31-321 Rafmagnsveitur ríkisins 
47-201 Íbúðalánasjóður 
88-000 Landspítali Háskólasjúkrahús 
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APPENDIX 2.D: VARIABLES IN THE DATA SET 
Variables on the individual: 
Id: A number used to identify each individual. The ID number is the same throughout 
the sample, while not traceable back to the individual in question. Each individual can 
have more than one observation in the sample in the case where he/she is paid from 
more than one institute. 
Gender: A dummy which takes the value 1 if the individual is a woman, 0 otherwise. 
Age: Age of individual in the particular year, based on the year of birth. 
Experience: Total experience based on the month and year the individual started work. 
Univ: Dummy equals 1 if individual can be assumed to have university education, 0 
otherwise. 
Wage variables: 
Daytime: Base wages paid for daytime work. Only individuals receiving base wages 
are included in the sample. 
Fulltime: Base wages paid for daytime work adjusted for share of daytime work. Base 
wages for daytime work if the share was 100. 
Total: Total earnings. Base wages along with any other type of payment, overtime or 
other. 
Share: Daytime work as a share of full-time work. Only those with share from 0.2 to 
1.2 are included in the sample. 
Rdaytime: Base wages paid, 2004 prices. 
Rfulltime: Base wages calculated per full-time equivalent, 2004 prices. 
Rtotal: Total earnings, 2004 prices. 
Lrdaytime: Log of base wages paid, 2004 prices. 
Lrfulltime: Log of base wages calculated per full-time equivalent, 2004 prices. 
Lrtotal: Log of total earnings, 2004 prices. 
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Workplace variables: 
Instit: The institute where the individual works. The number of institutes in the sample 
is from 320–330. 
Labamt: The number jobs at the institute. 
Sizeinst: The number of individuals working at the institute. 
Budget: The budget allocated to the institute. 
Ministry: The ministry to which the institute belongs. There are 16 ministries in the 
sample. 
m0-m88: Dummy, equals 1 for the ministry in question. Based on the variable 
Ministry. 
Union variables: 
Union: The union to which the individual belongs. The number of unions 47. 
Uxxxx: Dummy, equals 1 if the individual belongs to the union in question, 0 else, 
where each union is identified by a four digit number. Based on the variable 
Union. 
Womensh: The share of women in the union. 
Partsh: The share of part time employees in the union. 
Size: The size of the union, i.e. individuals belonging to the union. 
Federation: Variable that takes the values “bhm,” “ki,” “bsrb” or “outside” depending 
on to which federation the union belongs. Based on the variable Union. 
Bhm: Dummy, equals 1 for those that belong to the Association of Academics, BHM, 
0 else. 
Bsrb: Dummy, equals 1 for those that belong to the Federation of State and Municipal 
Employees, BSRB, 0 else. 
Ki: Dummy, equals 1 for those that belong to the Teachers’ federation, KI, 0 else. 
Outside: Dummy, equals 1 for those that are outside the federations, 0 else. 
Cfederation: Federation adjusted for changes between periods. Used when applying 
direct comparison of federations between periods. 
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Cbhm: Bhm adjusted for changes between periods. Used when applying direct 
comparison of federations between periods. 
Cbsrb: Bsrb adjusted for changes between periods. Used when applying direct 
comparison of federations between periods. 
Cki: Ki adjusted for changes between periods. Used when applying direct comparison 
of federations between periods. 
Coutside: Outside adjusted for changes between periods. Used when applying direct 
comparison of federations between periods. 
Bargaining unit: 
Bargunit: Identification number for each set of institute and union in bargaining. 
Location variables: 
Municip: The municipality where the institute is located. 
Country: Dummy, equals 1 for those that work outside the capital area, 0 else. Based 
on the variable Municip. 
Close: Dummy, equals 1 for those that work close to the capital area, 0 else. Based on 
the variable Municip. 
Time variables: 
Year: 1994–1997 or 2001–2004. 
Yxxxx: Dummies that take the value 1 in a particular year, 0 else. The years are 1994–
1997 and 2001–2004. 
Contractual variables: 
Arbxx: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the union in question went into arbitration in 
the year specified, where xx takes value from 94–97 or 01–04, 0 else. 
Arb1: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the union in question went into arbitration in 
any of the years 1994–1997, 0 else. 
Arb2: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the union in question went into arbitration in 
any of the years 2001–2004, 0 else. 
Thrstrxx: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the union in question threatened to strike 
in year xx, where xx takes value from 94–97 or 01–04, 0 else. 
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Thrstr1: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the union in question threatened to strike 
in any of the years 94–97, 0 else. 
Thrstr2: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the union in question threatened to strike 
in any of the years 01–04, 0 else. 
Strikexx: Dummy equals 1 if the union in question went on strike in year xx, where xx 
takes the value 94–97 or 01–04, 0 else. 
Strike1: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the union in question went on strike in any 
of the years 94–97, 0 else. 
Strike2: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the union in question went on strike in any 
of the years 01–04, 0 else. 
Lstrxx: Dummy equals 1 if the union in question went on a long strike in year xx, 
where xx takes the value 94–97 or 01–04, 0 else. A long strike is defined as a 
strike lasting over 40 days (there were no strikes of length between 10 and 40 
days). 
Lstr1: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the union in question went on a long strike in 
any of the years 94–97, 0 else. 
Lstr2: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the union in question went on a long strike in 
any of the years 01–04, 0 else. 
Nostrike: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the union or employees of the institute in 
question is not allowed to strike, 0 else. 
Wages system: 
Newwage97: Dummy equals 1 if the union entered the new wage system in 1997, 0 
else. 
Newwage01: Dummy equals 1 if the union entered the new wage system in 2001, 0 
else. 
Oldwage: Dummy equals 1 if the union did not enter the new wage system, 0 else. 
Alternative wages: 
Altfullwage: Base wages in alternative job as estimated using data from Statistics 
Iceland. Base wages for full-time job. See below. 
Alttotwage: Wages in alternative job as estimated using data from Statistics Iceland. 
Total earnings. See below. 
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APPENDIX 2.E: VARIABLES IN THE ALTERNATIVE WAGE DATA SET 
Id: id number to identify individuals within the sample. Individuals can be traced 
within each sample but not between samples. 
jobxxxx: Dummies for the type of job according to the Icelandic standard ISTARF95, 
which is based on the International Labour Organisation (ILO) International 
Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88). The job types chosen are 
those most comparable to the jobs in the public sector: Physical, mathematical and 
engineering science professionals and life science and health professionals 
(job2122), other professionals (job24), technicians and associate professionals 
(job3), clerks (job4), models, salespersons and demonstrators (job52). Job types in 
the data set for the earlier period are clerks and office workers. 
age: Age of individual. Based on the birth year. 
daywage: Wages paid for daytime work, fullwage adjusted for share. 
fullwage: Wages paid for regular work, full-time equivalent. 
totalwage: Total earnings for all work. 
rdaywage: real daywage, 2004 prices. 
rfullwage: real fullwage, 2004 prices. 
rtotwage: real totwage, 2004 prices. 
lrdaywage: log of rdaywage. 
lrfullwage: log of rfullwage. 
lrtotwage: log of rtotwage. 
share: Share of full-time work. 
workhrs: Total work hours. 
yxxxx: year dummies for each of the years 1994–1997 and 2001–2004. 
country: dummy equals 1 if the individuals lives in the countryside. 
female: dummy equals 1 if the individual is a woman, 0 otherwise. 
univ: dummy equal to 1 if the profession requires university education, 0 otherwise. 
Job types 2122, job24 and job3 get the value 1 in the data set for 2001–2004. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
ESTIMATING A MODEL OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR 
Abstract 
In this chapter I develop a model of collective bargaining as a two-stage process in the 
manner of Manning (1987). In the first step, the employer and the union bargain over 
wages, and in the second step, they bargain over employment, and the equilibrium is 
derived by solving the model using backward induction. The resulting two-equation 
nonlinear structural model is then applied to the central government in Iceland, 
estimated both without restrictions and with the different restrictions implied by the 
different bargaining models, in order to determine whether the collective bargaining 
structure has changed along with the changes in the collective bargaining agreements. 
1. Introduction 
How much and in which way did the changes in the collective bargaining structure 
change the wage structure? The previous chapter indicated that there might not be a 
fundamental change in the wage structure. To explore this matter further, I introduce a 
model of collective bargaining and later test the model on data from the public sector 
in Iceland. 
Several models have been developed to describe the bargaining process between firms 
and unions. In the monopoly union model, the union sets the wage level unilaterally 
subject to the firm’s labor demand curve, thus acting as a monopoly. When the wage 
has been set by the union, the firm reads off the labor demand curve how many 
workers to hire at the given wage (Booth, 1995). Therefore, no bargaining is involved 
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in the monopoly union model. This model thus represents an extreme case. A more 
realistic case is the right-to-manage model, in which the firm and the union are 
assumed to bargain over any surplus in order to determine wages. As in the monopoly 
union case, the employment level is determined by the firm. In fact, the monopoly 
union case is a special case of the right-to-manage model in which the firm has no 
bargaining power. Neither of the two models is Pareto efficient, as either party to the 
agreement can be made better off without making the other worse off by bargaining 
also over employment. This brings us to the efficient bargaining model; in this model 
both wages and employment are determined simultaneously in the bargaining process 
and, unlike the other two models, this model is efficient. 
Traditionally the two competing models of bargaining, monopoly union and efficient 
bargaining, have been treated as separate models (see, for example, McDonald and 
Solow, 1981). In this chapter I make use of the collective bargaining model set forth 
by Manning (1987) and Abowd and Lemieux (1993). In his paper, Manning 
introduces a sequential framework for bargaining in the private sector, bargaining 
separately over wages and employment. In his formulation it is possible to distinguish 
between the different collective bargaining models discussed above: monopoly union, 
right to manage, and efficient bargaining. 
In his sequential-bargaining framework, Manning considers the model in which the 
two parties bargain first over employment and then over wages as well as the model in 
which the bargaining is first over wages and then over employment. Manning shows 
that when the union and employer bargain first over employment, the level of 
employment will be such that the marginal product of labor equals the alternative 
wage, and thus, the contract is socially efficient. If the union and employer bargain 
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over wages first and then over employment, the result of the bargaining can be 
classified as monopoly union, right-to-manage, efficient bargaining, or even 
inefficient bargaining, depending on the parameters of the model. If the result of the 
bargaining does not qualify for any of the other results, Manning labels the result 
inefficient bargaining. In the model formulation, the bargaining power parameters are 
allowed to differ between the wage bargain and the employment bargain. A special 
case of efficient bargaining is strong efficiency, as described by Brown and 
Ashenfelter (1986), which implies that employment is based only on the alternative 
wage. 
Although bargaining first over employment and then over wages yields a socially 
efficient outcome, bargaining in reverse order can be considered more realistic in the 
case of the public sector in Iceland, as the contract duration is usually around 3 years, 
whereas employment fluctuates throughout the duration of the contract. All union 
contracts stipulate wages, but only a handful make any stipulations about employment 
levels. Thus it is reasonable to assume that union bargaining power for wages and for 
employment may be different. 
Trade union models usually focus on bargaining in the private sector, where the 
employers’ objectives are profit maximizing. Few attempts have been made to model 
bargaining in the public sector, and there is no universally accepted model of how 
unions and government engage in bargaining (Hosken and Margolis, 1997). A few 
papers in the literature have extended the general model of collective bargaining to the 
public sector such as Currie (1991), Hosken and Margolis (1997), and Falch (2001). 
169 
Many models of bargaining rely on the presence of a threat point for both the 
employer and the union in the determination of the equilibrium contract. The threat 
points are usually the zero-profit level for the firm and the value of time evaluated at 
the alternative wage for union workers (Abowd and Lemieux, 1993). However, in the 
public sector it is not clear that such a firm threat point exists for the employer. 
Instead, outlays in the public sector depend on a budget allocated each year. Thus, 
there is little incentive to bargain tough with the unions, and therefore wages might be 
higher than they would otherwise be, as the budget can be sidestepped. Profit 
maximization is unlikely to be the objective of institutions or ministries in the public 
sector. Total available income limits production in the public sector as opposed to 
product or service demand in the private sector. Public-sector employees are also 
voters and through the political process might seek to increase the demand for their 
services. The effect of strikes in the public sector, however, may be less than in the 
private sector, as governments continue to receive tax revenues, whereas in the private 
sector no revenue is received while production is halted (Freeman, 1986).  
2. Related research 
A few papers have been published that estimate the structure of collective bargaining 
in the public sector. Eberts and Stone (1986) and Currie (1991) both look at teachers: 
Eberts and Stone in New York State, and Currie in Canada. Falch and Stöm (2006) 
look at the effects of decentralization of bargaining in local governments in Norway. 
Falch (2001) expands the Manning sequential bargaining model to include a third step, 
which is the determination of the public-sector budget.  
Eberts and Stone (1986) use an efficient bargaining framework to test collective 
bargaining agreements made by teachers in New York State. The data are from the 
170 
New York Department of Education for the school years 1972–1973 and 1976–1977. 
They set up two competing models, a demand constraint model and a contract curve 
model. The results show strong support for the contract curve model.  
In her paper, Currie (1991) studies the contracts of school teachers in Ontario, Canada. 
She uses contract data from 1975–1983 and estimates different versions of her model, 
both a standard model and a reduced form model, with and without fixed effects. The 
results suggest that employment contracts are strongly efficient. However, she is not 
able to reject the monopoly union model.  
Falch and Ström (2006) study decentralization of wage agreements in local 
governments in Norway. Decentralization of wage bargaining should, according to the 
competitive model, increase pay differences and enhance efficiency as decentralized 
decisions on pay issues move local wages toward their competitive levels. However, 
according to Falch and Ström, observation and previous research suggest that public-
sector labor markets are not well described by the competitive model. Union influence 
and monopsony power are often considered important factors in the public sector. 
Thus, the outcome of decentralization in the public sector is an empirical question.  
Using individual earnings equations, they find that with decentralization, a larger 
budget means higher wages. Thus, the effect of budget size on wages increases as 
wage-setting is decentralized. They also find that wage differences increase somewhat 
as wage-setting is decentralized and that local wages become more responsive to local 
budgets.  
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Falch and Ström conclude their paper by conjecturing that common arguments on the 
expected efficiency gains from increased local flexibility in wage-setting in public 
institutions may be exaggerated, as the actual wage-setting process seems to be 
influenced by local unions, local interest groups, and local monopsony power, as well 
as by pay-equality norms, which change only slowly, over time. 
Falch (2001) follows the Manning model of sequential bargaining in a theoretical 
paper, applying it to the public sector. He uses a model with two inputs, labor and 
nonlabor, and a Cobb-Douglas production function. Instead of two-stage bargaining in 
the manner of Manning, he adds a third stage and solves with backward induction. The 
third bargaining stage occurs when the government budget is determined. Then, he 
looks at different regimes. In the first regime the first stage of bargaining is where the 
union and the employer bargain over employment, in the second stage they bargain 
over wages, and in the third stage the budget is determined. The second regime he 
discusses is one in which employment is determined first, the budget second, and 
wages last. Finally, Falch looks at the case in which the budget is determined first, 
employment second, and wages last.  
The first regime is shown to lead to efficient bargaining, as the outcome is on the 
contract curve. In the second regime, wages increase as budgets increase, which was 
shown empirically to be the case in Falch and Ström (2006). In general, the sign of the 
slope of the contract curve is independent of the timing of the budget decision. 
Furthermore, wages are independent of the timing of the budget decision as long as 
nothing happens between the wage and employment bargains, and if the budget is 
determined before bargaining, the employment level is lower than it otherwise would 
be. 
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The two-stage bargaining model has been developed further, with applications to both 
the private sector and the public sector. Using the private sector, Alogoskoufis and 
Manning (1991) propose a test on the two-stage bargaining introduced by Manning 
(1987). They divide the independent variables into four categories, X1, X2, X3, and Z, 
where X1 are variables that affect only the profit function of the firm, X2 are variables 
that affect both the profit function of the firm and the utility function of the union, X3 
are variables that affect only union utility, and, finally, Z are variables that affect 
neither the profit function nor the utility function. By running regressions on 
employment using 2SLS they show that it is possible to use this division of variables 
to test the model against the labor demand model and the efficient bargaining model. 
The test in the paper is on macro data, and both models are rejected. The authors 
recommend that the test be used on industry or establishment data.  
Hosken and Margolis (1997) use Manning’s model to test collective bargaining 
agreements of teachers in public schools in New York State in 1983, 1986, and 1989. 
Using two stage sequential bargaining over employment and wages on public-sector 
data, they estimate union power over wages and employment. According to their 
findings, union power varies depending on the bargaining model applied, that is, 
whether it is assumed to be monopoly union, right to manage, efficient bargaining, or 
inefficient bargaining. In the least constrained case, Hosken and Margolis find that the 
union bargaining power of wages is 0.53, while the union bargaining power over 
employment is higher, or 0.71.  
According to their results, teachers in public schools in New York State do not engage 
in monopoly union or right-to-manage style bargaining. Most of them do not engage 
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in efficient bargaining, either. Thus, the results suggest that the outcome of the 
bargaining is not Pareto-efficient. 
3. The model 
In the manner of Manning (1987), collective bargaining is modeled here as a two-
stage process. In the first step, the employer and the union bargain over wages, and in 
the second step they bargain over employment. The equilibrium is derived by solving 
the model using backward induction. First the equilibrium employment level, L, is 
found (the second stage) conditional on the outcome of the negotiated wage level, w, 
(the first stage). Then the equilibrium wage bargain is derived given that both parties 
know how this wage will affect the subsequent employment bargain. 
Using a formal representation, in the second stage of the bargain when the wage, w, 
has already been determined, employment, L, will be chosen to solve the following 
problem: 
 max
௅
ሺ1 െ ݍሻ log ܸሺݓ, ܮሻ ൅ ݍ logܷሺݓ, ܮሻ (1)
where ݍ is the union power over the employment determination, 0 ൑ ݍ ൑ 1, ܸ is the 
objective function of the employer, ܷ is the objective function of the union, ݓ is the 
wage level, and ܮ is the employment level. This problem will yield a solution ܮሺݓ, ݍሻ, 
which is assumed to be unique. 
In the first stage of the sequential bargain, when the wage level is determined, ݓ will 
be chosen to solve 
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 max
௪
ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ log ܸሾݓ, ܮሺݓ, ݍሻሿ ൅ ݌ logܷሾݓ, ܮሺݓ, ݍሻሿ (2)
where ݌ is the union power over the wage determination, 0 ൑ ݌ ൑ 1. 
The model could be set up the other way around, so that employment is determined 
first, followed by wages. However, it is more common for wages to be determined in 
advance of employment as most contracts are valid for 2 to 3 years, whereas 
employment can be adjusted throughout the term of the contract. The model assumes 
that union power can vary between the wage determination and employment 
determination, that is, ݌ does not have to equal ݍ.  
All of the different outcomes of the bargaining process can be incorporated into this 
model. In the monopoly union model, the union acts as a monopoly and unilaterally 
decides on wage levels, subject to the employer’s labor demand curve, and thus no 
bargaining takes place. In the framework of this model, this means that the union has 
all the bargaining power over wages and no bargaining power over employment. Thus, 
݌ ൌ 1 and ݍ ൌ 0. The model then becomes 
 max
௅
log ܸሺݓ, ܮሻ (3)
 max
௪
logܷሾݓ, ܮሺݓሻሿ (4)
In the right-to-manage model, the union and employer bargain over wages, and then 
the employer chooses the employment level. In terms of the model, this implies that 
0 ൏ ݌ ൏ 1 and ݍ ൌ 0. Thus, the model is now 
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 max
௅
log ܸሺݓ, ܮሻ (5)
 max
௪
ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ log ܸሾݓ, ܮሺݓሻሿ ൅ ݌ logܷሾݓ, ܮሺݓሻሿ (6)
In the case of efficient bargaining, the union has equal power over the wage 
determination and the employment determination. In that case, ݌ ൌ ݍ and the model 
becomes 
 max
௪,௅
ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ log ܸሾݓ, ܮሺݓ, ݌ሻሿ ൅ ݌ logܷሾݓ, ܮሺݓ, ݌ሻሿ (7)
The model cannot be estimated without assuming some functional form for the 
objective functions for the employer and the union. The results are therefore not 
independent of the assumptions made on the functional forms. Here, the employer is 
the central government of Iceland, and the union is one of the public-sector unions. 
In the absence of a universally accepted form for the employer’s objective function in 
the public sector, I borrow the employer’s objective function from the private sector 
and use a Cobb-Douglas production function and the objective of profit maximization, 
similar to Hosken and Margolis (1997) and Falch (2001). Thus, the employer’s 
objective function is defined as 
 ܸሺݓ, ܮሻ ൌ ݂ሺܮሻ െ ݓܮ (8)
where f(L) is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, with labor, L, being the only input. 
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 ܸሺݓ, ܮሻ ൌ ߛܮఈ െ ݓܮ (9)
where L is the employment level, γ is a constant, and α is the returns to scale. A value 
of α between 0 and 1 implies decreasing returns to scale, while ןൌ 1 implies constant 
returns to scale and ן൐ 1 suggests increasing returns. Here, γ is assumed to be a 
function of employment characteristics. As the model will be applied to the public 
sector, an option would have been to add the budget and thus the third stage to the 
bargaining in the manner of Falch (2001). However, in the case of the public sector in 
Iceland, collective bargaining takes precedence over the budget. Thus, if the total cost 
of the bargain exceeds the allocated budget, the difference will be added to the budget.   
The union objective function is defined as 
 ܷሺݓ, ܮሻ ൌ ܮఝሺݓఛ െ ܾఛሻ (10)
where b is the alternative wage or opportunity wage of a union member, φ signifies 
how much unions care about the employment level, L, and τ is an indicator of risk 
aversion. This form allows for risk-averse (߬ ൏ 1) or risk-loving (߬ ൐ 1) preferences 
of the union members. 
Using backward induction, equilibrium is found by solving first for employment and 
then for wages. The equilibrium level of employment (L) conditional on the negotiated 
wage (w) is found by solving the Nash cooperative bargaining game over employment, 
which is equivalent to solving 
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 max
௅
ሺ1 െ ݍሻ log ܸሺݓ, ܮሻ ൅ ݍ logܷሺݓ, ܮሻ (11)
or, substituting the functional forms above, 
 max
௅
ሺ1 െ ݍሻ logሺߛܮఈ െ ݓܮሻ ൅ ݍ logሺܮఝሺݓఛ െ ܾఛሻሻ (12)
This can be solved for L, and given the solution we can close the model by solving the 
Nash cooperative bargaining game over wages. This is equivalent to solving 
 max
௪
ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ log ܸሾݓ, ܮሺݓ, ݍሻሿ ൅ ݌ logܷሾݓ, ܮሺݓ, ݍሻሿ (13)
or, using the functional forms above, 
 max
௪
ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ log൫ߛܮሺݓ, ݍሻఈ െ ݓܮሺݓ, ݍሻ൯ ൅ ݌ logሺܮሺݓ, ݍሻఝሺݓఛ െ ܾఛሻሻ (14)
where the solution to the second stage is substituted in for L and p is not necessarily 
equal to q.  
The level of employment that satisfies the first-order conditions for an interior solution 
of equation (12) is 
 ܮ ൌ ൬
ݓ
ߛሺߙ െ ݍߙ ൅ ݍሻ
൰
ଵ
ןିଵ
 (15)
Solving the Nash cooperative bargaining game over wages given the employment 
level gives 
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ݓ ൌ ܾ ቈ
ן ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ൅ ݌߮
ߙሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ൅ ݌߮ ൅ ݌߬ሺߙ െ 1ሻ
቉
ଵ
ఛ
 (16)
Note that q, the bargaining power over employment, is not a factor in the wage 
equation. Furthermore, the wage, w, is an increasing function of the alternative wage, 
b. The wage, w, is also increasing in p, when ߬ ൌ 1 and ן൏ 1. 
Finally, substituting equation (16) into equation (15) yields 
 
ܮ ൌ
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
ܾ
1
ߛ
൤ ן
ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ൅ ݌߮
ߙሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ൅ ݌߮ ൅ ݌߬ሺߙ െ 1ሻ൨
ଵ
ఛ
ሺߙ െ ݍߙ ൅ ݍሻ
ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
ଵ
ఈିଵ
 
(17)
4. Implications of the model  
The different collective bargaining models discussed above are special cases of the 
model above depending on the values of the parameters p and q.  
The monopoly union model implies that ݌ ൌ 1 and ݍ ൌ 0 and thus, the solution takes 
the form 
 ܮ ൌ ൬
ݓ
ߛߙ
൰
ଵ
ןିଵ
 (18)
which is the labor demand curve that corresponds to the objective function given in 
equation (9), and 
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 ݓ ൌ ܾ ൤
߮
߮ ൅ ߬ሺߙ െ 1ሻ
൨
ଵ
ఛ
 (19)
The right-to-manage model implies that ݌ ൏ 1 and ݍ ൌ 0, giving the solution 
 ܮ ൌ ൬
ݓ
ߛߙ
൰
ଵ
ןିଵ
 (20)
and 
 
ݓ ൌ ܾ ቈ
ן ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ൅ ݌߮
ߙሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ൅ ݌߮ ൅ ݌߬ሺߙ െ 1ሻ
቉
ଵ
ఛ
 (21)
If  ݌ ൌ ݍ the contracts are efficient, that is, the negotiated agreement is on the contract 
curve given by the government’s and the union’s preferences. In the efficient 
bargaining model, the solution is 
 ܮ ൌ ൬
ݓ
ߛሺߙ െ ݌ߙ ൅ ݌ߛሻ
൰
ଵ
ןିଵ
 (22)
and 
 
ݓ ൌ ܾ ቈ
ן ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ൅ ݌߮
ߙሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ൅ ݌߮ ൅ ݌߬ሺߙ െ 1ሻ
቉
ଵ
ఛ
 (23)
If ݌ ് ݍ we observe inefficient bargaining, that is, the wage/employment combination 
is off the contract curve and off the demand curve as well, and the solution is identical 
to the original solution to the problem shown in equations (16) and (17). 
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5. Assumptions for estimating the model 
To estimate the model, equations (16) and (17) are transferred into log form and an 
error term is added: 
 ݈݋݃ܮ ൌ ൬
1
ߙ െ 1
൰ ൤݈݋ܾ݃ െ log ߛ െ ݈݋݃ሺߙ െ ݍߙ ൅ ݍሻ ൅
1
߬
logሺߙ െ ߙ݌ ൅ ݌߮ሻ
െ
1
߬
logሺߙ െ ߙ݌ ൅ ݌߮ ൅ ݌߬ߙ െ ݌߬ሻ൨ ൅ ߝ 
(24)
and 
 ݈݋݃ݓ ൌ ݈݋ܾ݃ ൅
1
߬
݈݋݃ሺߙ െ ߙ݌ ൅ ݌߮ሻ െ
1
߬
logሺߙ െ ߙ݌ ൅ ݌߮ ൅ ݌߬ߙ െ ݌߬ሻ
൅ ߦ 
(25)
Where ߝ and ߦ are statistical errors uncorrelated with the analysis variables on the 
right-hand side of equations (24) and (25). Before the model can be estimated, some 
simplifying assumptions have to be made. The variables p, q, and γ are not directly 
observable. Therefore, some assumptions have to be made in order to estimate these 
variables. The following approximating functions are defined to estimate the variables 
using observable characteristics. As p and q take values between 0 and 1, the 
functional form as shown in equations (26) and (27) is chosen so as to generate values 
between 0 and 1.  
 ݌ ൌ
݁௭భఉభ
1 ൅ ݁௭భఉభ
 (26)
 ݍ ൌ
݁௭మఉమ
1 ൅ ݁௭మఉమ
 (27)
The functions allow the bargaining power for wages and employment to vary. As there 
is no a priori reason to believe that there are factors that affect the bargaining power 
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over employment and not the bargaining power over wages or vice versa, the vector of 
variables used to explain p and q will be the same in the estimation. Thus, 
 ݖଵ ൌ ݖଶ (28)
Here, union power is defined as a function of the size of the union, the share of women 
in the union, the share of part-time employees in the union, the average age of union 
members in the workplace in question, dummy variables indicating the union 
federation, a dummy variable indicating whether the union has the right to strike or 
not, the size of the institute, the budget per employee in the institute, dummy variables 
indicating the years, and a dummy variable choice indicating whether alternative 
employment options are readily available or not.1  
The employment characteristic γ is approximated using a vector of characteristics, x. 
 ߛ ൌ ݔᇱߜ (29)
The variables used here are the age of the union members in the workplace in question 
and dummy variables indicating the years. 
Another simplifying assumption is that φ, the variable that signifies how much unions 
care about the employment level, is set equal to unity. 
                                                 
1 The values assigned to the variable choice are described in Appendix 3.A. 
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 ߮ ൌ 1 (30)
Finally, union members are assumed to be risk-neutral, and thus τ is set equal to 1. 
 ߬ ൌ 1 (31)
Thus, the structural model that is estimated is  
 ݈݋݃ܮ ൌ ൬
1
ߙ െ 1
൰ ሾ݈݋ܾ݃ െ log ߛ െ ݈݋݃ሺߙ െ ݍߙ ൅ ݍሻ ൅ logሺߙ െ ߙ݌ ൅ ݌ሻ
െ logሺߙሻሿ ൅ ߝ 
(32)
 ݈݋݃ݓ ൌ ݈݋ܾ݃ ൅ ݈݋݃ሺߙ െ ߙ݌ ൅ ݌ሻ െ logሺߙሻ ൅ ߦ (33)
The error terms in the equations represent omitted variables, for instance missing 
information on the individuals, especially better information on education; 
measurement error in the included variables; unobserved heterogeneity on both the 
individuals and the institutes as well as any effects if functional form is not correct and 
assumptions given before the estimation do not hold. 
6. Data 
The data is described in detail in Section 4 of Chapter 2. The data on individuals is 
transformed into data on each bargaining unit. The bargaining unit is defined as each 
pair of union and institute that signs an institutional agreement. There can be many 
unions in a single institute, and a single union can be present in many institutes. There 
are 3,780 bargaining pairs in the period 1994–1997 and 3,963 in the period 2001–
2004. Table 3.1 shows the mean and standard deviation of the variables used in the 
regressions. 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics. 
  
 1994-1997 2001-2004 
 Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
  
  
 log base wages 11.7828 0.2018 12.2985 0.2591
 log total earnings 12.0470 0.4700 12.4411 0.4306
 log alternative base wages 12.0322 0.3007 12.2416 0.5932
 log alternative total 
earnings 
10.6708 0.2766 12.4585 0.3628
 age 43.5183 8.7840 44.9403 8.0864
 year 1 0.2394 0.4268 0.2549 0.4358
 year 2 0.2537 0.4352 0.2602 0.4388
 year 3 0.2513 0.4338 0.2526 0.4346
 year 4 0.2556 0.4362 0.2324 0.4224
 size of union 606.6677 585.4782 788.3169 955.3626
 female share in union 57.1280 29.4580 60.1208 25.7892
 part time share in union 26.6909 19.8418 26.1546 19.1058
 choice 0.7069 0.4553 0.7552 0.4300
 federation bsrb 0.4503 0.4976 0.3954 0.4890
 federation bhm 0.4257 0.4945 0.4855 0.4999
 federation ki 0.0386 0.1927 0.0353 0.1846
 outside federations 0.0854 0.2796 0.0838 0.2771
 no strike 0.1336 0.3403 0.1408 0.3479
 size of institute 51.9267 72.6559 65.5686 89.7195
 average budget 5.3707 7.5520 13.4282 35.6798
  
 N 3,780 - 3,963 -
  
 
7. Estimating the model 
Before estimating the nonlinear structural model developed in the previous section, I 
start by estimating a linear model of employment to give me an indication of the 
results of the bargaining model and of whether to expect a difference between the two 
time periods. 
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If the labor demand model is the appropriate model, the alternative wage should be 
insignificant in determining employment and the relationship between inside wages 
and employment should be negative. The strong-form efficient bargaining model 
suggests that employment is fixed based on the alternative wage alone and, therefore, 
the inside wage should be insignificant in determining employment. Also, the 
relationship between employment and the alternative wage should be negative. The 
other forms of contracting, weakly efficient bargaining and inefficient bargaining, do 
not imply testable relationships on the employment regression. 
The results of the employment regressions are shown in Appendix 3.B. 
Looking at base wages, we see some indication of the strong-form efficient model in 
the period 1994–1997, with a negative relationship between the alternative wage and 
employment. For the period 2001–2004, the reverse is true, as the relationship 
between the inside wage and employment is negative, thus giving support to the labor 
demand model.  
Looking at total earnings for the period 1994–1997, we see that the alternative wage is 
significant, which weakens the case for the labor demand model. The evidence for 
strong-form efficient contracts is also weak, as the inside wage is significant, although 
there is a negative relationship between the alternative wage and employment in the 
regressions. In the period 2001–2004, the inside wage and employment have a positive 
relationship, and thus the likelihood of the labor demand model is slim. The case for a 
strong-form efficient contract is also weak, given the significant inside wage and the 
positive relationship between the alternative wage and employment. 
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Although the results do not show a strong support for either the labor demand model 
or the strong-form efficient bargaining, the results support the theory that the changes 
in the contracting environment led to changes in the contracting outcome.  
7.1. Estimating the nonlinear bargaining model 
The structural equations (32) and (33) in the last section are estimated using feasible 
generalized nonlinear least squares on a system of nonlinear equations (nlsur in Stata). 
The model is estimated using a different set of restrictions to match the different 
bargaining models as well as the simplifying assumptions described in the previous 
section. 
In addition to estimating the unconstrained model, the model is estimated under the 
restriction of the monopoly union or right-to-manage model, that is, one in which the 
union power over employment, q, is set equal to zero. The model is also estimated 
using the restriction of efficient bargaining, that is, with the bargaining power over 
wages set equal to the bargaining power over employment, or p=q. Finally, the 
unrestricted model is estimated after dropping the variable choice, which is a 
somewhat arbitrarily defined variable that indicates whether union members can easily 
move between jobs in the public sector and the private sector (see Appendix 3.A). 
This is done to determine whether the variable choice has a significant effect on the 
outcome of the model. 
The structural model is estimated for both wage measures, base wages adjusted for 
full-time work and total earnings. The model is also estimated for each of the two time 
periods in question. Finally, an estimate of p and q is calculated by estimating ݌̂ and ݍො 
for each observation according to equations (26) and (27) and for each restriction on 
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the model. The estimates of p and q reported here are the mean of the ݌̂s and the ݍොs in 
each case. 
7.2. Unrestricted model  
In the first specification of the structural model there are no restrictions on the 
estimation. Thus, the estimates of p and q are allowed to be different from each other. 
The results can be seen in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Unrestricted model. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
 Base wages Total earnings
 1994-1997 2001-2004 1994-1997 2001-2004
  
  
 alfa 0.6993 0.0000 1.1135 0.9990
 (0.0082) (0.0000) (0.0152) (0.0000)
 alternative wage (empl. eq.) 0.3874 -0.9506 -0.0228 -0.0009
 (0.0236) (0.0103) (0.0087) (0.0000)
 constant (γ) -237.8626 -35.9576 1.1544 0.9843
 (77.0995) - (0.0979) -
 age (γ) 19.7988 2.1779 -0.0243 0.0003
 (6.0608) (0.0463) (0.0029) (0.0000)
 age-squared (γ) -0.2136 -0.0236 0.0003 0.0000
 (0.0655) (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0000)
 year 2 (γ) 2.1727 2.6077 0.0041 0.0000
 (3.7769) - (0.0040) (0.0000)
 year 3 (γ) 2.4417 1.6489 0.0023 0.0000
 (3.9059) - (0.0041) (0.0000)
 year 4 (γ) 4.8195 1.9148 0.0030 0.0001
 (4.2744) - (0.0041) (0.0000)
 size of union (q) 0.0086 0.0004 0.0059 0.0042
 (0.0013) (0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0004)
 female share in union (q) -0.0553 -0.0063 -0.1048 0.0701
 (0.0164) (0.0018) (0.0264) (0.0134)
 age (q) -0.2742 -0.0192 -0.4565 -0.8828
 (0.0650) (0.0099) (0.1023) (0.0560)
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
  
 Base wages Total earnings
 1994-1997 2001-2004 1994-1997 2001-2004
  
  
 age squared (q) 0.0024 0.0001 0.0049 0.0129
 (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0009)
 part-time share in union (q) 0.0358 0.0032 0.1049 -0.3092
 (0.0214) (0.0022) (0.0330) (0.0402)
 choice (q) -6.3952 -0.3835 3.8754 -1.7724
 (0.9885) (0.0652) (0.8830) -
 federation bhm (q) 1.3452 -0.7334 4.2529 -1.1098
 (0.8171) (0.0734) (1.0978) -
 federation ki (q) 2.6610 2.1420 9.1787 6.9170
 (1.0758) - (1.9524) -
 outside federations (q) 4.8787 -0.5306 2.4796 7.6346
 (1.1936) (0.1214) (1.2882) -
 no strike (q) 368.0194 0.4439 -0.9493 7.2722
 - (0.0838) (0.6656) -
 size of institute (q) 0.0704 0.0062 0.2521 0.1718
 (0.0096) (0.0005) (0.0442) (0.0114)
 year 2 (q) 0.0990 -0.2030 0.2606 -0.3207
 (0.5179) (0.0645) (0.5977) -
 year 3 (q) 0.3887 -0.1144 0.4851 -0.2457
 (0.5158) (0.0652) (0.5988) -
 year 4 (q) 0.0605 -0.1248 0.1101 -1.1271
 (0.5115) (0.0679) (0.5962) -
 average budget (q) 0.0287 -0.0036 -0.0505 -0.0613
 (0.0213) (0.0006) (0.0296) (0.0265)
 size of union (p) 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0217 -0.0086
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0009)
 female share in union (p) 0.0453 -0.0008 0.2653 -0.0739
 (0.0046) (0.0005) (0.0208) (0.0193)
 age (p) -0.0469 0.0056 0.3575 -0.8274
 (0.0148) (0.0045) (0.0989) (0.0539)
 age squared (p) 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0038 0.0102
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0010)
 part-time share in union (p) 0.0111 -0.0033 -0.1647 0.1977
 (0.0058) (0.0006) (0.0349) (0.0288)
 choice (p) -1.6605 -0.2021 19.9100 4.8331
 (0.1639) (0.0263) (1.5873) -
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
  
 Base wages Total earnings
 1994-1997 2001-2004 1994-1997 2001-2004
  
  
 federation bhm (p) -3.0462 0.9631 -3.2639 19.0179
 (0.2391) (0.0777) (1.6358) -
 federation ki (p) -26.8823 0.5529 -0.6792 9.3542
 - (0.0604) (1.7987) -
 outside federations (p) -0.0220 1.5900 8.8246 14.6256
 (0.2987) (0.2008) (2.0594) -
 no strike (p) 2.9887 -0.0138 -41.0900 -6.5153
 (0.2757) (0.0247) - -
 size of institute (p) -0.0148 -0.0006 -0.1200 -0.0011
 (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0061) (0.0027)
 year 2 (p) 0.2144 0.1089 0.3110 0.4299
 (0.1424) (0.0197) (0.8525) -
 year 3 (p) 0.0460 0.1836 -0.4238 0.4792
 (0.1415) (0.0228) (0.8303) -
 year 4 (p) -0.2970 0.2166 -0.0807 0.5532
 (0.1403) (0.0266) (0.8112) -
 average budget (p) -0.0034 0.0003 0.0437 0.1567
 (0.0066) (0.0002) (0.0466) (0.0204)
 alternative wage (wage eq.) 0.9689 0.0473 1.1359 0.9985
 (0.0004) (0.0050) (0.0011) (0.0003)
  
 R-squared  
 Employment eq. 0.5809 0.6243 0.6145 0.6630
 Wage eq. 0.9998 0.9998 0.9989 0.9996
  
 Estimate of p 0.3287 0.6622 0.7098 0.5016
 (0.0215) (0.0291) (0.0267) (0.0177)
 Estimate of q 0.3774 0.2895 0.6612 0.2951
 (0.0356) (0.0284) (0.0382) (0.0171)
  
 
The overall fit is similar between the four regressions. Looking at total earnings, the 
returns to scale (α) has a value of around one. The alternative wage has a small 
189 
negative coefficient in the employment equation, while it has a coefficient close to one 
in the wage equation, except when looking at base wages in the second period.  
Looking first at the bargaining power of unions over wages (p), union size has a 
positive impact on base wages, but a negative impact on total earnings. Having a 
larger female share in the union has a positive impact in the first period, but a negative 
impact in the second period. Having an outside choice reduces the bargaining power 
over base wages, but it increases the bargaining power over total earnings. Not having 
the right to strike reduces the bargaining power over wages, except for base wages in 
the first period. The larger the institute, the lower the bargaining power over wages.  
The bargaining power of unions over employment (q) increases with the size of the 
union. The bargaining power decreases with the share of females in the union and 
increases with the share of part-time workers. The exception is total earnings in the 
second period. The explanation could be the correlation between female share and 
part-time share. Having an outside option for employment reduces the bargaining 
power over employment, except for total earnings in the first period. Not having the 
right to strike increases the bargaining power over employment with the same 
exception. Also, the size of the institute increases the bargaining power over 
employment.  
In this model p and q are allowed to vary; thus there is a difference between the 
estimated values for p and q. There is also a difference between the estimated values 
for p and q between base wages and total earnings. Except for base wages in the first 
period, the bargaining power of unions over wages is larger than their bargaining 
power over employment. For base wages in the first period, the estimated values of p 
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and q are quite similar: 0.33 and 0.38, respectively. For total earnings in the first 
period, the estimated values of p and q are 0.71 and 0.66. Thus, in the first period the 
bargaining power of unions seems to be higher for total earnings than for base wages. 
The reverse is true in the second period, when the bargaining power over wages is 
smaller for total earnings than for base wages (0.50 compared with 0.66). The 
bargaining power over employment is similar for total earnings and base wages in the 
second period (0.30 compared with 0.29).  
Based on these estimates, it is unlikely that q=0. It is, however, possible that p=q, 
especially in the first period. In those two cases, the estimates of p and q are easily 
within two standard deviations of each other. These possibilities will be explored 
further in the next two sections, when these restrictions will be imposed on the model. 
7.3. Restricting the model to be either monopoly union or right to manage 
(q=0) 
In the right-to-manage model and the monopoly union model, the union power over 
employment, q, is equal to zero. Which model applies depends on the value of p. If p 
is significantly lower than one, the right-to-manage model applies. However, if p is 
not significantly different from one, the monopoly union model applies. In this 
specification, the result of which can be seen in Table 3.3, q is forced to be equal to 
zero, which is equivalent to imposing a labor demand model on the data. 
The overall fit of the model is similar for each of the regressions, while lower than in 
the unrestricted case with the exception of total earnings in the second period. The 
returns to scale (α) has a value of around one when looking at total earnings, which is 
similar to the unrestricted case. The alternative wage has only a small effect in the 
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employment equation, while the coefficient in the wage equation is close to one, 
which is also in line with the results of the unrestricted model. 
Table 3.3. Restricted model where q=0. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
 Base wage Total earnings 
 1994-1997 2001-2004  1994-1997 2001-2004
  
 alfa 0.6944 8.4E-01 1.0136 1.0975
 (0.0071) (0.0179) (0.0139) (0.0089)
 alternative wage (empl. eq.) 0.5550 0.0810 -0.0072 0.0758
 (0.0046) (0.0100) (0.0073) (0.0082)
 constant (γ) -2673.3640 -0.6912 0.9860 3.5593
 - (0.7099) (0.0192) (0.4245)
 age (γ) 200.0133 0.2314 -0.0042 -0.0699
 (3.7749) (0.0659) (0.0038) (0.0121)
 age-squared (γ) -2.1705 -0.0025 0.0000 0.0008
 (0.0450) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0001)
 year 2 (γ) 36.0524 0.0477 0.0003 0.0064
 (29.2727) (0.0375) (0.0007) (0.0097)
 year 3 (γ) 67.5771 0.0618 -0.0005 0.0044
 (30.1601) (0.0397) (0.0008) (0.0097)
 year 4 (γ) 112.7157 0.1055 -0.0007 -0.0152
 (30.4947) (0.0478) (0.0009) (0.0101)
 size of union (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 female share in union (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 age (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 age squared (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 part-time share in union (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 choice (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 federation bhm (q) - - - -
 - - - -
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
  
 Base wage Total earnings 
 1994-1997 2001-2004  1994-1997 2001-2004
  
 federation ki (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 outside federations (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 no strike (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 size of institute (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 year 2 (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 year 3 (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 year 4 (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 average budget (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 size of union (p) -0.0001 -0.0112 -0.0214 -0.0923
 (0.0001) (0.0038) (0.0007) (0.0038)
 female share in union (p) 0.0447 -0.1055 0.1692 -0.7974
 (0.0044) (0.0470) (0.0236) (0.0741)
 age (p) 0.0033 0.6384 1.0850 -2.3103
 (0.0141) (0.2302) (0.0485) (0.1577)
 age squared (p) -0.0004 -0.0075 -0.0119 0.0389
 (0.0002) (0.0028) (0.0008) (0.0023)
 part-time share in union (p) 0.0081 1.5479 0.1991 2.2719
 (0.0058) (0.5308) (0.0429) (0.1071)
 choice (p) -1.4055 -9.1306 2.4800 26.9748
 (0.1452) (3.6872) (0.6762) (1.6167)
 federation bhm (p) -3.3678 34.2306 -19.1435 68.8825
 (0.2623) (11.8395) (0.7917) -
 federation ki (p) -10.5869 -18.5786 -27.1805 5.3691
 - (6.4647) - -
 outside federations (p) -0.8771 167.3566 -18.9460 30.5541
 (0.2826) - (0.9187) (2.4398)
 no strike (p) 1.9923 -8.3576 -8.9622 -34.0236
 (0.2174) (3.2409) (0.6239) (2.1639)
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
  
 Base wage Total earnings 
 1994-1997 2001-2004  1994-1997 2001-2004
  
 size of institute (p) -0.0211 -0.2738 -0.1897 -0.2200
 (0.0019) (0.0931) (0.0092) (0.0099)
 year 2 (p) 0.2393 1.3538 0.1862 -0.5775
 (0.1420) (1.1931) (0.6993) (1.7042)
 year 3 (p) 0.1022 0.8644 0.2477 0.2231
 (0.1421) (1.1469) (0.7070) (1.6310)
 year 4 (p) -0.2352 1.9333 0.7077 0.8686
 (0.1413) (1.3962) (0.7166) (1.6630)
 average budget (p) -0.0116 0.0023 0.0295 1.1227
 (0.0069) (0.0378) (0.0443) (0.0564)
 alternative wage (wage eq.) 0.9684 0.9910 1.1297 1.0026
 (0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0005)
  
 R-squared  
 Employment eq. 0.4893 0.5002 0.5629 0.6004
 Wage eq. 0.9998 0.9982 0.9989 0.9996
  
 Estimate of p 0.3360 0.8217 0.6882 0.5356
 (0.0210) (0.0196) (0.0297) (0.0126)
 Estimate of q - - - -
 - - - -
 
The effect of the female share in unions on the bargaining power of unions over 
wages, given that the bargaining power over employment is zero, is larger for total 
earnings than for base wages, and it changes sign between the two periods. It is 
positive in the first period, and negative in the second. Similarly, the effect of a higher 
share of part-time workers in a union on union bargaining power is larger in the 
second period than in the first, and also larger for total earnings than for base wages. 
The effect of having an outside choice for employment is negative on base wages, but 
positive for total earnings, and not being allowed to strike has a negative impact on the 
bargaining power of unions over wages, except for base wages in the first period. The 
194 
effect of the size of the union on the bargaining power of wages turns out to be 
negative when restricting q to be zero. On the other hand, the larger the institute, the 
smaller the union power over wages. The average budget does not affect union power 
over wages, except in the second period when determining total earnings.  
With q being set equal to zero, p is estimated to be 0.34 for base wages in the first 
period and much higher in the second period, or 0.82. Looking at total earnings, we 
see that the difference is much smaller, as the bargaining power of unions over wages 
(p) is estimated to be 0.69 in the first period but falls to 0.54 in the second. 
7.4. Restricting the model to efficient bargaining (p=q) 
In this specification, the bargaining power of unions over wages is set to be equal to 
the bargaining power of unions over employment. This imposes the efficient 
bargaining model on the data. The results of this specification can be seen in Table 
3.4. 
As when using no restrictions on p and q, the overall fit of the model is similar 
between the different regressions. The R-squared values are lower than in the 
unrestricted case, and even lower than in the case of q=0. 
As in the other two specifications on the model, the alternative wage has little effect 
on base wages in the wage equation, while the coefficient is closer to one in the total 
earnings regressions. The size of the union has a very small negative effect on union 
bargaining power. The share of females in the union changes sign between the two 
periods, from positive to negative, as in the case of q=0. Here, however, the 
coefficients are much smaller. Working part-time has a negative effect on union 
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bargaining power, except for total earnings in the second period. Having an outside 
employment option has a negative effect on the union bargaining power. Not having 
the right to strike increases the bargaining power of unions under the restriction of 
p=q, except in the second period when it comes to base wages. Here the size of the 
institute has a very little negative effect on union bargaining power.  
Table 3.4. Restricted model where p=q. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
 Base wage Total earnings 
 1994-1997 2001-2004  1994-1997 2001-2004
      
  
 alfa 0.0007 6.46E-06 0.0127 1.8650
 (0.0001) (0.0000) 0.0037 (0.0744)
 alternative wage (empl. eq.) -0.0691 -0.5153 0.1145 0.4791
 (0.0102) (0.0057) 0.0276 (0.0052)
 constant (γ) -4033.5100 -2182.9370 -1686.0210 918.2096
 - - - -
 age (γ) 267.7689 139.3654 112.9845 -37.4103
 (2.4371) . 2.2870 (0.4598)
 age-squared (γ) -2.9571 -1.5254 -1.2491 0.4061
 (0.0392) (0.0106) 0.0300 (0.0068)
 year 2 (γ) -52.8368 37.3454 -25.3648 0.8034
 - - 34.2507 (3.3893)
 year 3 (γ) -54.9053 -22.6138 -20.1047 0.1889
 - - 35.8497 (3.3940)
 year 4 (γ) 43.9986 4.6733 17.7751 -2.4634
 - - 32.2908 (3.3873)
 size of union (q) -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0024
 (0.0001) (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0006)
 female share in union (q) 0.0185 -0.0002 0.0047 -0.0352
 (0.0019) (0.0006) 0.0025 (0.0105)
 age (q) 0.0677 0.0242 0.0612 0.3754
 (0.0080) (0.0026) 0.0091 (0.0806)
 age squared (q) -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0045
 (0.0001) (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0009)
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
  
 Base wage Total earnings 
 1994-1997 2001-2004  1994-1997 2001-2004
      
   
 part-time share in union (q) -0.0138 -0.0061 -0.0241 0.3761
 (0.0035) (0.0008) 0.0036 (0.0805)
 choice (q) -0.7779 -0.2555 -0.1384 -6.9432
 (0.1231) (0.0324) 0.0813 (1.9380)
 federation bhm (q) 0.9199 1.2667 -0.0926 0.4361
 (0.1279) (0.0447) 0.0885 (0.5300)
 federation ki (q) -0.2275 0.9031 -0.5043 55.9294
 (0.1541) (0.0860) 0.1490 -
 outside federations (q) 3.8742 74.8451 0.3412 12.4401
 (1.6085) - 0.2288 -
 no strike (q) 124.2113 -0.0292 47.2439 5.6299
 - (0.0332) - (2.1639)
 size of institute (q) -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0017
 (0.0002) (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0011)
 year 2 (q) 0.2627 0.1415 0.1358 -0.4124
 (0.0503) (0.0237) 0.0769 (0.2722)
 year 3 (q) 0.3230 0.2342 -0.0349 -0.2241
 (0.0528) (0.0250) 0.0754 (0.2951)
 year 4 (q) 0.4967 0.2869 -0.0533 1.0675
 (0.0595) (0.0297) 0.0764 (0.4578)
 average budget (q) 0.0207 0.0001 0.2702 -0.0121
 (0.0052) (0.0002) 0.0318 (0.0036)
 size of union (p) -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0024
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0006)
 female share in union (p) 0.0185 -0.0002 0.0047 -0.0352
 (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0025) (0.0105)
 age (p) 0.0677 0.0242 0.0612 0.3754
 (0.0080) (0.0026) (0.0091) (0.0806)
 age squared (p) -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0045
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0009)
 part-time share in union (p) -0.0138 -0.0061 -0.0241 0.3761
 (0.0035) (0.0008) (0.0036) (0.0805)
 choice (p) -0.7779 -0.2555 -0.1384 -6.9432
 (0.1231) (0.0324) (0.0813) (1.9380)
 federation bhm (p) 0.9199 1.2667 -0.0926 0.4361
 (0.1279) (0.0447) (0.0885) (0.5300)
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
  
 Base wage Total earnings 
 1994-1997 2001-2004  1994-1997 2001-2004
      
  
 federation ki (p) -0.2275 0.9031 -0.5043 55.9294
 (0.1541) (0.0860) (0.1490) -
 outside federations (p) 3.8742 74.8451 0.3412 12.4401
 (1.6085) - (0.2288) -
 no strike (p) 124.2113 -0.0292 47.2439 5.6299
 - (0.0332) - (2.1639)
 size of institute (p) -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0017
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0011)
 year 2 (p) 0.2627 0.1415 0.1358 -0.4124
 (0.0503) (0.0237) (0.0769) (0.2722)
 year 3 (p) 0.3230 0.2342 -0.0349 -0.2241
 (0.0528) (0.0250) (0.0754) (0.2951)
 year 4 (p) 0.4967 0.2869 -0.0533 1.0675
 (0.0595) (0.0297) (0.0764) (0.4578)
 average budget (p) 0.0207 0.0001 0.2702 -0.0121
 (0.0052) (0.0002) (0.0318) (0.0036)
 alternative wage (wage eq.) 0.3829 0.0511 0.7394 1.0463
 (0.0099) (0.0049) 0.0274 (0.0032)
  
 R-squared  
 Employment eq. 0.4380 0.4906 0.4401 0.4914
 Wage eq. 0.9999 0.9998 0.9991 0.9996
  
 Estimate of p 0.9252 0.7700 0.8170 0.9647
 (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0164) (0.0106)
 Estimate of q 0.9252 0.7700 0.8170 0.9647
 (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0164) (0.0106)
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Table 3.5. Unrestricted model without choice. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
 Base wage Total earnings 
 1994-1997 2001-2004 1994-1997 2001-2004
  
  
 alfa 0.6374 0.0000 0.0161 1.0950
 (0.0124) (0.0000) (73.4800) (0.0091)
 alternative wage (empl. eq.) 0.6111 -0.9517 -0.0272 0.0848
 (0.0053) (0.0095) (0.0133) (0.0090)
 constant (γ) -4992.9680 -34.1874 1.2354 3.8287
 - - (0.1678) (0.4981)
 age (γ) 366.9780 2.0658 -0.0340 -0.0720
 (7.2394) (0.0388) (0.0048) (0.0138)
 age-squared (γ) -3.9499 -0.0224 0.0004 0.0008
 (0.0874) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0002)
 year 2 (γ) 63.0732 2.4365 0.0024 -0.0008
 (67.2301) - (0.0051) (0.0112)
 year 3 (γ) 67.1558 1.5524 -0.0032 0.0012
 (69.2416) - (0.0051) (0.0113)
 year 4 (γ) 109.4459 1.3611 -0.0013 -0.0087
 (68.7772) - (0.0051) (0.0117)
 size of union (q) 0.0088 0.0004 0.0070 0.0043
 (0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.0010)
 female share in union (q) -0.1568 -0.0095 -0.3903 0.0691
 (0.0243) (0.0018) (0.0966) (0.0223)
 age (q) -0.5564 -0.0285 0.6289 -0.8777
 (0.0823) (0.0092) (0.1713) (0.1986)
 age squared (q) 0.0052 0.0002 -0.0065 0.0125
 (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0028)
 part-time share in union (q) 0.1138 0.0091 0.1692 -0.3560
 (0.0252) (0.0021) (0.0576) (0.0863)
 choice (q) - - - -
 - - - -
 federation bhm (q) 11.4184 -0.6342 -7.8818 -0.4006
 (1.5948) (0.0737) (2.1596) (0.9110)
 federation ki (q) 12.5988 2.9720 -5.0061 8.5621
 (1.7990) - (2.0453) (2.1253)
 outside federations (q) 10.9867 -0.5108 -17.6111 7.9394
 (1.6801) (0.1251) (4.4635) (2.0457)
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
  
 Base wage Total earnings 
 1994-1997 2001-2004 1994-1997 2001-2004
  
  
 no strike (q) 5.6020 0.5351 -343.5867 7.5839
 (0.8954) (0.0866) - (1.9106)
 size of institute (q) 0.1180 0.0067 0.2578 0.1783
 (0.0158) (0.0006) (0.0590) (0.0398)
 year 2 (q) -0.2957 -0.1984 0.0099 -0.3442
 (0.4862) (0.0664) (0.7971) (0.7390)
 year 3 (q) 0.3319 -0.1142 0.2000 -0.3344
 (0.4863) (0.0673) (0.7934) (0.7704)
 year 4 (q) 0.6142 -0.0749 -0.0777 -0.7305
 (0.4986) (0.0701) (0.8172) (0.8095)
 average budget (q) -0.1015 -0.0040 -0.5886 -0.0625
 (0.0312) (0.0006) (0.1465) (0.0332)
 size of union (p) 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0258 -0.0067
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0017)
 female share in union (p) 0.0959 -0.0026 0.4084 0.4484
 (0.0108) (0.0005) (0.0206) (0.1181)
 age (p) -0.3355 0.0052 1.6491 -4.5014
 (0.0362) (0.0022) (0.0627) (0.8873)
 age squared (p) 0.0032 0.0000 -0.0195 0.0531
 (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0104)
 part-time share in union (p) -0.0039 -0.0016 -0.4452 -0.4069
 (0.0058) (0.0006) (0.0329) (0.1239)
 choice (p) - - - -
 - - - -
 federation bhm (p) -1.5939 1.1116 -21.6445 84.5578
 (0.1733) (0.0312) (0.6707) (17.3169)
 federation ki (p) -18.1267 0.7802 -14.9374 72.1293
 - (0.0510) (2.6463) (15.4669)
 outside federations (p) 2.7045 1.9283 -17.2368 115.6613
 (0.8389) - (1.3812) -
 no strike (p) -17.2467 0.0641 -50.8438 -14.0294
 - (0.0260) - (3.4385)
 size of institute (p) -0.0154 -0.0006 -0.1275 -0.0066
 (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0066) (0.0040)
 year 2 (p) 0.0387 0.1180 0.5088 -0.4139
 (0.1318) (0.0198) (0.8457) (0.9587)
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
  
 Base wage Total earnings 
 1994-1997 2001-2004 1994-1997 2001-2004
  
  
 year 3 (p) -0.2095 0.1998 1.1398 -0.7078
 (0.1351) (0.0208) (0.8345) (1.0530)
 year 4 (p) -0.5504 0.2277 1.3693 -0.5993
 (0.1402) (0.0240) (0.8354) (1.0291)
 average budget (p) -0.0226 0.0001 0.0012 0.3868
 (0.0096) (0.0002) (0.0317) (0.0833)
 alternative wage (wage eq.) 0.9740 0.0439 1.1402 1.0024
 (0.0003) (0.0050) (0.0011) (0.0005)
  
 R-squared  
 Employment eq. 0.5882 0.6218 0.5912 0.6615
 Wage eq. 0.9998 0.9998 0.9989 0.9996
  
 Estimate of p 0.1209 0.6967 0.7159 0.5198
 (0.0136) (0.0089) (0.0262) (0.0176)
 Estimate of q 0.3541 0.3158 0.5185 0.3121
 (0.0329) (0.0279) (0.0286) (0.0281)
  
 
When union bargaining power over employment and wages is restricted to be 
identical, bargaining power is lower for total earnings than base wages in the first 
period, while in the second period bargaining power is lower for base wages than for 
total earnings. Union bargaining power is estimated between 0.77 and 0.96 under the 
restriction of p=q. 
7.5. Unrestricted model without the variable choice 
The fourth specification is identical to the unrestricted model, except one of the 
variables has been dropped. The variable choice, which is a dummy variable 
indicating the ease with which a union member can move from the public sector to the 
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private sector, is a somewhat arbitrarily defined variable; thus, the model was also 
estimated after dropping this variable to see whether it had a significant effect on the 
outcome of the model. The results are shown in Table 3.5. 
After the variable choice is dropped, the results do not change much from the original 
unrestricted model. The largest difference occurs where the variable no strike changes 
sign in the bargaining power over wages from the unrestricted model in the first 
period. The overall fit is similar to the original unrestricted model, and the estimated 
values for p and q are similar, except for the value of p for base wages in the first 
period. The estimated value is 0.12 compared with 0.33 in the original model. 
7.6. Structural model estimates 
None of the restrictions placed on the model seem to affect the model’s explanatory 
power to any great extent. The estimate of the returns to scale in public services (α) is 
close to one when looking at total earnings. When looking at base wages, we see that 
the estimated value in the first period is between 0.6 and 0.7, while it is practically 
zero in the second period. These estimates hold for the different specifications of the 
model, except when p and q are restricted to be equal. In that case the estimated value 
of α is close to zero, except for total earnings in the second period, where the value is 
1.87. 
The estimated values for p and q can be seen in Table 3.6. In the first period, under the 
old regime, union bargaining power over wages and employment seems to be higher 
for total earnings than for base wages, with the exception of the restriction p=q. This 
is reversed in the second period, when the bargaining power over wages and 
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employment is higher for base wages than for total earnings, with the same exception 
as in the first period.  
Table 3.6. Estimated values for p and q. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
    
 1994-1997  no restrictions q=0 p=q w/o choice
       
    
 Base wages p 0.3287 0.3360 0.9252 0.1209
   (0.0215) (0.0210) (0.0066) (0.0136)
  q 0.3774 - 0.9252 0.3541
   (0.0356) - (0.0066) (0.0329)
 Total earnings p 0.7098 0.6882 0.8170 0.7159
   (0.0267) (0.0297) (0.0164) (0.0262)
  q 0.6612 - 0.8170 0.5185
   (0.0382) - (0.0164) (0.0286)
    
    
 2001-2004  no restrictions q=0 p=q w/o choice
       
    
 Base wages p 0.6622 0.8217 0.7700 0.6967
   (0.0291) (0.0196) (0.0081) (0.0089)
  q 0.2895 - 0.7700 0.3158
   (0.0284) - (0.0081) (0.0279)
 Total earnings p 0.5016 0.5356 0.9647 0.5198
   (0.0177) (0.0126) (0.0106) (0.0176)
  q 0.2951 - 0.9647 0.3121
   (0.0171) - (0.0106) (0.0281)
    
 
Hosken and Margolis (1997) found that in the most unrestricted case when looking at 
teachers’ wages, the bargaining power over wages (p) was 0.53, and the bargaining 
power over employment (q) was 0.71, which is contrary to my results, in which I 
obtain similar values for p and q in the first period and a higher value for p than for q 
in the second period. 
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The results for the estimated values of p and q suggest that in the first period, 1994–
1997, it is possible that the bargaining power of unions over wages, p, and the 
bargaining power of unions over employment, q, are equal. If I look at two standard 
deviations from the estimate for p and q, these ranges coincide. Thus there is a 
possibility of efficient bargaining in that period. On the other hand, looking at two 
standard deviations from the estimate in the period 2001–2004, I find that that ranges 
do not coincide, and therefore it is unlikely that there is efficient bargaining in the 
second period. 
The estimated values for q in all cases in the unrestricted case is more than ten 
standard deviations from zero; thus it is unlikely that q equals zero, thus reducing the 
likelihood of the monopoly union or right-to-manage bargaining models. Thus it 
appears that the collective bargaining model in the public sector in Iceland moved 
from being close to efficient to inefficient bargaining. Before drawing that conclusion, 
I will run some tests. 
7.7. Testing the results 
Some statistical tests are in order to test the results of the regressions and to help 
determine which of the bargaining models applies to collective bargaining in the 
public sector in Iceland.  
The first test is to jointly determine whether the individual coefficients in the 
estimation of p and q are equal, that is, whether ߚଵ ൌ ߚଶ in equations (26) and (27). A 
chi-square test is applied to the four regressions in the unrestricted model, and the 
results are shown in Table 3.7. In each case the null hypothesis of ߚଵ ൌ ߚଶ can be 
rejected. 
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Table 3.7. Chi-square test on β 1 ൌ β 2 
P-values in parentheses. 
   
 1994-1997 2001-2004  
   
   
 Base wages 2362094.13 2900.15  
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  
 Total earnings 9717.21 1976.31  
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  
   
 
This test places strong restrictions on p and q, and p could equal q without ߚଵ ൌ ߚଶ. 
Still, this test suggests that ݌ ് ݍ, and the collective bargaining model therefore is not 
efficient bargaining in any of the cases. 
The estimates of p and q presented in Table 3.6 are based on the average over all 
bargaining pairs. The next step is to determine for which bargaining pairs I can reject 
the null hypothesis of a monopoly union or right-to-manage bargaining model, that is, 
whether q=0, and for which bargaining pairs I can reject the null hypothesis of 
efficient contracting, or whether p=q.  
First I calculate the fitted values for q and the standard deviation in the unrestricted 
model. I then calculate t-values for each observation. The results are shown in Table 
3.8. Looking at base wages, I cannot rule out the possibility of q=0 in the first period, 
while in the second period, the lowest t-value was over 3, and therefore I can conclude 
with 99% certainty that when bargaining over base wages in 2001–2004, the 
bargaining power of unions over employment is significantly different from zero. The 
tables are turned when it comes to total earnings, as 75% of the bargaining units in the 
first period have an estimated value for q that is significantly different from zero, 
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while in the second period only 40% of the bargaining units showed a t-value above 
1.96. 
Table 3.8. T-tests on estimated q for each bargaining unit for q=0. 
          
 t-value |t|<1.645 1.645<|t|<1.96 1.96<|t| 
          
     
1994-1997 Base wages 50 7 42 
 Total earnings 30 3 75 
2001-2004 Base wages 0 0 100 
 Total earnings 52 8 40 
          
 
Thus, only in the case of bargaining over base wages in the second period can I reject 
the labor demand model. It seems to have some merit when bargaining over base 
wages in the first period and total earnings in the second period. Hosken and Margolis 
(1997) are able to reject the null hypothesis of q=0 with 99% certainty in all cases. 
Looking at the relationship between p and q in the unrestricted case, we see that the 
correlation between the two estimates changes signs between the two periods. During 
the period 1994–1997 the correlation between p and q when bargaining over base 
wages is 0.1554, and for total earnings is 0.0404. In the period 2001–2004 the 
correlation is negative: -0.3776 for base wages and -0.1539 for total earnings. 
To test for the restriction of p=q I use bootstrap techniques as the t-distribution is not 
necessarily appropriate to test whether p-q=0. The results can be seen in Table 3.9. 
The estimates were made for p-q using 1000 replications clustering over bargaining 
unit. Three confidence intervals are reported; N signifies normal confidence interval, P 
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a percentile confidence interval, and BS a bias-corrected confidence interval. The 
estimate for p-q is similar for base wages in both periods, -0.15 in 1994–1997 and -
0.16 in 2004–2007. The estimated standard error on both cases is quite large and thus 
it cannot be ruled out that p=q. The estimated coefficient for p-q, although similar for 
base wages between the two periods, changes for total earnings between the two 
periods. While an estimated -0.29 in the first period, it is 0.75 in the second period; 
thus it is much less likely that p=q in the second period than in the first when it comes 
to total earnings. This further supports the earlier findings that the collective 
bargaining seems to be less efficient in the second period than in the first period. 
Table 3.9. Bootstrap analysis of p-q. 
  
Coef.est. Bias Std. err. 90% confidence interval  
  
  
1994-1997   
  
Base wages -0.1504 0.0036 0.4789 -0.9381 0.6374 N
   -0.9696 0.6220 P
   -1.0000 0.3322 BC
Total earnings -0.2977 0.1899 0.5655 -1.2279 0.6324 N
   -1.0000 0.9608 P
   -1.0000 0.0239 BC
2001-2004      
     
Base wages -0.1619 0.4760 0.2841 -0.6293 0.3055 N
   -0.1753 0.6517 P
   -0.5146 -0.1542 BC
Total earnings 0.7538 -0.6823 0.7106 -0.4150 1.9225 N
   -1.0000 0.9999 P
   -0.0402 1.0000 BC
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8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I developed a model of sequential bargaining over wages and 
employment in the public sector. Solving the model led to a set of structural equations 
for wages and employment. To be able to estimate the model, I first defined functional 
forms for the union objective function and the employer objective function. In 
addition, some simplifying assumptions were made. 
Based on those structural equations, the model was estimated using data from the 
central government of Iceland on base wages adjusted for full-time work as well as 
total earnings. The model was estimated using various restrictions implied by the 
different bargaining models. The unions seem to have greater bargaining power over 
employment than over wages, while bargaining power over wages seems to be much 
larger for base wages than for total earnings. 
Based on the mean of the estimates of p and q, the bargaining power of unions over 
wages and employment, respectively, under various restrictions, we can reject the 
monopoly union and right-to-manage bargaining models. When looking at individual 
bargaining units, these models cannot be completely rejected. Although the mean 
estimates of p and q in the first period indicate that there could be efficient bargaining, 
the tests suggest that this is probably not the case. 
Although the results are not clear-cut in terms of the bargaining models applied, I can 
safely conclude that the decentralization of bargaining and the change in the collective 
bargaining agreements has changed the bargaining structure in the public sector in 
Iceland. 
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Going forward, it would be interesting to analyze whether there is a pattern in the 
bargaining units in each of the cells in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9. Also, one of the 
federations, BHM, changed its wage system again in 2004–2005; thus it would be 
interesting to analyze whether the bargaining structure has changed again in the most 
recent period.  
  
209 
APPENDIX 3.A: THE VARIABLE CHOICE 
The variable choice is a dummy variable that indicates whether comparative 
alternative employment options are readily available for the public sector employees 
in the private sector. The value for the variable is assigned by union, where the value 
1signifies that outside opportunities are available while the value 0 means that outside 
options are not readily available. The table below shows the values assigned to each 
union. 
BHM Association of Academics  
u5129 Icelandic Veterinary Association     1 
u5171 Union of Library and Information Scientists    1 
u5184 The Society of Broadcast Journalists     1 
u5192 The Union of University Teachers     1 
u5193 The Union of University Teachers in Akureyri     1 
u5196 The Association of University Graduates Ministry Employees  1 
u5225 The Society for Icelandic Studies     0 
u5232 The Icelandic Nurses’ Association     0 
u5243 The Union of Natural Scientists     0 
u5252 The Union of Physiotherapists     1 
u5307 The Union of Engineering College Teachers    1 
u5313 Icelandic Social Science Association     0 
u5366 Icelandic Occupational Therapy Association    0 
u5397 The Teachers’ Association of the Iceland University of Education 0 
u5406 Union of Economists      1 
u5414 The Icelandic Midwives’ Association     0 
u5440 Union of Nutrition Scientists      1 
u5445 Biomedical Scientists’ Union     0 
u5469 The Icelandic Society of Radiographers    0 
u5477 Union of Psychologists in Iceland     1 
u5580 The Icelandic Association of Social Workers    1 
u5582 The Lawyers Union       1 
u5641 The Union of University Graduates     1 
u5740 Association of Social Educators     0 
 
 
210 
BSRB Federation of State and Municipal Employees  
u5177 Union of Public Employees in Aviation    1 
u5303 The Union of Government Ministries’ employees   1 
u5405 The Policemen’s Union      0 
u5479 The Icelandic Union of Practical Nurses    0 
u5535 Reykjavik Municipal Employees’ Association    1 
u5546 State Radio and Television Employees’ Association   1 
u5573 Union of Public Servants, technicians     1 
u5574 Union of Public Servants, office workers    1 
u5575 Union of Public Servants, health sector workers   1 
u5627 Icelandic Customs Officers Union     0 
u8001 Various local unions with a common contract 1994-1997  1 
u8002 Various local unions with a common contract I 2001-2004  1 
u8001 Various local unions with a common contract II 2001-2004  1 
 
KI The Icelandic Teachers’ Union  
u5321 The Association of Teachers in Preschools     1 
u5341 The Association of Teachers in Upper Secondary Schools  0 
u5343 The Association of Teachers in Upper Secondary Schools  0 
u5400 The Association of Teachers in Upper Secondary Schools  0 
 
UTAN Outside federations 
u5195 Union of Employees of Althingi      1 
u5222 Icelandic Air Traffic Controllers’ Association    0 
u5404 The Icelandic Society of Engineers     1 
u5412 Icelandic Actors’ Association     1 
u5418 The Icelandic Medical Association      0 
u5536 Union of Employees of the National Audit Office   1 
u5576 Union of Members of the Symphonic Orchestra   0 
u5732 Society of Chartered Engineers      1 
u7581 Pharmaceutical Society of Iceland     1 
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APPENDIX 3.B: ESTIMATING THE LINEAR EMPLOYMENT MODEL 
Before estimating the structural model, I estimated a linear model of employment as 
discussed in section 7 above. This gives me an indication of the results of the 
bargaining model and whether to expect a difference between the two time periods. 
The employment equations are estimated using both inside and alternative wages, 
where the wages are either total earnings or base wages. The equations are estimated 
using both OLS and IV estimation where the lagged inside wage is used as an 
instrument. 
If the labor demand model is the appropriate model, the alternative wage should be 
insignificant in determining employment, as all the relevant information is already 
reflected in the inside wage. Also, the labor demand model implies that the 
relationship between inside wages and employment should be negative. The strong-
form efficient bargaining model suggests that employment is fixed based on the 
alternative wage alone and that, therefore, the inside wage should be insignificant in 
determining employment. Strong-form efficient bargaining also implies that the 
relationship between employment and the alternative wage should be negative. The 
other forms of contracting, weakly efficient bargaining and inefficient bargaining, do 
not imply testable relationships on the employment regression. 
Appendix Table 3.B.1 shows the results of the linear employment regressions using 
base wages for full-time work for both the alternative wage and the inside wage. Both 
the OLS and IV regressions are shown, as well as regressions for both time periods. 
Looking at base wages, we see that both the alternative wage and the inside wage are 
significant. This holds for both periods and for the OLS regression as well as the IV 
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regression. There is some indication of the strong-form efficient model in the period 
1994–1997, as both regressions show a negative relationship between the alternative 
wage and employment. For the period 2001–2004, the reverse is true, as the 
relationship between the inside wage and employment is negative, thus giving support 
to the labor demand model.  
Appendix Table 3.B.1. Employment regressions—Base wages. 
                
 Dependent variable: 1994-1997 2001-2004  
 log(share)  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  
               
           
 constant  -0.5364  -4.5554  -0.3118   -0.3409  
 log base wages 0.1717  0.6642 * -1.1683 * -1.1475 *
 log alternative wage -0.6461 * -0.7967 * 0.7301 * 0.7133 *
 age  0.3418 * 0.3441 * 0.3263 * 0.3304 *
 age squared -0.0038 * -0.0038 * -0.0036 * -0.0036 *
 year 2  0.0039  -0.0187  0.0587   -0.0273  
 year 3  0.0301  0.0021  0.0875   -0.0069  
 year 4  0.0594  0.0788  0.0853   (dropped)  
 size of union 0.0005 * 0.0005 * 0.0002 * 0.0002 *
 female share in union -0.0081 * -0.0098 * -0.0050 * -0.0053 *
 
part-time share in 
union -0.0060 * -0.0041  -0.0019   -0.0013  
 choice  -0.2045 * -0.1250  -0.2582 * -0.2589 *
 
federation 
bhm  0.0592  0.0720  -0.3658 * -0.3496 *
 
federation 
ki  0.3028 * 0.3523 * 1.0296 * 1.0589 *
 outside federations -0.2878 * -0.3370  -0.2682 * -0.2724  
 no strike  0.3991 * 0.3767 * 0.2790 * 0.2765 *
 size of institute 0.0054 * 0.0058 * 0.0029 * 0.0031 *
 average budget -0.0067 * -0.0077 * -0.0030 * -0.0028 *
           
 R-squared  0.2981  0.3103  0.3758  0.3735  
 N  3,780  2,647  3,963  2,776  
                
 *  significant at 5% level.         
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Appendix Table 3.B.2 shows the same regressions as Appendix Table 3.B.1, this time 
using total earnings instead of base wages for both the inside wage and the alternative 
wage. 
Looking at total earnings for the period 1994–1997, we see that both the OLS and the 
IV regressions show a similar result. Both the inside and the alternative wages are 
significant. This weakens the case for the labor demand model, as in that case, the 
alternative wage should be insignificant. Furthermore, the relationship between the 
inside wage and employment here is positive. The evidence for strong-form efficient 
contracts is also weak in the period 1994–1997, as the inside wage is significant, 
although there is a negative relationship between alternative wages and employment in 
the regressions.  
In the period 2001–2004, the inside wage and the alternative wage are significant in 
both regressions, with a positive sign. Given that the inside wage and employment 
have a positive relationship, the likelihood of the labor demand model is slim. The 
case for a strong-form efficient contract is also weak, given the significant inside wage 
and the positive relationship between the alternative wage and employment. 
There is however, a difference between the two periods, as the relationship between 
alternative wages and employment in the first period is negative, while it is positive in 
the second period, and the coefficient on the inside wage is lower in the second period. 
In both periods the inside wage has a positive sign. The alternative wage, on the other 
hand, is negative in 1994–1997 and positive in 2001–2004. 
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Although the results do not show a strong support for either the labor demand model 
or the strong-form efficient bargaining, the results support the theory that the changes 
in the contracting environment led to changes in the contracting outcome.  
Appendix Table 3.B.2. Employment regressions—Total earnings. 
    
 Dependent variable: 1994-1997 2001-2004 
 log(share) OLS IV OLS  IV 
       
       
 constant -8.7582 * -9.9077 * -18.8131 * -18.4671 *
 log total earnings 0.8545 * 1.0612 * 0.4777 * 0.7270 *
 log alternative wage -0.6381 * -0.7882 * 0.6525 * 0.3492 *
 age 0.2879 * 0.2935 * 0.2909 * 0.3020 *
 age squared -0.0032 * -0.0032 * -0.0033 * -0.0034 *
 year 2 -0.0436  -0.0300  -0.0072   0.0250  
 year 3 -0.0255  -0.0318  -0.0210   0.0087  
 year 4 -0.0570  -0.0073  -0.0336   (dropped)
 size of union 0.0005 * 0.0005 * 0.0002 * 0.0002 *
 female share in union -0.0059 * -0.0064 * -0.0015   -0.0013  
 part-time share in 
union 
0.0008  0.0031  -0.0033 * -0.0033  
 choice -0.1497 * -0.0934  -0.1463 * -0.1278  
 federation 
bhm 
-0.0805  0.0001  -0.8958 * -0.8077 *
 federation ki 0.2787 * 0.3754 * 0.6820 * 0.7855 *
 outside federations -0.3782 * -0.3083 * -0.9006 * -0.8426 *
 no strike 0.3758 * 0.3768 * 0.2513 * 0.2453 *
 size of institute 0.0051 * 0.0054 * 0.0032 * 0.0033 *
 average budget -0.0091 * -0.0104 * -0.0032 * -0.0032 *
    
 R-squared 0.3502 0.3545 0.3468  0.3382
 N 3,780 2,647 3,963  2,776
    
 *  significant at 5% level.   
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